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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis reviews and critically analyses the Australian law and procedure 
relating to the offence of contempt in the face of the court and, in particular, 
its impact on people with mental health issues. The fundamental argument 
advanced in this thesis is that the law and procedure of contempt in the face 
of the court should be reformed in order to take into account the mental 
health of people accused of contempt. The thesis proposes reforms to the 
legal principles and procedures governing contempt in the face of the court 
that are designed to achieve that objective. The thesis also examines judicial 
administration, particularly the dynamic between judge and alleged 
contemnor. It recommends continuing improvement in mental health 
literacy among members of the judiciary, along with new policies and 
programs to build and reinforce referral pathways from the courts to mental 
health services for contemnors. It also examines the issue of judicial stress 
and, in some instances, mental ill-health among members of the judiciary, to 
highlight that the power to commit for contempt can be abused by judicial 
officers experiencing work-related stress and/or mental ill-health. It is then 
demonstrated that the reforms proposed in the thesis are not only consistent 
with Australia’s human rights obligations, but also will help to ensure the 
due administration of justice. 
 
 
 
 
 
The law in this thesis is stated as at 10 April 2016.
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Introduction 
 
This thesis critically analyses the Australian law and procedure governing 
contempt in the face of the court, and in particular its impact on people with 
mental health issues. (In this thesis, the expressions ‘mental health issues’ 
and ‘mental ill-health’ are used to capture any mental abnormalities, 
disorders, syndromes or illnesses that might contribute to a person behaving 
contemptuously in court. The expression has been adopted because it is 
employed in the Council of Australian Governments Roadmap for National 
Mental Health Reform 2012–2022).  The fundamental arguments advanced 
in this thesis are that the law and procedure in this area should be reformed 
in order to take account of the mental health of people accused of contempt.  
Their mental health should be taken into account in making an assessment 
as to whether they are criminally liable and should also be given weight in 
sentencing.  Human rights principles that aim to guarantee fairness in 
criminal trials should apply when a person is tried for contempt in the face 
of the court to ensure that they have a fair hearing.  Reforms should be 
made to the law and practice of contempt to develop referral pathways for 
people to mental health services and treatment where this is appropriate, to 
enhance the prospect of recovery and decrease disruptions in court.   
 (In passing, it should be noted that while it is recognised that people 
with mental health issues may also have cognitive disability caused by 
acquired brain injury, intellectual disability or other conditions, this thesis 
focuses narrowly on those experiencing mental health issues. While it is 
recognised that people with mental health issues who also live with 
disability may be able to invoke legal and human rights protections that are 
not available to those who merely have mental health issues (such as under 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disability), this 
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thesis will not address these co-morbidities or any specialist legal or human 
rights provisions available to people in dual or multiple categories).  
Chapter One of this thesis examines how Australian courts currently 
deal with people with mental health issues who are accused of committing 
commit contempt in the face of the court. It is demonstrated that Australia’s 
complicated, federally-organised justice system has produced diverse 
approaches to contempt in the face of the court that, in most jurisdictions, 
provide few protections for contemnors or alleged contemnors with mental 
health issues.  In most Australian jurisdictions, only rudimentary common-
law safeguards are available.  In some jurisdictions protections of the 
accused have scarcely advanced since the late Middle Ages.  
The description of the legal frameworks developed in Chapter One 
highlights significant substantive and procedural differences across 
Australian jurisdictions. One important issue that emerges from this 
description, and which is explored in Chapter One, is the question whether 
the offence of contempt in the face of the court incorporates mens rea, a 
traditional common law element of criminal offences. The different position 
adopted in the various jurisdictions in relation to mens rea, typically 
whether or not the charge requires the contempt to have been committed 
wilfully, is explored. It is argued that the absence of a mens rea requirement 
in many jurisdictions may result in unfairness to an accused person as the 
opportunity to argue that their actions were not committed wilfully but were 
perhaps instead propelled by their mental ill-health, is lost.  
Having mapped the complex common law and statutory frameworks 
governing contempt in the face of the court, the question of whether there 
remains inherent power and/or a constitutional power to commit for 
contempt that lies outside of statute – and cannot be removed by statute – is 
then considered. In this thesis it is demonstrated that Australian courts 
have a power to commit for contempt in the face of the court that arises 
from their status as independent courts under the Constitution.  However, 
as the High Court of Australia has not provided guidance as to the ambit of 
	 3	
this power, it is possible that any certainty that might come from the 
legislative reform recommended in this thesis may yield, in some future case 
or cases, to this constitutional jurisdiction; that is, notwithstanding any 
legislative reform, the High Court might decide that the power of courts to 
commit for contempt of court has a different shape and quality to the 
legislative reforms promoted herein.  This constitutional ‘wrinkle’ 
complicates the certainty of any reforms.  
As a matter of legal history, the law governing contempt in the face of 
the court has been the subject of two long and searching reviews by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission and the Western Australian Law 
Reform Commission, respectively.  The national review recommended 
reforms grounded in the principles enshrined in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. However the recommendations of those 
Commissions have not been implemented, except in the Family Court of 
Australia.  Neither of the law reform commission reports dealt with the 
question of how the courts should manage people with mental ill-health, 
which is the gist of this thesis.   
The fundamental tension that must be addressed in any reform 
proposal is the tension that exists between the interests of a judge in 
maintaining order in a court, on the one hand, and the interests of a person 
charged with contempt of court, on the other.  A judge who charges, tries 
and punishes a person for contempt in the face of the court will often be 
motivated to act swiftly to protect the dignity of the judicial system.  
However in doing so, she or he may well be adopting procedures that are 
inconsistent with human rights. The speed of summary procedure in 
particular, and the very broad, indeed unique, powers available to judges 
who adopt that procedure, create significant risks for people who are dealt 
with for contempt.  Indeed all of this was recognised in the reports of the 
Australian Law Reform Commission and the Western Australian Law 
Reform Commission.  However these reviews failed to address the position 
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of defendants, particularly unrepresented litigants, who may additionally 
suffer mental ill-health.  
 At present the majority of Australian jurisdictions make no special 
provision to ensure that a person accused of contempt in the face of the 
court has an opportunity to have his or her mental health taken into 
account in determinations of culpability or in sentencing. The result is that 
their mental ill-health may be completely ignored. For the reasons 
developed in this thesis, it is recommended that the law governing contempt 
in the face of the court should be reformed to incorporate a wilfulness 
requirement in order to address this defect. While many contemporary 
statutory offences remove the traditional mens rea requirement of a crime in 
the contempt context, it is particularly important for a person with mental 
health issues, as the presence of such a requirement can yield an 
opportunity for the court to consider issues relating to mental health. 
 In this thesis it is recommended that the human rights principles set 
out in Chapter Two should apply when people are charged with contempt in 
the face of the court. Summary procedure has traditionally been justified on 
the basis that contempt in the face of the court requires immediate 
discipline and the avoidance of the delay associated with an adjournment 
and a trial, but not all situations require immediate action. There will 
continue to be rare instances where a judge feels compelled to act swiftly — 
for example, to protect people in the court from physical harm — however it 
is argued that expulsion from the court will often suffice in these situations. 
Summary procedure should be abandoned. Not only can the use of summary 
procedure in these circumstances be an affront to human rights, the power 
to punish for contempt can be used as an instrument of oppression: this is 
apparent from one of the case studies set out in Chapter Three, in which a 
judge experiencing mental health problems terrorised a litigant with 
dementia. 
In this thesis it is demonstrated that current approaches in dealing 
with contempt in the face of the court are incompatible with Australia’s 
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human rights obligations.  In Chapter Two, the relevant human rights 
principles are identified and Australian law is assessed for compliance.  It is 
demonstrated that the law in virtually every jurisdiction falls well short of 
what is required to ensure justice for people with mental health issues who 
are accused of contempt.  This is particularly the case when the action of the 
alleged contemnor is perceived by the judge to be insulting or challenging 
his or her authority.  It is here that the exercise of the summary power of 
the court to commit for contempt is likely to conflict with the safeguards 
associated with the traditional criminal trial, i.e., the requirement that 
there be a clearly defined charge, the presumption of innocence, the right to 
legal representation and the right to a tribunal that is free from bias. The 
human rights of access to justice and to the highest attainable standard of 
mental health require that more be done to manage and assist litigants who 
may be suffering mental ill-health.   
The Australian Capital Territory and the State of Victoria, which 
have charters of human rights, already have such protections in place.  
Having said this, a self-represented litigant suffering mental ill-health will 
not be best placed to know of their charter rights, let alone assert those 
right, while being dealt (often very hastily) for contempt.  For these reasons, 
the approach taken by the Family Court is again endorsed. The Family 
Court’s approach generates a number of opportunities for the court to 
consider the mental health of the accused. Requiring a formal plea raises 
the issue of fitness to plead. Requiring that a person understand the charge 
also focuses attention on their mental state. Procedures that provide an 
opportunity for a plea and a formal defence may open the door for the 
involvement of counsel, who can raise mental health issues if appropriate. It 
is noteworthy that the Family Court is able to extend these procedural 
safeguards to court users charged with contempt while still maintaining 
order in the court, particularly noteworthy given the often contentious and 
high stakes caseload of that court.  
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 Chapter Three of the thesis considers a number of detailed case 
studies against the backdrop provided by the human rights principles 
discussed in Chapter Two. People with mental health issues were denied 
procedural fairness in a variety of ways, such as being deprived of the 
opportunity to plead to a specified charge, or of an opportunity to raise 
fitness to plead as a distinct issue. In all of the trials where summary 
procedure was adopted, judges failed to give proper consideration to the 
mental health issues of the accused and justice was only achieved on appeal. 
All of the case studies raised the question of whether substantial resources 
could have been saved if appropriate diversions to mental health services 
were in place. In each case, it is arguable that early diversion might have 
prevented the deteriorating mental health of the accused, and more swiftly 
provided a pathway to recovery.  In this thesis it is argued that a system 
that is compliant with human rights obligations would authorise courts to 
adjourn proceedings and direct the psychological assessment of the 
person; that comprehensive mental health liaison services should be 
available to assist this; and that mental health issues should be relevant 
in sentencing for contempt.   
The approach outlined above and set out in detail in Chapters One 
and Two raises a number of important issues, set out briefly here, and 
developed further in Chapter Three.  
First, in order for evidence of mental ill-health to exculpate an 
accused, there needs to be a connection established between the person’s 
mental ill-health and the contumacious behaviour. For example, if a 
schizophrenic who was not medicated was experiencing a florid, paranoid 
episode at the relevant time, and told a judge to ‘get fucked’ in an aggressive 
tone of voice, then it might be arguable, even strongly arguable, that they 
lacked mens rea to commit the offence in that they did not wilfully commit 
the contempt. On the other hand, if a person who is schizophrenic, but 
medicated, tells a judge to ‘get fucked’ in an aggressive tone of voice, and the 
judge charges the person with contempt, then it may be arguable, even 
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strongly arguable, that their schizophrenia did not affect the wilfulness of 
their conduct at the relevant time, and that they should be punished for 
their contempt.  
While a requirement for contempt to have been committed wilfully 
provides some protection for an accused person suffering mental ill-health, it 
provides a low threshold of mens rea and one that is easy for the prosecution 
to satisfy. For this reason it is likely that it will only be in a small subset of 
cases that a person’s mental ill-health will negate a finding that they 
wilfully committed contempt.  It is argued that wilfulness is an appropriate 
standard to apply in this context, because wilfulness requires advertence to 
consequences.  This standard is necessary to ensure that a diagnosis of 
mental ill-health is not invoked inappropriately by people to blame their 
mental ill-health for contumacious behaviour over which they had control.  
(This recommendation of the thesis would not limit the power of courts to 
have regard to mental ill-health in sentencing). 
So, for example, in a number of the cases analysed in Chapter Three, 
expert evidence indicated that the contemnor or alleged contemnor suffered 
from a personality disorder, and not a condition that affected their will at 
the relevant time.  These disorders, such as obsessive compulsive disorder, 
are not classified as psychiatric conditions, per se, and are not, typically, 
readily treatable. Since some contemnors with personality disorders 
continue to appear in the courts and commit contempt after contempt, 
appearing not to respond to judicial attempts to manage their contumacious 
behaviour, even under pain of imprisonment, a real question can be raised 
whether any recommendations made by a court for treatment would be 
followed.  Indeed, this phenomenon demonstrates a significant practical 
limit that would apply to any reform proposal that recommends referral 
pathways to mental health services: these services may not be effective, or 
referrals may be resisted entirely.  Recovery may not be possible.  In such 
cases, it is argued that rules governing abuse of process or vexatious 
litigation, should be applied to minimise the likelihood of further 
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disruptions to court processes.  In such cases, the invocation of a rule 
requiring the leave of the court before proceedings are issued might be the 
only way possible to balance the human right of access to justice, on the one 
hand, and the need for a court to control order, on the other.   
 Finally, managing people with mental ill-health is a difficult job and 
more needs to be done to support judges in their work.  The final chapter of 
the thesis argues that judges need to be provided with ongoing training to 
improve and maintain high standards of mental health literacy. This would 
help ensure that they are able to detect people with mental ill-health in 
their courtrooms and then make informed decision about how best to 
manage those court users. Further, in some cases, judges may need to be 
provided with mental health services themselves.  Judges are not immune 
from mental health problems and they obviously have a pivotal role in 
contempt trials.  Formal but confidential supports should be available to 
assist judges experiencing mental health challenges themselves, to assist 
them to remain calm and dispassionate in their dealings with difficult court-
users. Again, given the lack of safeguards associated with the use of 
summary procedure – a procedure commonly employed in contempt trials – 
and the gravity of the consequences of such trials, some focus on the mental 
health of judges is warranted in this context.      
The Council of Australian Governments, in its Roadmap for Mental 
Health Reform 2012-2022, said: 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is committed to 
mental health reform as an ongoing national priority. We are 
determined to keep working toward creating real improvement in the 
lives of people with mental illness, their families, carers and 
communities.  
Our long term aspiration is for a society that: values and promotes 
the importance of good mental health and wellbeing; maximises 
opportunities to prevent and reduce the impact of mental health 
issues and mental illness; and supports people with mental health 
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issues and mental illness, their families and carers to live 
contributing lives. 
The reforms recommended in this thesis, specifically substantive and 
procedural law reforms that accord with human rights principles, advance 
this objective.  In the conclusion of this thesis, it is demonstrated that only 
the Family Court, which has adopted the recommendations in the 1987 
Australian Law Reform Commission report, has an acceptable approach to 
contempt in the face of the court at present.  The Family Court’s approach 
provides two opportunities for the accused to lead evidence that his or her 
contempt in the face of the court was influenced by mental ill-health. The 
requirements that the accused understand the charge and that the contempt 
be wilful increases the likelihood that a person’s mental ill-health will be 
considered, consistent with human rights principles.  It is recommended 
that this approach should be accepted and implemented via a national, co-
operative law reform initiative, to ensure uniformity across all Australian 
jurisdictions.   
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Chapter One 
 
The Law of Contempt In the Face of the 
Court in Australia: Swift Justice or an 
Instrument of Oppression? 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 Chapter One of this thesis examines the law governing contempt in 
the face of the court. The first part of the chapter examines contempt in the 
face of the court, as distinct from other varieties of contempt, in both a 
historic and contemporary context. The bulk of the chapter then examines 
the law applicable in each Australian jurisdiction. Particular attention is 
paid to the issue of wilfulness as a component of a contempt charge. The 
chapter identifies how the law creates an undesirable culpability hazard for 
people experiencing mental health issues, and demonstrates why there is a 
need for reform.  
  
II WHAT IS CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT? 
A Contempt In the Face of the Court Distinguished from Other Varieties 
of Contempt 
‘Contempt of court’ has been described as ‘the Proteus of the legal world, 
assuming an almost infinite diversity of forms’.1 Generally, it is a collection 
of legal principles and procedures intended to protect the authority of courts 
and ensure the due administration of justice.2 Broadly, two varieties exist: 
criminal contempt and civil contempt. 
																																								 																				
1  Joseph Moskovitz, ‘Contempt of injunctions: civil and criminal’ (1943) 43 Columbia 
Law Review 780, 780. 
2  Bell v Stewart (1920) 28 CLR 419, 425, 426; The King v Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams 
(1935) 53 CLR 434, 446; A-G v Newspaper Publishing Plc [1988] Ch 333, 368.  
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 There are, in turn, two types of criminal contempt. Contempt in the 
face of the court is conduct that takes place in or near a court,3 typically 
during court proceedings, that interferes with, or has the tendency to 
interfere with, the due administration of justice.4 Contempt in the face of 
the court can be distinguished from ‘scandalising the judges’, a variety of 
criminal contempt that is adjudged to occur when a person has made a 
statement that has the tendency to impair the authority of the courts, such 
as comments reflecting negatively on the impartiality of a judge.5 
Scandalising the judges is said to impair confidence in the judiciary or 
detract from the influence of judicial decisions.6  
 Contempt in the face of the court and scandalising the judges can in 
turn be distinguished from civil contempts, which include ‘contempt by 
																																								 																				
3  The summary power of a court of record to punish contempt is not limited to conduct 
witnessed by the presiding judge. For example, a solicitor’s clerk was found on the roof 
of an English court-house in 1974 attempting to introduce laughing-gas into the air 
conditioning system of the courts and was charged with contempt (Balogh v The Crown 
Court at St Albans [1975] QB 73; (1974) 3 All ER 283). In Mansell v Mignacca-
Randazzo [2013] WASCA 262 (20 November 2013) the Western Australian Court of 
Appeal held that a contempt had been committed by a prisoner who failed to appear by 
video-link from a prison to a court when he was directed to do so by a Magistrate on a 
charge of stealing.  
4  In Re Special Reference from the Bahama Islands [1893] AC 138, 148; McLeod v St 
Aubyn [1899] AC 549; R v O’Dogherty (1848) 5 Cox CC 348; R v Davies [1906] 1 KB 32, 
40; R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36, 40; In re Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhicary (1906) 28 TLR 
202; Lewis v Ogden (1984) 153 CLR 682, 688; MacGroarty v Clauson (1989) 167 CLR 
251, 255 sub nom MacGroarty v A-G (Qld) (1989) 86 ALR 513, 515; Parashuram 
Detaram Shamdasani v King-Emperor [1945] AC 264, 268; Re Bellanto; Ex parte Prior 
[1963] SR (NSW) 190, 202; Porter v The King; Ex parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432, 433 
(Isaacs J), 447 (Higgins J); Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 238; Nationwide News 
Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 32.  
5  Bell v Stewart (1920) 28 CLR 419; R v Fletcher; Ex parte Kisch (1935) 52 CLR 248; R v 
Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 447; Gallagher v Durack (1983) 152 CLR 
238, and also Henry Burmester, 'Scandalising the Judges' (1985) 15 Melbourne 
University Law Review 313; Oyiela Litaba, ‘Does the “Offence” of Contempt by 
Scandalising the Court have a valid place in the law of Modern Day Australia?’ (2003) 
Deakin Law Review 113; Michael Addo, Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of 
Judges: A Comparative Study of European Legal Standards (Ashgate, 2000).  
6  Parashuram Detaram Shamdasani v The King Emperor [1945] AC 264, 268. 
Contempt in the face of the court typically takes place in the court during proceedings. 
Theoretically, there is no reason why it could not occur anywhere, so long as the 
contumelious nature of the conduct is felt within the court during proceedings (Cf 
McKeown v The King [1971] 16 DLR 390, 408). However proceedings need to be in 
train for contempt to take place; there is no contempt where the relevant proceedings 
are complete. It is not necessary that contempt in the face of the court involve actual 
physical disruption of a hearing or an impediment to its progress. Typically, though, 
contempt in the face of the court involves litigants interrupting legal proceedings and 
showing disrespect for the court in the court. 
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publication’ or ‘sub judice contempt’,7 disobedience to court orders,8 and 
contempt of Parliament.9  
 This thesis is particularly concerned with contempt in the face of the 
court. 
B Rationale and Historical Origins of Contempt In the Face of the Court 
The rules governing contempt in the face of the court are intended to ensure 
orderly judicial proceedings. They are intended to ensure that people who 
have business in the courts can participate in court proceedings without fear 
that they will be abused or assaulted. Recently, Logan J of the Federal 
Court observed:10 
All contempts are serious. ... The reason ... is that they strike at the very 
heart of a feature of our society and our heritage in British justice. That is, 
they strike at a system of justice according to law, a system in which 
disputes between citizens, be they corporate citizens or individuals, are 
adjudicated where necessary by judges who enjoy independence, and who 
make decisions according to the laws of our country. Those decisions, when 
reflected in a court order, must, unless there is a reasonable excuse, be 
obeyed. ... The alternative to justice, according to law, is a system whereby 
the strong can prey upon the weak and where vigilantes supplant civilised 
behaviour.  
 Henry de Bracton, the distinguished thirteenth-century cleric and 
jurist, observed in De Legibus et Consuetunidibus Anglae that there ‘is no 
greater Contempt and Disobedience, for all persons within the Realm ought 
to be obedient to the King and within his Peace’.11 The law of contempt 
originated from the medieval notion that the monarch ruled by divine right, 
and that any affront to the authority of the monarch ought to attract an 
																																								 																				
7  As to which, see New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Contempt By 
Publication, Report No 100 (2003) [1.10], and Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Contempt, Report No 35, (1987) ch 5.  
8  As to which, see Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525, 534; C J Miller, Contempt of 
Court (Clarendon, 3rd ed, 2000) 2−11.  
9  R v Richards; Ex parte Fitzpatrick and Browne (1954) 92 CLR 157 and, further, John 
Waugh, ‘Contempt of parliament’ (2005) 26 Adelaide Law Review 29.  
10  Plastec Australia Pty Ltd v Plumbing Solutions and Services Pty Ltd (No 4) [2012] 
FCA 657 [4]. 
11  Quoted on the title page of John C Fox, The History of Contempt of Court: The Form of 
Trial and the Mode of Punishment (Clarendon, 1927; reprinted by Professional Books 
Limited, 1972).  
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immediate rebuke.12 Resistance or affronts to the authority of the Crown 
and its emanations, including the courts, was considered contemptuous of 
royal authority and therefore warranted punishment.13 From its medieval 
inception in the twelfth century, contemptus curiae evolved into the crime of 
contempt, and by the fourteenth century, prosecutions for contempt of court 
were an established process for the restraint of disobedience to courts.14 
 The power to commit a person for contempt in the face of the court 
was later received into Australian colonial law along with the rest of the 
common law.15 The first reported exercise of the power to commit for 
contempt in New South Wales was in R v Foley on 4 November 1831.16 The 
prosecutrix in a rape trial was held to be in contempt for declining to give 
evidence and refusing a judicial direction that she should do so. In Re Bunn, 
on 1 March 1832, Dowling J, in a case in which a magistrate failed to attend 
the Court to participate as an assessor in a case, explained that ‘this is the 
king’s Supreme Court. It is a necessary incident of a Supreme Court of 
Record that it should have power to punish for contempts.’17 In what may be 
the first example of contempt in the face of the court in Australia, New 
South Wales Chief Justice Stephen committed two barristers (Richard 
Windeyer, ancestor of Justice Windeyer of the High Court of Australia, and 
also J B Darvall) for contempt in the face of the court on 23 December 1846 
for coming to blows in court during a hearing. 
C The Varieties of Contempt In the Face of the Court 
The Privy Council once observed that ‘it is not possible to particularise the 
acts which can or cannot constitute contempt in the face of the court’,18 and 
																																								 																				
12  Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 16.  
13  Fox, above n 11, 1. See also A H Pekelis, ‘Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies: A 
Comparative Study’ (1943) 41 Michigan Law Review 665. 
14  Fox, above n 11, 1. 
15  For further discussion see William Morison, The System of Law and Courts Governing 
New South Wales (Butterworths, 1994) [1.10]−[1.14]. 
16  [1831] NSWSupC 75. The principle that a court of the common law has an inherent 
jurisdiction to punish for contempt is discussed further later in this chapter. 
17  [1832] NSWSupC 13. 
18  Izuora v The Queen [1953] AC 327, 336. 
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the diverse examples to be found in Australian cases reinforce this 
observation. People have been convicted of contempt in the face of the court 
for threatening people in court,19 threatening reprisals against people when 
they leave the court,20 abusing judges,21 refusing to answer questions or 
prevaricating,22 calling a judge racist,23 being disrespectful,24 taking off their 
clothes in court,25 making a clenched-fist salute in court as a gesture of 
solidarity with people being tried for a crime,26 tossing a coin to decide a 
																																								 																				
19  Anon (1631) 2 Dyer 1886n; 73 ER 416 (assaulting a judge); R v Herring (Unreported, 
NSWSC, No 70140 of 1990, 3 October 1991) (the defendant was given two years’ 
imprisonment for escaping from the dock and climbing over the bench with the 
intention of assaulting the judge (Slattery AJ) before he was restrained); Purdin v 
Roberts (1910) 74 JP Jo 88; Runting [1989] Cr App R 243 (assaulting a witness); R v 
Wigley (1835) 7 C&P 4; 175 ER 3 (assaulting the accused); Brown v Putman (1975) 6 
ALR 307 (assaulting counsel); Re Perry; Ex parte Griffith (1931) 34 WALR 66 
(threatening a law clerk); R v Rustom [2005] NSWSC 61 (threatening the jury); 
Mitchell v Smythe [1894] 2 IR 351 (assaulting someone in the public gallery); 
Principal Registrar, Supreme Court of New South Wales v Katelaris [2001] NSWSC 
724 (punching a barrister); R v Phelps [2009] EWCA 2308 [2010] 2 Cr App R (S) 1 
(spitting on a court officer); R v Huggins [2007] EWCA Crim 732; [2007] 2 Cr App R 
107 (shouting at the jury in a threatening fashion). 
20  Sharples v DPP [2011] QCA 249 (‘Oh, he'll die — he’ll die for that one’); special leave 
to appeal refused (Sharples v DPP [2012] HCASL 138, Gummow and Kiefel JJ). 
21  Moore-McQuillan v Registrar of the Supreme Court [2009] SASC 265 [12] (‘thank you 
for being a cunt’); Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84 
[32] (repeatedly saying ‘get fucked’ or ‘fuck off’ but also refusing to answer questions in 
a Corruption Commission inquiry into organised crime). 
22  Nicholls v DPP (SA) (1993) 66 A Crim R 517 (journalist refused to disclose source in 
criminal trial); Australian Securities and Investment Commission v Albarran (No 2) 
[2008] FCA 386; Allbeury v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 84 
[33]−[34] (refusing to answer questions in a Corruption Commission inquiry into 
organised crime); Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Gilby [1991] NSWCA 235, 1; 
Smith v R (1991) 25 NSWLR 1, 9; Registrar, Supreme Court of South Australia v 
Zappia [2003] 86 SASR 388, 399–400; R v Phillips (1983) 78 Cr App R 88, 94; Allen v 
The Queen [2013] VSCA 44; R v Allan Dennis Pena; R v RY [2007] NSWDC 190; 
Registrar, Criminal Division, Supreme Court of New South Wales v Glasby [1999] 
NSWSC 846 (contemnor refused to answer questions in her husband’s murder trial 
and was sentenced to six months — the judge took into account the fact that her 
husband was a vicious, brutal man, that the contemnor had a history of substance 
abuse and had attempted suicide twice). See also Allbeury v Corruption and Crime 
Commission [2012] WASCA 84 [232]; Registrar of the Supreme Court of South 
Australia v Zappia [2003] SASC 276. 
23  R v Hill [1986] Crim LR 457. 
24  Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW v Katelaris [2008] NSWSC 389 (calling a 
judge ignorant in the presence of the jury; comparing the jury to sheep, notably, in an 
interview with a television reporter outside the court). 
25  R v Ogawa [2009] QCA 307; see also Amelia Bentley, ‘Stalker’s howls of anguish at 
verdict’, Brisbane Times, 27 March 2009. 
26  Ex parte Tuckerman; Re Nash [1970] 3 NSWR 23, discussed by Danielle Tyson in Sex, 
Culpability, and the Defence of Provocation (Routledge, 2013) 72 and Michael 
Chesterman, ‘Disorder in the Court: The Judge’s Response’ (1987) 10 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 32. 
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verdict,27 drawing lots to decide a verdict,28 throwing bags of paint at a 
judge29 and attempting to release laughing gas in court.30 In one memorable 
case, a person who was dissatisfied with a verdict threw a dead cat at an 
exceedingly tolerant judge, who then said, ‘if you do that again, I shall 
commit you for contempt’.31 
D Questions to Consider 
The bizarreness of some of these examples compels a number of questions. 
Is it possible that some or even many of these people were experiencing 
mental health issues that caused them to behave in such a way? If so, 
should their mental health have been taken into account when they were 
tried, to determine whether they were culpable? If a person was found guilty 
of wilful contempt even though they were animated by mental illness, 
should their mental health have been taken into account when they were 
sentenced?32 Should steps have been taken to refer these contemnors to 
mental health services, where that was appropriate? Could more have been 
done at an earlier stage of proceedings to divert people to mental health 
services? 
 A number of significant reasons exist as to why a more sophisticated 
procedure is warranted to take into account the possible mental health 
issues of people who may be involved in contempt in the face of the court. A 
contempt prosecution, particularly one conducted by way of summary 
procedure, can unfold very quickly, leaving even people with sound mental 
health floundering. Summary procedure conducted after an oral charge 
could present very considerable difficulties, perhaps even insuperable 
difficulties, for people with many types of mental health issues. For 
																																								 																				
27  Foster v Hawden (1676) 2 Levinz’s King’s Bench and Common Pleas Reports 205; 83 
ER 520. 
28  Langdell v Sutton (1736) Barnes 32; 94 ER 791. 
29  Wilson v Prothonotary [2000] NSWCA 23. 
30  Balogh v Crown Court at St Alban’s [1974] 3 All ER 283. 
31  Sir Victor Windeyer, ‘Contempt of Court’ in Richard Blackburn (ed) Judicial Essays: 
Being a Selection from the papers read in the Conference of Australian Supreme Court 
Judges held in 1972, 1973 and 1974 (Victoria Law Foundation, 1975) 17−34, 18−19. 
32  R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102. 
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example, some mental health conditions are characterised by auditory 
processing disorders. Wernicke’s Aphasia leaves some people unable to 
understand language in its spoken form (such as by a judge in a trial), and 
the sufferers cannot express themselves meaningfully using language (for 
example, when speaking to a judge). A person with Wernicke’s Aphasia is 
typically unaware of his or her language deficits. He or she can swear at you 
but have no control over it, and may not even understand his or her own 
profanity.33 
 Likewise, a person with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder may present 
in the same way, committing contempt in the face of the court while 
apparently failing to understand how damaging this is to his or her cause. 
Tourette Syndrome is an inherited neuropsychiatric disorder, characterised 
by motor or vocal tics. It is estimated that 10 per cent of people who have 
Tourette Syndrome experience coprolalia, or involuntary swearing. A person 
with this mental disorder may swear at a judge and not really understand 
why he or she is doing it. Similarly, a person experiencing paranoia caused 
by schizophrenia and/or drug use may lack the capacity to control his or her 
tongue. A person with Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder may present with a 
range of challenging behaviours such as reduced impulse control and violent 
outbursts, and can be so cognitively impaired that they lack fitness to plead. 
There is every reason for judges to be informed by evidence relating to the 
mental state of a person who is alleged to have committed a criminal 
offence. 
 It is difficult to overestimate the capacity for tolerance of a judge who 
forgives a litigant for declining to throw a dead cat at them. Plainly, the 
response of the judge to contemptuous behaviour is pivotal in a contempt 
prosecution. Is there a case for anger-management training for judges? Is 
there a case for further judicial education about the management of difficult 
litigants? 
																																								 																				
33  Maria Nystrom, ‘Aphasia — A study on the loss of the world of symbols’ (2006) 1 
International Journal on Qualitative Studies on Health and Well-being 38. 
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 These questions animate this thesis. The first step in the analysis is 
to consider how Australian law operates at present and to identify the 
tensions that underpin it.  The next step is to consider how these tensions 
can be resolved in a way that ensures that courts retain the power to ensure 
order in the courtroom, but in a manner that is mindful of the mental health 
of the participants. 
III THE LAW GOVERNING CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT 
When the common-law principles of contempt were received in colonial 
Australia, only one jurisdiction existed: New South Wales. But the birth of 
separately administered colonies, then Federation, then territory self-
government, together with the development of intermediate courts in many 
of these jurisdictions, necessitates analysis of a more complicated web of 
principle: the law of contempt in the four Commonwealth jurisdictions (the 
High Court, Federal Court, Family Court and Federal Circuit Court) and 
each of the eight states and territories. To reduce the complexity and enable 
more efficient analysis, the Commonwealth jurisdictions will be considered 
first, and the states and territories will be divided into the common-law 
criminal jurisdictions (the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, 
South Australia and Victoria) and the code criminal law jurisdictions (the 
Northern Territory, Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia). The 
specialist mental health courts will not be considered as a predicate to their 
operation is recognition of the mental ill-health of the relevant person.  The 
analysis will include consideration of the substantive law relating to the 
offence of contempt in the face of the court, as well as the procedural law 
governing prosecution. Sentencing options will also be considered. 
A The Commonwealth Courts 
Commencing at the apex of the federal judicature, the High Court’s power to 
commit for contempt is expressed in the following terms in s 24 of the 
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): 
	 19	
The High Court shall have the same power to punish contempts of its power 
and authority as is possessed at the commencement of this Act by the 
Supreme Court of Judicature in England.  
This provision has been interpreted as referring to the common law in 
1903.34 Certainly, when the Judiciary Act commenced, the Supreme Court of 
Judicature in England had power to punish for contempt, including 
contempt in the face of the court.35 
 Federal statutes confirm that the Federal Court,36 Family Court37 and 
Federal Circuit Court of Australia38 each enjoy the same power to commit 
for contempt as the High Court. As the offence of contempt in 
Commonwealth courts is not defined under statute, the common law 
applies. (The elements of the offence of contempt in the face of the court at 
common law are considered further shortly.) 
 Part 11 of the High Court Rules deals with the topic of contempt. Rule 
11.01 deals with procedure for contempt in the face of the court: 
																																								 																				
34  Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 
159 [31] (Spender J); Pattison (Trustee), in the matter of Bell (Bankrupt) v Bell [2007] 
FCA 137 [43]−[44]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hercules 
Iron Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1182 (8 August 2008) [3]; Ali v Collection Point Pty Ltd, in the 
matter of Collection Point Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1066 (28 September 2010) [7]. 1903 was 
selected as a reference point because it was in that year that the Judiciary Act was 
enacted, and the High Court of Australia, as envisaged by the Constitution (Cth), 
established: Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v Jones (No 3) [2010] 
FCA 908 (17 August 2010) [29].  
35  Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 
161 CLR 98, 105−6; Alfred v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) 
[2011] FCA 557 [12].  
36  The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) gives that court the same power and 
authority to control contempt as the High Court of Australia: see Australian 
Competition & Consumer Commission v INFO4PC.com Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 949 [2]; 
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v World Netsafe Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 
159 [31] (Spender J); Pattison (Trustee), in the matter of Bell (Bankrupt) v Bell [2007] 
FCA 137 [43]−[44]; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hercules 
Iron Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1182 (8 August 2008) [3]; Ali v Collection Point Pty Ltd, in the 
matter of Collection Point Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 1066 (28 September 2010) [7]. French J 
(as his Honour then was) also said in Mercator Property Consultants Pty Ltd v 
Christmas Island Resort Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1572 (11 November 1999) [21] that a 
power to commit for contempt would properly be regarded to be incidental to the 
vesting of original jurisdiction in the Federal Court under a Commonwealth law. 
37  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35 and 112AP, and Rules of Court. These provisions are 
discussed in A Bank v Coleiro [2011] FamFCAFC 157 [4]−[56] (Bryant CJ). 
38  Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth) s 17.  
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11.01.1 When it is alleged, or it appears to the Court, that a person (the 
alleged contemnor) has been guilty of contempt of Court, committed in the 
face of the Court or in the hearing of the Court, the presiding Justice may, 
by oral order, direct that the alleged contemnor be arrested and brought 
before the Court forthwith or may issue a warrant under the Justice's hand 
for the arrest of the alleged contemnor. 
11.01.2 When the alleged contemnor is brought before the Court, the Court 
shall:  
(a)  orally inform the alleged contemnor of the contempt charged;  
(b)  require the alleged contemnor to make his or her defence to that charge;  
(c)  after hearing the alleged contemnor proceed then or after adjournment 
to determine the charge; and  
(d)  make whatever order for the punishment or discharge of the alleged 
contemnor as is just. 
11.01.3 Unless the Court admits the alleged contemnor to bail he or she 
shall be detained in custody as directed by the Court or a Justice until the 
charge is heard and determined. 
 Part 42 of the Federal Court Rules and part 19 of the Federal Circuit 
Court Rules also deal with contempt in the face of the court and outline the 
procedure to be adopted. The provisions are drafted in substantially the 
same terms as those set out under the High Court Rules detailed above.  
 The High Court Rules, which are developed by the High Court Rules 
Committee but have the status of regulation and therefore condition the 
common law, reflect the common law’s traditional preference for summary 
procedure, with wide discretion available to the court to act swiftly in the 
face of contempt. The court can proceed by way of an oral charge (which can 
be issued in the heat of the moment). The judge can then conduct a hearing, 
convict and punish the accused. Neither the High Court Rules nor the 
Federal Court Rules provide a right to a written charge. There is no 
requirement for the judge to consider whether the matter is one that needs 
to be heard immediately or whether it must instead be adjourned for 
hearing on a later date. As the court can proceed without an adjournment, 
the litigant may not have the opportunity to use an adjournment to seek 
legal advice. There is no requirement that the matter be assigned to a 
different adjudicator. There is no opportunity for the accused to formally 
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plead to the charge (which would enliven the associated safeguard of an 
inquiry to determine whether the accused is fit to plead to the charge). As 
will be demonstrated in this chapter and the next, many of the common-law 
procedural safeguards associated with the criminal trial are not available to 
a person accused of contempt in the face of the court. This thesis will 
advocate reform to ameliorate these defects in contemporary practice.  
 The Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which applies to both the Family 
Court and the Federal Circuit Court exercising jurisdiction under that Act, 
adopts the procedure of the High Court,39 but also makes provision in the 
Family Law Rules requiring the court to:40 
(a)  inform the respondent of the allegation;  
(b)  ask the respondent whether the respondent wishes to admit or deny 
 the allegation;  
(c)  hear any evidence supporting the allegation;  
(d)  ask the respondent to state the response to the allegation;  
(e)  hear any evidence for the respondent; and  
(f)  determine the case.  
 The Family Court has held that the following principles apply when 
the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act and Family Law Rules are 
invoked to try a person for contempt in the face of the court in that 
jurisdiction.41 First, while the charge can be laid orally or in writing, it is 
essential that the alleged contemnor understand the charge that is being 
laid.42 Second, the decision to proceed to hear the charge immediately is to 
be regarded as an exceptional step to take; it must be necessary in all the 
circumstances. Summary procedure should only be adopted in serious cases 
because that procedure, which involves the court acting as both prosecutor 
and judge, conflicts with fundamental principles of justice and could be seen 
																																								 																				
39  Family Law Act 1975 s 35. 
40  Ibid s 112AP and r 21.08 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth). 
41  A Bank & Coleiro [2011] FamCAFC 157 [19]. 
42  Ibid [17]; Bienstein v Bienstein [2001] FamCA 349; Coward v Stapleton (1953) 90 CLR 
373. 
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as diminishing the authority of the court.43 This rule is informed by 
common-law principle: in many cases it has been stated that the power to 
punish for contempt is an exceptional and significant power that should be 
exercised sparingly and with great caution.44 In the Family Court, ordering 
an adjournment so that another judicial officer can hear the matter is 
regarded as typical. Third, the alleged contemnor should be given the 
opportunity to consider the charge, and the court should adjourn for that 
purpose if necessary.45 Fourth, the court should determine whether the 
charge requires the alleged contemnor to be held in custody, and hear 
submissions on the issue. Fifth, in the event the alleged contemnor pleads 
not guilty, the court must give him or her the opportunity to present 
evidence and make submissions relevant to the defence and determination 
of the charge.46 Sixth, having heard the defence, the judge can determine 
the charge beyond reasonable doubt and, if established, convict the alleged 
contemnor.47 Notably, the contempt must be wilful.48 Seventh, the judge can 
make an order for punishment if the person is convicted, or discharge if not. 
If sentencing, the judge must have regard to relevant sentencing 
principles.49 Finally, the court must give reasons for the decision to convict 
and sentence the contemnor.  
																																								 																				
43  A Bank & Coleiro [2011] FamCAFC 157 [16]; Clampett v A-G (Cth) [2009] FCAFC 151; 
(2009) 260 ALR 462; AGF & LLS [2005] FamCA 13; (2005) FLC 93−210 [23]; Fraser v 
The Queen (1984) 3 NSWLR 212, 213, 224−5 (Kirby P and McHugh JA); Rich v A-G 
(Vic) [1999] VSCA 14. The Full Family Court has also held that because s 112AP of 
the Family Law Act refers to ‘punishment’ and not ‘sentencing’, the general law 
criminal relating to sentencing does not apply: Rand v Rand [2008] FamCA 281 
[27]−[30].  
44  Kift v R [1993] VicRp 51; [1993] 1 VR 703, 707−8; Balogh v St Albans Crown Court 
[1975] QB 73, 85 (Denning MR), 89−91 (Stephenson LJ); Keeley v Brooking (1979) 143 
CLR 162, 170−1, 186; Fraser v the Queen (1984) 3 NSWLR 212, 224−5; Clampett v A-G 
(Cth) (2009) 260 ALR 462 [158] (Greenwood J); Zukanovic v Magistrates Court of 
Victoria at Moorabbin [2011] VSC 141 [32].  
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
47  A Bank & Coleiro [2011] FamCAFC 157 [13]; Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 525; 
Tate & Tate [2002] FamCA 356; (2002) FLC 93−107. 
48  A Bank & Coleiro [2011] FamCAFC 157 [15]; Bande & Cade [2011] FamCAFC 93. 
49  A Bank & Coleiro [2011] FamCAFC 157 [18]; LGM v CAM (Contempt) [1008] 
FamCAFC 1; (2008) FLC 93−355; Kendling & Kendling (Contempt) (2008) FLC 
93−384. 
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 Under the High Court Rules, the only orders contemplated apart from 
discharge are fines or imprisonment.50 The Federal Court Rules do not 
specifically mention the power to impose a fine, but rather speak more 
generally of the power to make an order for the person’s discharge or 
punishment.51 Both pieces of legislation allow the court to discharge the 
contemnor before the end of the prison term.52 The Family Court Rules 
make no mention of penalty. However, the Family Law Act allows a court to 
commit a person to prison, or fine the contemnor, or both,53 along with the 
option of discharge prior to the expiration of the term.54 The Act also allows 
for the suspension of punishment or the giving of security for good 
behaviour.55 
 The Family Court’s approach, by requiring that the accused 
understand the charge, and by requiring wilfulness on the part of the 
accused, provides more protection to the accused than the approaches taken 
in the other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The Family Court’s approach 
provides two opportunities for the accused to lead evidence that his or her 
contempt in the face of the court was influenced by mental ill-health. The 
requirements that the accused understand the charge and that the contempt 
be wilful therefore increases the likelihood that a person will be found not 
guilty, or have his or her punishment reduced on the ground of mental ill-
health.56 
B The Common-Law Jurisdictions 
For convenience, and also to reflect a distinction that is relevant to 
Australian criminal lawyers, the treatment of contempt principles below 
will be divided into the common-law jurisdictions and the code jurisdictions.  
																																								 																				
50  High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) reg 11.04.1(a). 
51  Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) reg 42.02(d). 
52  High Court Rules 2004 (Cth) reg 11.04.4, Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) reg 42.22. 
53  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 112AP(4). 
54  Ibid s 112AP(7). 
55  Ibid s 112AP(6). 
56  R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102. 
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1 The Australian Capital Territory 
Starting in the smallest jurisdiction but at the beginning of the alphabet, 
the Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’) Supreme Court has been vested 
with original jurisdiction necessary to administer justice in the Territory.57 
As a superior court of record, it has an inherent jurisdiction to punish for 
contempt in the face of the court.58 As Menzies J explained in R v Forbes; Ex 
parte Bevan:59 
‘Inherent jurisdiction’ is the power which a court has simply because it is a 
court of a particular description. Thus the Courts of Common Law without 
the aid of any authorizing provision had inherent jurisdiction to prevent 
abuse of their process and to punish for contempt.  
 The ACT Court Procedures Rules 2006 apply to both the Supreme and 
Magistrates Courts (there is no intermediate court in the ACT). The ACT 
Magistrates Court has the same power to deal with contempt of court as the 
Supreme Court.60  
 Since the offence of contempt is not defined, the common law applies 
in both courts to define the offence and regulate the applicable procedure. 
 In relation to the procedure for dealing with contempt in the face of 
the court, the ACT Rules require only that the court must tell the person 
orally of the contempt charged and ask the person to ‘show cause’ as to why 
punishment should not be imposed for contempt of court. This is consistent 
with the broad approach that is reflected in the common law.  
 In relation to punishment, the ACT Rules empower the court to make 
an order for the person’s punishment or discharge.61 Given that the Rules 
specifically allow the court to punish the person under the Crimes 
																																								 																				
57  Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 20. 
58  R v Dunbabin; Ex parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434, 442. The concept of inherent 
jurisdiction is explained later in this chapter.  
59  (1972) 127 CLR 1, 7. See also Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1 and I H Jacob, 
‘The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court’ (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23, 27. 
60  Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) s 307(2). 
61  Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) reg 2504(5). 
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(Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT),62 the full range of sentencing options are 
available, including prison, suspended sentences, fines and community-
based orders.63 Without limiting the application of the general sentencing 
regime, the ACT Rules also contemplate that the court may make an order 
for punishment on conditions, including suspension of punishment during 
good behaviour, with or without the giving of security.64 The court can also 
order the release of a person before the end of his or her prison term.65  
 Before turning to consider the relevant principles in the remaining 
common-law jurisdictions, it is important to note the divergence of approach 
between the procedure adopted by the Family Court under the Family Law 
Rules detailed above, and the position reflected in the ACT Rules, which 
require only that the court must communicate the charge of contempt 
orally66 and then ask the person to show cause why punishment should not 
be imposed. This constitutes a hearing, but it can be a most rudimentary 
one. The Family Court’s approach, by requiring that the accused understand 
the charge, and by requiring wilfulness on the part of the accused, provides 
more protection to the accused than the approaches taken in the ACT or in 
the other Commonwealth jurisdictions. The requirements that the accused 
understand the charge and that the contempt be wilful provides additional 
exculpatory possibilities. These requirements also increase the likelihood 
that a convicted contemnor might have his or her punishment reduced on 
the ground of mental ill-health.67  
 The ACT has enacted the Human Rights Act 2004, and, in some 
future case, it could be argued that relevant human rights principles that 
might be drawn from the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights should apply to ensure that people with mental ill-health who are 
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charged with contempt are dealt with appropriately in that jurisdiction.68 
The human rights principles that are relevant to consider in this context are 
identified and reviewed extensively in Chapter Two of the thesis.  To date, 
no person charged with contempt in the face of the court in an Australian 
Capital Territory court has sought to invoke the ACT Human Rights Act 
and the principles enshrined therein to argue that their mental ill-health 
had not been, and should have beeen taken into account.   
2 New South Wales 
The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is found in ss 22 
and 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), which provide: 
22 The Supreme Court of New South Wales as formerly established as the 
superior court of record in New South Wales is hereby continued. 
23 The Court shall have all jurisdiction which may be necessary for the 
administration of justice in New South Wales.  
 The offence of contempt in the face of the court is not expressly 
defined under statute in either the Supreme, District or Local Court 
jurisdictions, and so the common law applies. 
 The Supreme Court’s rules relating to contempt in the face of the 
court set out a procedure that is essentially the same as the procedure set 
out in Rule 11.01 of the High Court Rules. Rule 55.3 of the Supreme Court 
Rules require the court to cause the ‘contemnor’69 to be informed orally of 
the contempt for which he or she has been charged, to require the person to 
make his or her defence to the charge, and, after hearing him or her, to 
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determine the charge and make an order. Unlike the ACT, this procedure 
provides the opportunity for a formal (represented) defence.  
 The court can punish a convicted contemnor by making an order of 
imprisonment, issuing a fine, or both. It can order suspension of the 
punishment with or without security.70 The court may also discharge the 
contemnor before the expiry of a prison term for the offence.71 
 The District Court of New South Wales (‘NSW’) has similar contempt 
powers to the Supreme Court. It adopts a similar, summary procedure for 
prosecutions: the court is required to inform the contemnor of the contempt 
orally, require the contemnor to make his or her defence, and then 
determine the matter.72 The power to punish, however, is more limited than 
in the Supreme Court. The court may order imprisonment for a term, and 
may order a suspended punishment with or without security. However, fines 
cannot exceed 20 penalty units and imprisonment cannot exceed 28 days.73 
 The Local Court has exactly the same power to commit for contempt 
of court as the District Court.74 The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 
appears to apply in criminal contempt cases. There is no express exclusion 
of such cases; however, given that punishment is expressly provided for 
under the contempt provisions described above, the sentencing options 
available under that Act would presumably be unavailable on the basis of 
the application of the principle that penal laws are construed strictly.75 
3 South Australia 
The Supreme Court of South Australia is a superior court of record that has 
general jurisdiction.76 While conduct amounting to contempt in the face of 
the court is not defined (and therefore the common law applies in relation to 
																																								 																				
70  Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) s 55.13. 
71  Ibid. 
72  District Court Act 1973 s 199(3). 
73  Ibid s 199. 
74  Local Court Act 2007 s 24. 
75  Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277. 
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the offence), Chapter 14 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 sets out a 
relatively detailed procedure for prosecutions. 
 Where it is necessary to deal with contempt in the face of the court 
urgently, the court must formulate a written charge containing reasonable 
details of the alleged contempt and have the charge served on the accused.77 
Where the matter is not urgent, the Rules set out a separate procedure 
requiring the Registrar to formulate a written charge and issue the person 
with a summons.78 The court dealing with the charge will then hear 
relevant evidence for and against the charge from the prosecutor and the 
accused. The court may, on its own initiative, call witnesses who may be 
able to give relevant evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court 
will allow the prosecutor and the accused a reasonable opportunity to 
address the court on the question of whether the charge has been 
established. If, after hearing the evidence and representations from the 
prosecutor and the accused, the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
that the charge has been established, the court will find the accused guilty 
of the contempt.79 
 The Rules expressly require the court, if it finds the accused guilty of 
the contempt, to allow the prosecutor and the accused a reasonable 
opportunity to make submissions on penalty.80 In relation to punishment, 
the court may punish contempt by way of fine, imprisonment, or both. 
Alternatively, the court may release a person into an undertaking to observe 
conditions determined by the court. The court can cancel or reduce a 
penalty. The penalty can be made on conditions and the penalty can be 
suspended on conditions.81 
																																								 																				
77  Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) s 301. 
78  Ibid s 302. 
79  Ibid s 305(3). 
80  Ibid s 305(3)(e). 
81  Ibid s 306. 
	 29	
 The District Court of South Australia has the same power to deal 
with contempt that the Supreme Court has in respect of contempt of the 
Supreme Court.82  
 To reiterate, South Australian procedure is notable because it 
requires a written charge. It contemplates an adjournment and 
representation. The court can also call witnesses, leaving open the 
possibility that a properly informed judge could appraise himself or herself 
as to the mental health of the accused, perhaps by directing the Registrar to 
lead evidence or by appointing an amicus curiae to do so. 
 Unlike the common-law courts already considered, the offence of 
contempt in the face of a South Australian magistrate is defined under 
statute. A person is guilty of contempt if he or she interrupts the 
proceedings of the court, misbehaves before the court, insults a magistrate, 
Registrar or other officer of the court who is acting in the exercise of official 
functions, or refuses, in the face of the court, to obey a lawful direction of the 
court. There is no requirement that the person act ‘wilfully’.83  
 The legislation is silent on procedure; however, the articulation of the 
charge carries, by implication, a requirement that the gist of the accusation 
would need to be communicated. The Act allows the magistrate to punish a 
contempt by imposing a fine,84 or the magistrate may commit a person to 
prison for a specified term,85 or until the contempt is purged.86 Section 4 of 
the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) states that the powers 
conferred on a court by that Act are in addition to, and do not derogate from, 
the powers conferred by any other Act or law to impose a penalty upon, or 
make any order or give any direction in relation to, a person found guilty of 
an offence. Section 5 states that nothing in the Act affects the powers of a 
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court to punish a person for contempt of that court (that is to say, common-
law principles would apply).  
4 Victoria 
The Supreme Court of Victoria is a superior court of record and has general 
jurisdiction, including power to commit for contempt in the face of the 
court.87 The procedure is described in the Supreme Court (General Civil 
Procedure) Rules 2005. As in New South Wales, the court must inform the 
person of the contempt with which he or she is charged, but there is no 
requirement to do so in writing. Thereafter the court is to adopt such 
procedure ‘as in the circumstances the court thinks fit’.88 The court may 
punish by committal to prison, by fine, or both.89 The court may also make 
an order for punishment on terms,90 including a suspension of 
punishment.91  
 The County Court has exactly the same powers in respect of contempt 
in the County Court that the Supreme Court has in the Supreme Court,92 
and exactly the same powers in relation to punishment.93  
 A similar scheme operates at the Magistrate Court level. As in the 
Supreme and County Courts, if it is alleged or it appears to a Victorian 
magistrate that a person is guilty of contempt in the face of the court, the 
court may, by oral order, arrest the person and have the person brought 
before the court, and the magistrate may then adopt any procedure for the 
prosecution and trial of the contempt as he or she thinks fit.94 Sentencing is, 
however, limited to a maximum of six months’ imprisonment or a fine of not 
more than 25 penalty units.95 The court may order a person’s discharge 
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before the end of his or her prison term.96 The court may also accept an 
apology made by a person who has committed contempt (or, conceivably, on 
his or her behalf) and may remit any punishment either wholly or in part.97 
 The offence of contempt in the face of the court is not expressly 
defined under statute in either of the Supreme, County or Magistrate Court 
jurisdictions, and so the common law applies. 
 Like the ACT, Victoria has enacted a Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities, and, while no cases have been decided on this question to 
date, it is conceivable that these statutes could affect the exercise of the 
power to commit for contempt within these jurisdictions.98 As in the 
Australian Capital Territory, it could be argued that relevant human rights 
principles that might be drawn from the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights should apply to ensure that people with mental ill-
health who are charged with contempt are dealt with appropriately in that 
jurisdiction. Again, the human rights principles that are relevant to 
consider in this context are identified and reviewed extensively in Chapter 
Two of the thesis.  To date, no person charged with contempt in the face of 
the court in a Victorian court has sought to invoke the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities in order to challenge the way they have been 
dealt with by the court. 
5 Summary of the Common-Law States 
The common-law definition of the offence of contempt in the face of the court 
applies in each of the common-law jurisdictions at every level of the court 
system with the exception of the South Australian Magistrate Court. 
Procedurally, each of the superior courts of the ACT, New South Wales and 
Victoria retain power to commit for contempt in the face of the court after 
an oral charge. In South Australia, a written charge is required, along with 
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a ‘reasonable opportunity’ for the prosecution and defence to make 
submissions on penalty.  
 The South Australian approach, by requiring a written charge, 
practically necessitates an order of adjournment to allow for the writing of 
the charge, particularly where the contempt is continuing (for example, 
when a contemnor is shouting over the top of a judge who is preparing the 
charge). This might provide a person experiencing mental ill-health with an 
opportunity to be removed from the stressful environment of the court. It 
might also provide the opportunity for the person to access legal 
representation. 
 As for sentencing, the majority decision of the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal in Prothonotary v Wilson99 (to be reviewed extensively in 
Chapter 3 below) confirms that courts may have regard to mental health 
issues when sentencing a person who has committed contempt in the face of 
the court. In that case, Wilson, who threw two bags of paint at a judge, was 
convicted of contempt in the face of the court and imprisoned for two years. 
He had Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and declined to appeal. Ultimately 
persuaded to do so, a majority of the Court concluded that Wilson’s mental 
health issues should have been taken into account in sentencing. The case is 
likely to be followed in the common-law contempt jurisdictions.  
 In review, the South Australian approach, while providing more 
procedural fairness than the approach in the other common-law 
jurisdictions, nonetheless falls short of the approach taken in the Family 
Court, for the reasons detailed earlier. As noted above, the Family Court 
provides two opportunities for the accused to lead evidence that his or her 
contempt in the face of the court was the product of mental ill-health. First, 
the requirement that the accused understand the charge, and second, the 
requirement that the contempt be wilful, increase the likelihood that a 
																																								 																				
99  [2000] NSWCA 23. 
	 33	
person will be found not guilty, or have their punishment reduced on the 
ground of mental ill-health.100 
C The Code Jurisdictions 
1 The Northern Territory 
The Northern Territory Criminal Code does not affect the authority of a 
Northern Territory court to punish a person summarily for contempt in the 
face of the court.101  
 As a superior court of record, the Northern Territory Supreme Court 
has an inherent power to commit for contempt.102 The Supreme Court can 
make an oral order that a person be arrested for contempt in the face of the 
court or issue a warrant for that person’s arrest.103 The offence of contempt 
in the face of the court is not defined, and so the common law applies. The 
court is required to inform the person of the contempt with which he or she 
is charged, but after doing so it can adopt such procedures as in the 
circumstances it thinks fit.104 No requirement exists that the charge be in 
writing.  
 The court can impose imprisonment or a fine, or both.105 It can order 
punishment on terms and can suspend punishment.106 
 There is no intermediate court in the Northern Territory. 
 The Local Court’s power to commit for contempt in the face of the 
court is drafted in broad terms. The offence is not defined, and so the 
common law applies. Like the power enjoyed by the Supreme Court, there is 
no requirement that the charge be reduced to writing and the court may 
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adopt any procedure it thinks fit.107 The power of the Northern Territory 
Local Court to punish contemnors is limited. Upon a finding of guilt, the 
court may order that the person be imprisoned for not more than one month 
or fined not more than 15 penalty units.108 The court may order the person’s 
discharge before the end of the term of imprisonment.109 The court may 
accept an apology for a contempt of court and may remit any punishment for 
the contempt either wholly or in part.110  
 The Northern Territory Magistrates Court has jurisdiction to commit 
a person for contempt in the face of the court. Unlike the Supreme Court 
and Local Court, the offence is defined under statute. The proscribed 
conduct is defined to capture any person who wilfully interrupts proceedings 
of the court or conducts themselves disrespectfully to a magistrate during 
sittings, or who obstructs or assaults any person in attendance, or any 
officer thereof, in the execution of his duty, in view of the court.111 The 
proscribed conduct also extends to anyone who wilfully prevaricates in 
giving evidence. If the person apologises, the Justices may, if they think fit, 
remit the penalty either wholly or in part.112  
2 Queensland 
Just as in the Northern Territory, the Queensland Criminal Code expressly 
preserves the authority of courts of record to punish a person summarily for 
contempt.113  
 The Supreme Court’s power to commit for contempt in the face of the 
court is set out in its Rules.114 The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 
(‘UCPR’) apply.115 The UCPR set out a procedure that is essentially the 
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same procedure that applies in the High Court Rules: the Supreme Court 
must cause the respondent to be orally informed of the contempt charged, 
ask the respondent to ‘show cause’ as to why punishment should not be 
imposed for contempt of court, and, after hearing the respondent, the court 
determines guilt.116 Conduct amounting to contempt in the face of the court 
is not defined; therefore, the common law applies.  
 The District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) specifies conduct 
deemed to constitute contempt of court. Accordingly, the District Court may 
commit a person for contempt of court if he or she: wilfully insults a judge or 
juror, or a registrar, bailiff or other court officer during the persons’ sitting 
or attendance in court, or in going to or returning from the court; wilfully 
interrupts the proceedings of the court or otherwise misbehaves himself or 
herself in court; unlawfully obstructs or assaults someone in attendance in 
court; without lawful excuse, disobeys a lawful order or direction of the court 
at the hearing of any proceeding; or (otherwise) commits any other contempt 
of the court.117 The UCPR procedure detailed above applying in the 
Supreme Court also applies in the District Court and the Magistrates 
Court.118 The District Court enjoys the same power to punish as the 
Supreme Court of Queensland,119 and the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 
(Qld) applies.  
 In Queensland’s Magistrates Courts, conduct constituting contempt is 
defined under statute to capture a person who: wilfully insults a justice, 
witness or officer of the court; wilfully misbehaves; wilfully interrupts 
proceedings; or wilfully assault or obstructs a person in attendance at 
court.120 The Justice Act 1886 (Qld) sets out the procedure that provides that 
a ‘person’ may be dealt with without a complaint being made and may be 
taken into custody by a police officer on order of such court or justice and 
without further warrant, and may be called upon by such court or justice to 
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show cause as to why the person should not be convicted of contempt and 
may be dealt with by the court upon the court’s or justice’s own view or upon 
the evidence of a credible witness.121 It appears that the procedures under 
the UCPR applicable in Queensland also apply,122 which require only that 
the person be orally informed of the contempt charged and asked to show 
cause as to why punishment should not be imposed. Punishment in the 
Magistrates Court extends to 84 penalty units or one year of 
imprisonment.123 The UCPR confirm that a court, including the Supreme 
Court, the District Court and the Magistrates Court, may sentence under 
the Penalties and Sentences Act.124  
 Importantly, and unlike the other code (and common-law) 
jurisdictions, the UCPR expressly state that the Penalties and Sentences Act 
1992 (Qld) applies when sentencing a person for contempt, though no 
maximum penalties are stipulated.125 The UCPR also state that the court 
may make an order for punishment on conditions, including, for example, a 
suspension of punishment during good behaviour, with or without the giving 
of security.126 The Rules also state that the court may order the person’s 
discharge from prison before the end of the term.127 
 Section 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act is relevant to people who 
experience mental ill-health and who are convicted of contempt in the face 
of the court. It sets out criteria to which a court must have regard when 
sentencing a person in Queensland, including the extent to which the 
offender is to blame for the offence (a provision that arguably enables the 
court to give consideration to the issue of intention,128 albeit in the 
sentencing context only), the ‘intellectual capacity’ of the person convicted 
(which may be apt to pick up some varieties of cognitive functioning 
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deficits),129 ‘mitigating factors’,130 and ‘any other relevant circumstance’.131 
Plainly, the last two criteria open the door to submissions from people 
experiencing mental ill-health that their mental health should be taken into 
account when sentencing.  
3 Tasmania 
The Tasmanian Criminal Code expressly preserves the power of Tasmanian 
courts to punish a person summarily for contempt in the face of the court.132 
The offence of contempt in the face of the court is not defined, and so the 
common law applies. The procedure and punishment are dealt with in the 
Supreme Court Rules,133 which requires the court to inform the respondent 
of the contempt with which the person is charged, require the respondent to 
defend the charge, and determine the matter of the charge after having 
heard the respondent.134 No requirement exists that the charge be reduced 
to writing. The power of Tasmanian courts to sentence contemnors is at 
large, and they can impose imprisonment or a fine for contempt in the face 
of the court, or both.135 The court can also order the person’s discharge 
before the end of the prison term.136  
 In the Tasmanian Magistrates Court, conduct amounting to contempt 
is defined under statute to include wilful misbehaviour in court, and wilfully 
interrupting or obstructing proceedings, or wilfully prevaricating in giving 
evidence.137 The relevant statutes are silent on procedure. In relation to 
punishment, under the Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas), magistrates may 
impose a fine up to five penalty units or imprisonment up to three 
months.138 Under the Justices Act 1959 (Tas), magistrates may impose a fine 
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of up to 10 penalty units or, if they proceed by warrant, commit that person 
to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months.139 In the light of these 
apparently conflicting provisions, the later statute would impliedly repeal 
the former, and the lesser penalties would apply.140  
4 Western Australia 
The power of the Supreme Court of Western Australia as a superior court of 
record to commit for contempt of court has been expressly preserved,141 and 
the common law defines the offence. The applicable procedure is set out in 
the Supreme Court Rules, which only require that the ‘contemnor’142 be 
informed orally of the contempt with which he or she is charged and that he 
or she be required to defend the charge.143 The court can sentence at large 
with either an order for commitment to prison, imposition of a fine, or 
both.144 The court making an order committing a person for contempt may 
direct suspension for such a period or on such terms or conditions as the 
court thinks fit.145 The court can also order the discharge of the contemnor 
before the expiry of the term.146 
 The power of the District Court of Western Australia to commit a 
person for contempt of court is more narrowly drawn that that of the 
District Court of Queensland, and protects that court from wilful insults, 
wilful interruptions and misbehaviour.147 The District Court of Western 
Australia Act 1969 (WA) is silent on procedure, and the District Court judge 
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can punish a person for contempt ‘if he thinks fit’.148 The power to penalise 
is wide, and includes a power to imprison a person for up to five years or 
impose a fine of up to $50,000.149  
 The Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) also protects courts from wilful 
interruptions, misbehaviour or insults.150 Magistrates can deal with 
contempt orally and immediately, or by way of a warrant.151 A person guilty 
of a contempt is liable to a fine of not more than $12,000 or imprisonment 
for not more than 12 months, or both.152 The Magistrates Court Act states 
that where a person apologises to the court for the contempt, the court may 
amend or cancel the order imposing the punishment.153 
 The Family Court of Western Australia has a power to deal with 
contempt in the face of the court that is in the same terms as the power 
enjoyed by the Family Court of Australia.154 (The Family Court of Australia 
is dealt with under the heading ‘Commonwealth Courts’, above). 
 Unlike other Australian jurisdictions, the operation of the Sentencing 
Act 1995 (WA) is expressly excluded from applying to punishment for 
contempt of court.155 
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5 Summary of the Code jurisdictions 
The Northern Territory, Tasmanian and Western Australian courts have 
wide powers to commit for contempt in the face of the court, with the Local 
Court and the Magistrates Court only being limited as to penalty. In the 
Supreme Court in each Code jurisdiction, the common law defines the 
offences and, therefore, there is no wilfulness requirement. In contrast, in 
the Magistrate Court in the Northern Territory, Queensland, Western 
Australia and Tasmanian, along with the District Court in Western 
Australia, the offences require that contempt in the face of the court be 
committed willfully. The Queensland District Court requires wilfulness but 
also contemplates punishment for (mere) ‘misbehavior’. Queensland courts 
retain authority to punish a person summarily for contempt; however, the 
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules are also said to apply. Queensland District 
and Magistrates Court Rules are more specific in their treatment of 
prosecutions and penalties.  
 Sentencing is at large in the Northern Territory, Tasmanian and 
Western Australian superior courts, characterised by wide latitude in the 
Western Australian District Court, but is limited in the Magistrates Courts 
of each jurisdiction. Only Queensland imposes specific criteria that can be 
interpreted as enabling an inquiry into mental health, via its Penalties and 
Sentences Act.  
 In broad summary, it is the exception, rather than the rule, for the 
discretionary power of judges in relation to contempt in the face of the court 
to be conditioned by procedural safeguards. A requirement of a written 
charge only applies in the Supreme Court and District Court of South 
Australia, wilfulness is required only in certain inferior courts, with the 
common-law definition of the offence instead applying in all of the superior 
courts, procedure is only rigorously circumscribed in the Family Court and 
Federal Circuit Court exercising family jurisdiction, and sentencing 
approaches vary significantly across the jurisdictions and among the courts. 
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IV A CONSTITUTIONAL WRINKLE — THE STATUS OF THE INHERENT 
JURISDICTION TO COMMIT FOR CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT 
Before leaving the review of the law in the various jurisdictions, it is 
important to make an additional set of observations about the law of 
contempt in the face of the court in Australia. In Re Colina; Ex parte Torney, 
Gleeson CJ and Gummow J, with whom Hayne J agreed, made the 
intriguing observation that statutory provisions relating to the powers of 
Chapter III courts (such as s 24 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and s 35 of 
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)) ‘should be read as declaratory of an 
attribute of the judicial power of the Commonwealth which is vested in 
these courts by s 71 of the Constitution’.156  
 Presumably, s 24 of the Judiciary Act and s 35 of the Family Law Act 
are supported by ss 76 and 77, along with s 51(xxxix) of the Constitution, 
which, together, authorise the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws 
with respect to the vesting of jurisdiction in the High Court, federal courts, 
and state and territory courts. However, it appears from the remarks of 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ that the judicial power to commit for 
contempt in the face of the court is not dependent on any statute, per se, but 
rather is an inherent power of courts contemplated by Chapter III of the 
Constitution. If this is so, then this could yield a number of possible 
implications. 
 First, the ambit of the power to commit for contempt in the face of the 
court will, in the final analysis, be a question of constitutional law (to be 
determined by the High Court) rather than by parliaments in statutes. 
 Second, if that is so, then every Australian court could, conceivably, 
have contempt powers that are wider than (or, conceivably, more narrowly 
drawn than) the powers they may have been granted by statute. So, since s 
77(iii) of the Constitution contemplates the exercise of judicial power of the 
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Commonwealth by ‘any court of a State’, it is possible that even the inferior 
courts of the states such as district courts and magistrates courts that have 
their powers limited by the statutes and codes may enjoy a power, drawn 
from Chapter III of the Constitution, to commit for contempt in the face of 
the court that extends beyond (or could conceivably be more narrowly drawn 
than) their statutory powers. These propositions would be likely to apply to 
the territories, too.157 
 Another complicating wrinkle in the tapestry of principles in 
Australia is the inherent jurisdiction to commit for contempt in the face of 
the court. Superior courts of record in Australia have an inherent power to 
commit for contempt in the face of the court.158 They also enjoy inherent 
power to supervise decisions by inferior courts to commit for contempt.159 In 
1926, Isaacs J held that the power to deal summarily with contempt of court 
is ‘inherent’ and ‘a power of self-protection or a power incidental to the 
function of superintending the administration of justice’.160 As the Victorian 
Court of Appeal observed in 1989,161 the ‘jurisdiction of the court which is 
comprised within the term “inherent” is that which enables it to fulfil itself 
properly and effectively as a court of law’.162 Further:  
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A superior court always had an inherent power to prevent an abuse of its 
process and to maintain its authority. Such a power is intrinsic to a superior 
Court; it is its very life blood, its very essence, its imminent attribute. 
Without such a power, the Court would have form, but lack substance.163 
 The relationship between the (undefined) inherent jurisdiction of 
superior courts to commit for contempt in the face of the court and the 
‘constitutional’ power to do so has not yet been clarified. They may be co-
extensive, but at present this is unclear. It has long been held that inferior 
courts had no inherent power to commit a person for contempt in the face of 
the court;164 however, the situation may well be different if the inherent 
jurisdiction is enjoyed by all Chapter III courts, and this question is yet to 
be resolved.  
 It has been held that where statutory provisions set out procedures to 
be followed in contempt prosecutions, they must be strictly adhered to.165 
However, if the inherent power to commit for contempt in the face of the 
court has a constitutional foundation, then this may conserve the wider 
powers contemplated by the structured rules contemplated in those 
jurisdictions that have chosen to be specific in their treatment of the offence, 
procedure and sentencing. In DPP v Green and Magistrates’ Court, Whelan 
JA of the Victorian Court of Appeal observed that the ‘exercise of inherent 
jurisdiction to summarily deal with contempt may not necessarily be subject 
to the same requirements’ as contempt offences governed by statute.166  
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 The upshot of all of this is that it may be that statutory attempts to 
control the ambit of prosecutions for contempt of court, whether by way of 
procedure or penalty, could conceivably be outflanked by the inherent 
jurisdiction, or constitutional jurisdiction, of any of Australia’s courts. That 
is to say, a court could conceivably decide to exercise power to prosecute and 
convict for contempt of court disregarding statute, on the basis that to do so 
is an incident of its inherent jurisdiction as a Chapter III court under the 
Commonwealth Constitution. If this were attempted, and the High Court 
confirmed that such an exercise of judicial power could be undertaken by a 
court, then the question would be how wide such a power would be.  
 To sum up, a constitutional wrinkle and uncertainty relating to the 
status of the inherent power of a court to commit for contempt in the face of 
the court means that a summary power to do so may be enjoyed by every 
Australian court.  
 The preceding description of the legislative framework in place in 
Australian courts highlights significant substantive and procedural 
differences between contempt laws in different jurisdictions. The question of 
whether there remains inherent power and/or a constitutional power to 
commit for contempt adds extra layers of uncertainty that, for the reasons 
iterated above, remain unresolved. The upshot of the preceding analysis is 
that, except in some respects in some jurisdictions, the law of contempt in 
the face of the court is largely characterised by common-law rules and 
common-law safeguards. For the reasons that follow, this is problematic. 
 As has been illustrated in this chapter, no barriers exist to the 
adoption of truly summary contempt procedure in many, if not all, 
Australian jurisdictions. Where this is adopted, it is possible for contempt 
proceedings to be commenced and concluded in a matter of seconds. The 
speed of the procedure allows for a very real risk that defendants, especially 
unrepresented litigants who may additionally suffer mental ill-health, may 
be convicted of contempt too swiftly, quite possibly with their conditions 
going undetected.  
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 The procedure adopted by the Family Court offers the best procedural 
safeguards in relation to a charge of contempt. In fact, perhaps somewhat 
ironically, the procedures adopted in that court are in keeping with the 
procedural safeguards that attach to a standard criminal prosecution, far 
more so than contempt proceedings as they operate in some of Australia’s 
criminal courts. As previously detailed, in addition to the relevant statutory 
rules, the Full Family Court has held that, when the relevant provisions of 
the Family Law Act and Family Law Rules are invoked to try a person for 
contempt in the face of the court in that jurisdiction,167 it is essential that 
the charge be set out, either orally or in writing. Importantly in the context 
of this thesis, the Court has held that it is essential that the alleged 
contemnor understand the charge that is being laid168 and is given the 
opportunity to state whether he or she pleads guilty or not guilty to the 
charge.  
 Reform of the law governing contempt in the face of the court to 
conform to the approach taken in the Family Court would have a salutary 
effect. The Family Court’s approach generates a number of opportunities for 
the court to consider the mental health of the accused. Requiring a formal 
plea raises the issue of fitness to plead. Requiring that a person understand 
the charge also focuses attention on their mental state. Providing an 
opportunity for a plea and a formal defence is likely to involve counsel, who 
can raise mental health issues if appropriate.  
 The plight of accused people with mental ill-health is considered in 
more detail in the next chapter. Here, the use of summary procedure can 
also be criticised on two fundamental legal grounds: first, it is inconsistent 
with the principles of procedural fairness ordinarily applicable in a criminal 
trial; and, second, it is inconsistent with international human rights 
principles.  
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V A CRITIQUE OF THE SUMMARY PROCEDURE FOR CONTEMPT 
IN THE FACE OF THE COURT 
John Fox observed that the first use of summary procedure for the 
punishment of contempt ‘has not been clearly traced’,169 and that the early 
cases demonstrated that ‘contumelious conduct was … [only] punished after 
conviction by a jury and not by summary procedure’.170 Eminent jurists 
Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, in an article concerned with the power 
of the US Congress to regulate contempt in the inferior courts in the United 
States, made similar observations.171 However, John Fox also observed that 
while the ‘modern practice of proceeding summarily to the punishment of 
contempt of court has been the subject of comment and protest’, it is also 
‘founded upon immemorial usage [and] has, since the eighteenth century, 
been generally assumed or has not been expressly questioned by the 
court’.172 
 Some early common-law cases exist in which contempt in the face of 
the court was characterised as an indictable misdemeanour, with the result 
that it could be tried as an ordinary criminal offence, on indictment before a 
jury.173 However, the procedure for trial by jury of such a charge or 
indictment has fallen into disuse and has not been revived.174 Justice 
McHugh (as his Honour then was) noted in 1985 that trial by jury for 
contempt in the face of the court had not been used in England since 
1902.175 At any rate, the controversy surrounding the historical foundation 
of the practice of summary prosecutions for contempt has been considered 
by members of the High Court and has been resolved in favour of its 
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continued use. In Re Colina; Ex parte Torney, Gleeson CJ and Gummow J 
(with whom Hayne J agreed) explained: 
[S]ince the latter part of the 18th century, courts have adopted the general 
practice of punishing all contempts by summary procedure, which has 
largely superseded trial by jury. Thus, in 1987, the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal said that ‘the proper procedure by which to prosecute criminal 
contempt is now by summary proceedings, and not by indictment.’176 The 
practice had its origin in an undelivered draft judgment of Wilmot J in R v 
Almon.177 The soundness of that opinion has been subjected to scholarly 
criticism,178 but the practice is well-established,179 and was so at the time of 
Federation. In 1900 the Queen's Bench Division, in R v Gray,180 held that 
the publication of a newspaper article which contained scurrilous abuse of a 
judge was a contempt punishable on summary process. It is not necessary 
for present purposes to decide whether Hutley AP was strictly correct when 
he said, in 1984, that an indictment in respect of contempt was for all 
practical purposes obsolete.181 It is sufficient to observe that summary 
procedure is, and has been for at least a century, the usual procedure.  
 Summary procedure has also been defended on practical grounds, in 
circumstances where ‘recourse to indictment or criminal information is too 
dilatory and too inconvenient to afford any satisfactory remedy.’182 In extra-
curial remarks, Australian High Court Justice Sir Victor Windeyer 
criticised the notion that a judge before whom a contempt of court has 
occurred should refer the matter to another judge, saying:183 
Whatever weight this may have in cases of contempts committed outside the 
court, for offensive conduct inside the court room it would be historically a 
monstrosity; and it would, it seems to me, be undesirable, for the occasion is 
not one for adjudication to determine facts, but for prompt action to 
maintain discipline.  
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Similarly, in Morris v Crown Office, Lord Denning MR observed:184 
The phrase ‘contempt in the face of the court’ has an old-fashioned ring 
about it; but the importance of it is this: of all the places where law and 
order must be maintained, it is here in these courts. The course of justice 
must not be deflected or interfered with. Those who strike at it strike at the 
very foundations of our society. To maintain law and order, the judges have, 
and must have, power at once to deal with those who offend against it. It is 
a great power — a power instantly to imprison a person without a trial — 
but it is a necessary power. 
 The immediate nature of the enquiry, which has been described as a 
‘truly summary’ procedure, was described by Mustill LJ in R v Griffin in the 
following terms:185 
There is no summons or indictment, nor is it mandatory for any written 
account of the accusation made against him to be furnished to the 
contemnor. There is no preliminary enquiry or filtering procedure, such as 
committal. Depositions are not taken. There is no jury. Nor is the system 
adversarial in character. The judge himself enquires into the circumstances, 
so far as they are not within his personal knowledge. He identifies the 
grounds of complaint, selects the witnesses and investigates what they have 
to say … decides guilt and pronounces sentence.  
 The fundamental legal criticism of the procedure is that the 
procedure places the judge simultaneously in the position of prosecutor, 
witness, jury and judge.186 In Fraser v The Queen, Kirby P and McHugh JA, 
as their Honours then were, said:187  
In the case of summary proceedings for contempt in the face or hearing of 
the court, there are special reasons for the extension of facilities and 
privileges to the alleged contemnor. By any standard the procedure is 
extraordinary. The judge may be, at once, the witness, possibly even the 
victim, of the contempt. He may be the initiator of the former curial 
proceedings to bring the contemnor before the court, as was the case here. It 
is he who has to decide the issues of fact, to determine the charge, and then 
to make the order for punishment or discharge the contemnor. This unusual 
concatenation of roles imposes upon the judge peculiar responsibilities and 
equivalent duties to ensure that justice is done and seen to be done. If he 
decides to deal with a matter summarily ... It is trite to say that a person 
faced with a serious charge, and the risk of punishment, including 
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imprisonment, should be given an ample opportunity to be heard ... The rule 
as to hearing parties is fundamental to due process of law. But it is 
specifically important in the extraordinary summary procedure for contempt 
for the reasons already suggested. The requirement of the appearance of 
justice imposes on the judge a special obligation to ensure that he has not 
made up his mind until everything that can reasonably be placed on the 
scale is allowed to be put there.188  
 For these reasons, the United Kingdom Court of Appeal, in Balogh v 
St Albans Crown Court, described the summary power to commit for 
contempt as ‘salutary and dangerous’189 and as a power that should only be 
exercised ‘with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and beyond 
reasonable doubt’.190 It should not be used ‘to subvert principles of fairness 
or to become an instrument of oppression to an alleged contemnor’.191 
Similar observations were made by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Allen v 
The Queen.192  
 In contrast to the normal procedures that apply when an accused 
person is tried for a criminal offence, the magistrate or judge who has laid 
the charges on the basis of matters perceived by him or her within the 
courtroom, takes the further step of deciding whether the charge is proved. 
This means that nobody independent of the judiciary, such as a jury, is 
brought into the process of trial, and in the case of contempt in the face of 
the court, the presiding judge or magistrate may ‘deal with’ an alleged 
contempt even though he or she is also the chief witness, the victim and the 
prosecutor.193 These features of the procedure make this criminal offence 
unique.194  
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 The Phillimore Committee195 (which reviewed the law of contempt in 
the United Kingdom in 1974, which resulted in the enactment of the UK 
Contempt of Court Act of 1981), characterised the power of courts to punish 
for contempt characterised it as arbitrary and unlimited. The Australian 
Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) has commented that ‘[t]hese powers of 
presiding judges, taken in combination, have a peremptory and 
authoritarian quality similar to those of school teachers or parents dealing 
with young children. It is “summary” discipline in the fullest sense of the 
word.’196 In submissions made to the Phillimore Committee it was argued 
that:  
first, the judge appears to assume the role of prosecutor and judge in his 
own cause, especially where the missile or insult is directed against him 
personally; and secondly, the contemnor usually has little or no opportunity 
to defend himself or make a plea in mitigation.197 
 The use of truly summary procedure — as distinct from the formal 
procedure followed in local or magistrates courts that is also properly 
classified as ‘summary procedure’ — to try and convict people for contempt 
in the face of the court has been strongly criticised in the two formal reviews 
of the law of contempt that have been undertaken in Australia. In 1987, the 
ALRC said: 
The Commission considers that the appropriateness of the existing law and 
procedure relating to contempt in the face of the court is seriously open to 
question. The avowed aim of the law of contempt as a whole is to preserve 
the system of administration of justice, and in particular to ensure that this 
system enjoys public confidence. The Commission views this as an 
appropriate aim. It follows that, in any proceedings where a person is 
charged with contempt, on the basis that his or her conduct threatens the 
due administration of justice, it is imperative that, to use a time-honoured 
phrase, ‘justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done’.198 If this is not the case, the contempt 
proceedings are likely to subvert one of the principal purposes for which 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
O’Shea & Parnell (1890) 15 PD 59, 64, cited with approval in Australian Building and 
Construction and Builders’ Labourers’ Federation v David Syme & Co Ltd [1982] 59 
FLR 48, 52. 
195  United Kingdom, Report on the Committee on Contempt of Court (Cmd 5794, 1974). 
196  Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 7, 60. 
197  United Kingdom, Report on the Committee on Contempt of Court (Cmd 5794, 1974) 
[29]. 
198  R v Sussex Justices, exparte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 (Hewart CJ). 
	 51	
they were instituted. The conflict between the law and procedure governing 
contempt in the face of the court and fundamental doctrines of criminal law 
and procedure — notably those relating to certainty in the definition of 
offences, a presumption of innocence and, above all, lack of bias or partiality 
— seems to the Commission to be a real conflict, leading on occasions to 
injustice which may not always be corrected on appeal. Even if the conflict 
is not real, but only apparent, the image of the judicial system in the public 
eye is tarnished. Persons who have been summarily convicted of contempt 
in the face of the court are inclined to feel that they have not had a fair trial, 
and other members of the public hearing of their experiences must 
inevitably ask themselves whether a presiding judge who has been the 
target of personal insults in the courtroom, or whose proceedings have been 
disrupted, is the right and proper person to determine liability and impose 
punishment. Many contempt proceedings are instigated at times of 
considerable emotional tension in the courtroom. Accordingly, even if the 
judge seems no longer to be emotionally involved at the time when liability 
is determined and a penalty imposed, the suspicion that he or she could 
never be truly impartial in dealing with the case must always persist.199 
 The Commission recommended, inter alia, that normal procedures for 
the trial of criminal offences should apply instead of summary contempt 
procedures. The ALRC also persuasively argued that the rights of alleged 
contemnors might be better safeguarded by statutory reform rather than 
relying on ‘notions of elementary justice’ to safeguard procedural fairness. 
 Although the Western Australian Law Reform Commission 
(‘WALRC’), in its 2003 review of the topic, reported that judges and judicial 
officers at all levels regarded the powers to punish for contempt in the face 
of the court as crucial to their capacity to control proceedings,200 it 
ultimately recommended that the law of contempt be codified and 
controlled.201  
 While common-law decisions have injected some safeguards for the 
accused into summary procedure out of concern for natural justice, the 
ALRC noted during their review of the law of contempt that a significantly 
high proportion of summary convictions for contempt in the face of the court 
have been overruled on procedural grounds by a higher court, and that this 
was due to the difficulty for the presiding judge to reconcile age-old swift 
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and summary justice with the recent injection of natural justice. However, 
the ALRC noted the difficulty in proving the truth of the argument that 
convictions were being overturned on appeal on procedural grounds, as the 
relevant statistics are not maintained by the courts. 202  
VI THE ISSUE OF ‘WILFULNESS’ AS A REQUIREMENT OF THE OFFENCE OF 
CONTEMPT IN THE FACE OF THE COURT	
HLA Hart once observed that all ‘civilized penal systems make liability to 
punishment for … any serious crime dependent not merely on the fact that 
the person to be punished has done the outward act of a crime, but on his 
having done it in a certain state or frame of mind or will’.203 Traditionally, 
although admittedly not invariably, wilfulness has been required for 
criminal offences. The review of the law governing contempt in the face of 
the court in Australian jurisdictions conducted earlier in this chapter 
highlighted the rarity of any requirement of wilfulness and the lack of 
uniformity in approach. In most jurisdictions wilfulness is not required. As 
the WALRC observed in 2003, the question of whether intention to interfere 
or obstruct is required is ‘unclear’. The disjunction of the criminal offence of 
contempt in the face of the court from the foundational principle of criminal 
law of wilfulness requires further interrogation.204  
 At common law, it has been said that it is not necessary to prove any 
subjective intent on the part of the contemnor.205 The New South Wales 
Court of Appeal has said that there is no requirement of wilfulness, per se, 
in the sense that the person need not intend to interfere with or obstruct the 
due administration of justice. Accordingly, if contempt in the face of the 
court objectively diminishes the authority of the court, it will constitute 
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contempt regardless of the intent of the contemnor.206 Conduct that takes 
place in the face of the court that is deliberate (in the sense that it is not 
inadvertent) and which objectively tends to lessen the authority of the court 
will constitute contempt, even if the person who engaged in the conduct had 
no intention to obstruct or interfere with the administration of justice.  
 The leading authority for this principle is a 1970 decision of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal in Ex parte Tuckerman; Ex parte Nash.207 The 
applicants had appeared before a New South Wales magistrate to answer 
charges of trespass that apparently had taken place during a political 
demonstration relating to Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War.208 
As the applicants entered the courtroom, they raised their arms in a 
clenched-fist salute, which, in later explanations to the presiding 
magistrate, were explained as gestures of solidarity with the oppressed 
people of the world.209 They were charged with contempt under the Justices 
Act 1902 (NSW), remanded in custody for about two hours, brought back to 
the court to show cause as to why they should not be convicted of contempt 
of court, tried, and then sentenced to 14 days’ imprisonment, the maximum 
allowed under the relevant provision.210 It is notable that the editor of the 
Australian Law Journal later wrote that the applicants had at all times 
submitted respectfully to the court.211 The applicants appealed to the Court 
of Appeal, which said:212 
[W]hatever in fact the gestures of the applicants were intended by them to 
represent, in our opinion, acts, words or other forms of behaviour which give 
rise to the appearance of defying the authority of a Court of law or which by 
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intimidation, ridicule or otherwise tend to lessen the authority of the courts 
to administer the law and seek to apply even-handed justice between 
parties in a calm and orderly manner may be regarded as contempt of 
Court.  
 The Supreme Court of New South Wales has also more recently held 
that it is not necessary for a defendant charged with contempt in the face of 
the court to establish intent, the objective effect of what is done being of 
paramount importance.213 As such, at least at common law, the offence of 
contempt in the face of the court is an offence of general intent only. It is 
sufficient that the alleged contemnor intended only the action — in the case 
of Nash, the act of raising their clenched fist — but not the consequence of 
that action, which was the disruption to court proceedings. 
 In the United Kingdom, the common law requires that a person 
accused of contempt must be proven to have intended to do the act in 
question.214 However, Borrie and Lowe have said that ‘it is not yet settled 
whether it must also be proved that the accused intended to interfere with 
the course of justice’.215  
 As noted above, in the majority of Australian jurisdictions there is no 
requirement of wilfulness. In the remaining jurisdictions, intention extends 
beyond intentionally committing the act, to intentionally causing a result, 
typically disruption to the court proceedings. For example, in Queensland, 
the District Court may commit a person for contempt of court if a person, 
relevantly: willfully insults a judge or juror, or a registrar, bailiff or other 
court officer during the persons’ sitting or attendance in court, or in going to 
or returning from the court; willfully interrupts the proceedings of the court 
or otherwise misbehaves himself or herself in court; unlawfully obstructs or 
assaults someone in attendance in court; without lawful excuse, disobeys a 
lawful order or direction of the court at the hearing of any proceeding; or 
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(otherwise) commits any other contempt of the court.216 In Queensland’s 
Magistrates Court, conduct constituting contempt is defined under statute 
to capture a person who: wilfully insults a justice, witness or officer of the 
court; wilfully misbehaves; wilfully interrupts proceedings; or wilfully 
assault or obstructs a person in attendance at court.217 The power of the 
District Court of Western Australia to commit a person for contempt of court 
is more narrowly drawn that that of the District Court of Queensland, and 
protects that court from willful insults, willful interruptions and 
misbehaviour.218 The Magistrates Court Act also protects courts from willful 
interruptions, misbehaviour or insults.219 In the Tasmanian Magistrates 
Court, conduct amounting to contempt is defined under statute to include 
willful misbehaviour in court, and willful interrupting or obstructing of 
proceedings.220 The Family Court has also held that the contempt must be 
wilful (but not necessarily contumacious).221 The Family Court of Western 
Australia has a power to deal with contempt in the face of the court that is 
in the same terms as the power enjoyed by the Family Court of Australia.222 
Presumably this means that contempt in the Family Court of Western 
Australia involves the element of ‘wilfulness’.	
 ‘Wilfulness’ is not defined under any of the relevant statutes 
governing contempt. It reflects a less culpable state of mind than that 
required where intention to cause a specific result is an element of an 
offence, such as the intention to interrupt court proceedings. It also reflects 
a less culpable state of mind than knowledge; it does not require that the 
person had actual knowledge that the disruption would occur as a result of 
their behaviour. There is general consensus that wilfulness is analogous to 
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recklessness,223 such that all that is required is some awareness or foresight 
of a possibility that an event will occur.  
 As noted above, in the remaining state criminal courts, and in the 
Commonwealth courts, the offence of contempt is not defined and so the 
common law applies, meaning that in the majority of jurisdictions, the 
offence is one of basic intent only.  
 All of this is significant because the presence of a requirement of 
wilfulness opens up the possibility of a defence that a person with mental 
health issues did not intend to commit contempt. An inquiry into wilfulness 
involves subjective consideration of the state of mind of the accused rather 
than an objective consideration of the state of mind of a reasonable person. 
Accordingly, all matters bearing upon the state of mind of the accused are 
relevant, including mental health issues. Everyone is presumed to be sane 
and to be in control of his or her actions. It may be that in a limited set of 
circumstances, a person’s mental state might impair their volitional control 
to the extent that they did not have even basic intent to engage in the 
conduct. A defendant who tries to argue that his or her actions were 
involuntary bears the burden of proof given the presumption of sanity and 
voluntariness. It may well be that some conditions affect volitional control to 
the extent a person’s conduct in court was unwilled, or at least committed in 
circumstances where the person was experiencing an irresistible impulse. 
 Volitional control relates to an ability to control one’s conduct. Some 
disorders can cause volitional incapacity such that the person may lack 
control over their actions. At other times, or for other disorders, control may 
not be lost altogether but rather merely impaired. Where a person engages 
in contumacious conduct while suffering some form of mental ill-health, it is 
necessary for careful consideration to be given to the impact of his or her 
condition on the person’s volitional capacity in relation to the specific 
conduct complained of.  
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 The case of Keeley v Brooking is worthy of consideration here, 
particularly the issues explored by Murphy J in his dissenting judgment 
following Keeley’s unsuccessful appeal to the High Court. Justice Brooking, 
sitting as the Supreme Court of Victoria, had convicted Keeley of contempt 
in the face of the court on 9 May 1978. Keeley had been a prosecution 
witness in a trial of a police officer on bribery and related misconduct 
charges. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Keeley gave evidence over 
three days during the trial, saying on numerous occasions that he was 
unable to remember various events in detail or at all. He also indicated that 
he could not remember what he had said at the committal proceeding 
against the police officer. Justice Brooking declared that he was a hostile 
witness, advised Keeley that he had formed an opinion that he was not 
telling the truth, warned him that he could be charged with perjury, 
directed him to the fact that he could be dealt with for contempt of court and 
then, after the conclusion of Keeley’s evidence, asked him to show cause as 
to why he should not be dealt with for contempt. At the conclusion of the 
police officer’s trial, Brooking J dealt with Keeley, summarily, for contempt 
on the basis of his finding of fact that Keeley had been prevaricating.224 
 Keeley’s defence consisted of four affidavits by doctors that Keeley’s 
memory and concentration were impaired. The first medical witness said 
that Keeley was experiencing ‘an acute anxiety state’; the second said that 
he suffered ‘fluctuating anxiety’ and it was reasonably possible that this 
affected his memory; the third said that the majority of his symptoms were 
genuine; and the fourth said that Keeley experienced depression that was 
likely to impair his memory.  
 Justice Brooking rejected this evidence and concluded that Keeley 
was ‘a sly and thoroughly untruthful person, well capable of misleading 
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members of the medical profession for his own purposes’.225 In the High 
Court appeal, Murphy J, in dissent, observed that ‘[t]he judge formed the 
opinion on his experience of Mr. Keeley as a witness at the police officer's 
trial, and by reference to extrinsic evidence, a tape recording.’226 After 
dealing with a number of authorities from the United States of America 
relating to findings of fact in prevarication contempt cases, Murphy J 
said:227 
A difficulty inherent in criminal contempt in refusing to answer is that to 
constitute contempt the affront to the court must be so obvious to the judge 
that a summary trial of the question by the same judge is generally a mere 
formality. Only in rare cases (for example, where an attempt is made to 
show cause by evidence that the accused was physically or mentally 
incompetent to give evidence) is a trial more than a formality. The more a 
charge of such contempt requires a real trial, the less it resembles criminal 
contempt. 
 When there is a charge by the judge and a summary trial conducted 
by the same judge, the trial commences, as this one did, by requiring the 
accused to show cause. The requirement to show cause is not mere form, for 
the accused is required to meet, not a case which is presented against him 
by evidence given at his trial, but a case which exists in the mind of the 
judge at the commencement of the trial, although it may be explained, as it 
was here, by reference to various matters which formed the basis of the 
judge's opinion. This can only mean that the tribunal commences, not with a 
presumption of innocence, but with a presumption of guilt. Such procedures 
are not easily reconcilable with fundamental principles of justice. … 
 The summary procedure cannot be reconciled with fundamental 
principles where, as here, the charge of contempt called for a consideration 
of material other than those answers which were alleged to constitute the 
contempt. In any event, it should not have been persisted with after the 
question of the applicant’s mental condition, that is, his capacity to 
concentrate and to recall, arose as a real issue. 
 The significance of the inclusion of a requirement of wilfulness in the 
Australian laws governing contempt of court is that a person who is alleged 
to have committed the offence would have an opportunity to exonerate his or 
her behaviour on the basis of mental ill-health, for example, that they did 
not appreciate that disruption of court proceedings was a likely consequence 
of their behaviour. The Phillimore Committee on Contempt of Court 
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recommended that intention be required (that is, intention to pervert the 
course of justice) and that it should therefore be dealt with as a criminal 
offence unless there were compelling reasons for urgent action.228 The 
WALRC also pointed to the fact that ‘codification would bring certainty to 
the identification of the basis for liability and clearer guidance to 
participants in judicial proceedings’.229  
 A uniform adoption of a requirement of wilfulness would serve an 
important function. While in the vast majority of instances it may be that, 
notwithstanding a person’s deficits in executive functioning or reduced 
volitional control, the court still forms the view that the person has wilfully 
interrupted the court, it would open the door for expert evidence to be led 
relating to the mental health of the alleged contemnor, and then, in 
appropriate cases, the diversion of contemnors with mental health issues 
toward services and away from inappropriate penalties.  
 The ALRC recommended that the common-law offence of contempt in 
the face of the court should be replaced by a series of offences.230 The ALRC 
recommended:  
The principal offence to be substituted for contempt in the face of the court 
should be drafted in terms of willfully causing ‘a substantial disruption’ to 
the conduct of a hearing. This means that conduct which was disrespectful, 
offensive or insulting would not attract liability unless it amounted to 
substantial disruption.231  
 The Commission stated that drafting the offence in terms of 
‘wilfulness’ meant that the person ‘should be liable for the offence of 
substantial disruption only if he or she intended to disrupt the relevant 
proceedings, or was recklessly indifferent as to whether the conduct in 
question would have this effect’.232 The wilfulness of the disruption could 
then be tested having regard to relevant psychological evidence. Indeed, as 
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will be demonstrated later in this thesis, the human rights of people 
experiencing mental ill-health militate in favour of this reform.  
 Just like the ALRC, the WALRC recommended that the existing 
statutory and common-law offences relating to contempt in the face of the 
court be replaced by a series of statutory offences to apply to all courts of 
civil and criminal jurisdiction in Western Australia.233 However, the 
WALRC recommended that the state of mind of the alleged offender should 
generally not be an element of contempt in the face of the court, that is, 
unless otherwise stated.234 The Commission recommended that the offence 
should provide courts with an option to prosecute wilful contempt and non-
wilful contempt along the following lines: 
(a)  A person shall not wilfully insult the presiding judicial officer or officer 
of a court acting in the course of his or her official duties. 
(b)  A person shall not interrupt or disrupt proceedings of a court without 
reasonable excuse.235 
 This recommendation should not be implemented for the reasons set 
out above.  
VII EXPULSION FROM THE COURT 
It should not be overlooked that an alternative approach available to a court 
— in circumstances where a person is being unruly — is the remedy of 
temporary expulsion from court. Judges have an inherent power to exclude 
people from the courtroom. As Lord Loreburn observed in Scott v Scott:236  
The Court may be closed or cleared if such a precaution is necessary for the 
administration of justice. Tumult or disorder, or the just apprehension of it, 
would certainly justify the exclusion of all from whom such interruption is 
expected, and, if discrimination is impracticable, the exclusion of the public 
in general ... It would be impossible to enumerate or anticipate all possible 
contingencies, but in all cases where the public has been excluded with 
admitted propriety the underlying principle, as it seems to me, is that the 
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administration of justice would be rendered impracticable by their presence, 
whether because the case could not be effectively tried, or the parties 
entitled to justice would be reasonably deterred from seeking it at the hands 
of the Court. ... It is, therefore, well established that those who preside in 
the courts of petty sessions as well as in other courts of justice in this State 
inherently have the power, where it becomes necessary in order to 
administer justice, to exclude from the court-room all or any persons by 
whose behaviour interruption to the orderly procedures of the court is 
caused or is reasonably to be apprehended.  
 In Ex parte Cory, the power of inferior courts to control disturbances 
by removing a person engaged in poor behaviour from the court was also 
confirmed. The Court observed:237  
[T]o remove a turbulent or misbehaving person for the moment, merely, 
without the correlative necessary power of continuing his enforced absence, 
for the required period of peaceful progress, would be nugatory and idle. It 
would seem reasonably to follow that a Magistrate might, instead of 
removing the offender, refuse any further to hear him in the case pending — 
at all events, until he shall have given full assurance by apology or 
retraction, and otherwise, that he will not repeat the objectionable conduct.  
 There are significant access-to-justice implications associated with 
exclusion from court. However, there can be little doubt that exercise of such 
a power is warranted where a person is engaging in seriously contumacious 
behaviour.238 Importantly, resort to the power of expulsion can obviate the 
need to have regard to the contempt power altogether, or, if not, it can be 
utilised together with the power of adjournment to commence a contempt 
prosecution on a preferable footing: consistently with human rights. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
To sum up this chapter, as matters currently stand, with some small 
exceptions in the Family Court, Queensland inferior courts and South 
Australian courts, and assuming that a wider inherent or constitutional 
jurisdiction to commit for contempt is not availed of in those jurisdictions, 
the principles governing contempt in the face of the court in Australia 
reflect only the most rudimentary of safeguards for the accused. Contempt 
prosecutions reflect an absence of the procedural safeguards that typically 
operate in a criminal trial. This renders especially vulnerable accused 
persons affected by mental ill-health. 
 Do human rights principles point the way to a more just approach to 
people with mental health issues accused of contempt in the face of the 
court?  
 
 
 
	 63	
Chapter Two 
 
Reforming Contempt Law and Procedure by 
Reference to Human Rights Principles 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
This chapter critically analyses the procedural law of contempt in the face of 
the court set out in the last chapter by reference to the yardstick of human 
rights principles. In the last chapter, it was demonstrated that the 
procedure adopted in many Australian jurisdictions is deficient in material 
respects. To ensure that Australian law is consistent with human rights 
principles, a person accused of contempt in any Australian court should 
have: the charge against them specifically stated; an opportunity to plead to 
the charge (with an associated opportunity to plead that they are unfit to 
plead); an opportunity to have their trial adjourned in order that they may 
seek legal advice; and the opportunity of a fair hearing of the charge before 
an impartial tribunal. 
  Of most direct relevance to any consideration of the standards to be 
applied within Australian criminal trials is the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’ or ‘the Covenant’). Australia is a 
signatory to the Covenant, and a signatory to its First Optional Protocol, 
which entitles Australians to communicate breaches of the Covenant to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee for consideration. It should be 
acknowledged that Australia has a poor record of compliance with decisions 
of the Committee under the Protocol;239 however, there are instances of 
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statutory reform based on principles in the Covenant, and the common law 
may be adapted by reference to the principles of international law.240  
 Article 14 of the ICCPR relevantly guarantees: 
• Equality before the courts and the right to a fair hearing by an 
impartial tribunal (article 14.1);  
• The right to be presumed innocent (article 14.2); 
• The right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and 
cause of the charge against oneself (article 14.3); 
• The right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of one’s defence and to communicate with counsel of one’s own 
choosing (article 14.3(b)); 
• The right to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance 
(article 14.3(d)) and the right to examine, or have examined, the 
witnesses against oneself (article 14.3(e)); and 
• The right to have one’s conviction and sentence reviewed by a 
higher tribunal (article 14.5). 
The availability of these rights under the contemporary law of contempt in 
the face of the court will now be considered. Reference will also be made to 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights developed 
pursuant to article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(‘ECHR’), as article 14 of the ICCPR and article 6 of the ECHR are drafted 
in similar terms. Conveniently, the United Kingdom Law Commission has 
also undertaken a review of the laws of contempt in England and Wales to 
test their compliance with the ECHR. The consultation paper released by 
the Law Commission included an examination of the compatibility of 
current English and Welsh laws of contempt, including contempt in the face 
of the court, with the ECHR.241 This consultation paper will be referred to in 
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the analysis that follows. The European principles are relevant to a 
consideration of the principles that may be developed and applied in those 
Australian jurisdictions with statutory protection of human rights: the ACT 
and Victoria.242  
 Each principle will now be discussed in turn.  
 
II EQUALITY BEFORE THE COURTS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING BY 
AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL (ARTICLE 14.1) 
The principle of equality before the law and the right to a fair trial are 
enshrined in article 14.1 of the ICCPR: 
All persons shall be equal before courts and tribunals. In the determination 
of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit 
at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  
 Perhaps the most obvious issue that arises for consideration in 
relation to the compatibility of summary contempt procedure is whether a 
judge who has just been abused by an alleged contemnor can guarantee a 
fair and impartial hearing when he or she enjoys the power to charge, 
prosecute and adjudicate contempt in the face of his or her own court. No 
requirement exists in any Australian jurisdiction for a court to transfer 
proceedings for contempt in the face of the court to another court. The 
Family Court approach indicates that it would be an exceptional case for a 
judge to determine a contempt prosecution in brevi manu, but that does not 
mean that it will not take place. 
 The ALRC, in its report of almost 30 years ago, observed that ‘[w]hile 
a presiding judge would undoubtedly make every conscious effort to 
eliminate bias in his or her assessment of the relevant facts, there is 
undoubtedly a danger that the judge’s role as the target of the relevant 
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conduct (in many cases) may subconsciously influence his or her impression 
as to what happened.’243  
 The relevance of human rights principles to this issue was considered 
in the United Kingdom Law Commission consultation paper, specifically, 
compliance with article 6.1 of the ECHR. As noted above, that provision is 
drafted in similar terms to article 14.1 of the ICCPR. Article 6.1 of the 
ECHR provides that ‘everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within 
a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law’. The Law Commission reviewed case law that highlighted issues 
regarding the difficulty of ensuring both subjective and objective 
impartiality (justice being done and also being seen to be done) in cases 
where the judge may have personally been insulted by the alleged 
contemnor.  
 The Commission drew attention to the decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights in Lewandowski v Poland.244 In that case, Mariusz 
Lewandowski was a Polish man who, in 2009, was serving a prison 
sentence. He applied for a stay of execution of his sentence and his 
application was denied. In his appeal submissions, Lewandowski drew 
attention to a factual error made by the trial judge, and recorded his opinion 
that the judge must have drafted his judgment ‘under the influence of 
intoxicating substances, for instance alcohol or other narcotic substances’, 
that the judge’s ‘mental functions were therefore impaired’, and that the 
Court of Appeal should ‘examine the capacity of the judge to decide cases’.245 
Lewandowski’s appeal was rejected by the trial judge, who sat as the Court 
of Appeal from his own judgment, and in proceedings where Lewandowski 
was neither present nor represented. The judge gave Lewandowski 28 days’ 
solitary confinement as punishment for the remarks he made in his appeal 
submissions. A subsequent Court of Appeal quashed the decision, citing the 
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purpose of contempt was to control order in the court, not punish people for 
criticising judges.  
 Lewandowski sought confirmation of his human rights under the 
European Charter. The European Court of Human Rights declared the 
cause admissible, deciding that contempt in the face of the court is properly 
characterised as a criminal offence, and that, accordingly, article 6 of the 
ECHR was applicable.246 As to Lewandowski’s substantive claims, the Court 
held that personal impartiality should be presumed unless evidence is 
secured to rebut the presumption. The Court then observed:247 
The fact that the judge whom the applicant criticised sat as a single judge in 
considering whether the criticism of him constituted contempt of court and 
whether to punish the applicant must have implications for the 
characterisation of the type of bias in question. In its case-law the Court has 
already recognised the difficulty of establishing a breach of Article 6 on 
account of subjective bias and for this reason has, in the vast majority of 
cases raising impartiality issues, focused on the objective test. However, 
there is no watertight division between the two notions, since the conduct of 
a judge may not only prompt objectively held misgivings as to impartiality 
from the point of view of the external observer (the objective test) but may 
also go to the issue of his or her personal convictions (the subjective test) … 
The Court further notes that in his letter to the applicant the President of 
the Elbląg Regional Court stated that Judge E.O. had felt offended by the 
allegations made in the applicant’s letter and that Judge E.O. was 
envisaging bringing criminal proceedings against the applicant for 
defamation punishable under Article 212 of the Criminal Code. In these 
circumstances, given that the judge decided a case concerning criticism 
directed personally against him alone, the absence of that watertight 
division is even more pronounced. 
 Lewandowski was a relatively extreme case. There was no hearing at 
all, and the punishment was very severe. However, the case does draw 
attention to the human rights issues associated with judges acting in brevi 
manu. Such proceedings amplify the risk of bias and compel a search for 
fairer procedures. 
 The decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Kyprianou v 
Cyprus, which also applied article 6 of the ECHR in a case of contempt in 
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the face of the court, is worth considering as well.248 Michalakis Kyprianou, 
a Cypriot national and lawyer, was defending a person accused of murder in 
a Cypriot court in 2001. During the trial, Kyprianou objected to being 
interrupted during his cross-examination of a prosecution witness, and 
sought leave to withdraw from the proceedings. When leave was not 
granted, Kyprianou alleged that the judges were biased, pointing to the fact 
that they had been talking to one another and sending each other secret 
notes during the trial (‘ravasakia’ — short and secret letters/notes, or love 
letters, or messages with unpleasant contents). The judges said they had 
been ‘deeply insulted’, that they could not ‘conceive of another occasion of 
such a manifest and unacceptable contempt of court by any person, let alone 
an advocate’, and opined that ‘if the court’s reaction is not immediate and 
drastic, we feel that justice will have suffered a disastrous blow’.249 
Kyprianou was offered the choice to be sentenced to contempt or to retract 
what he had said. He refused. The Court found Mr Kyprianou to be in 
contempt of court and sentenced him to five days’ imprisonment, enforced 
immediately. His appeal to the Supreme Court of Cyprus was dismissed on 
2 April 2001. 
 Kyprianou sought a ruling in the European Court of Human Rights, 
complaining, inter alia, that he had not been tried by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, contrary to article 6(1), as the same court that had 
charged him with contempt had also tried and punished him. The European 
Court noted the trend in common-law jurisdictions acknowledging that 
summary procedure should be used sparingly, after careful reflection, and 
with appropriate safeguards. However, the Court said that in a case like the 
present, the confusion of roles between complainant, witness, prosecutor 
and judge could self-evidently prompt objectively justified fears as to the 
conformity of the proceedings with the time-honoured principle that no one 
should be a judge in his or her own cause and, consequently, as to the 
impartiality of the bench. The Court found that the impartiality of the lower 
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Court was open to doubt. It noted that judges enjoy the power to commit for 
contempt in the face of the court, but they had reached the conclusion that 
Kyprianou was found to be guilty too hastily, and that the judges had not 
detached themselves from the situation. 
 In the light of the long-standing criticisms of summary procedure for 
contempt in the face of the court — criticisms made at common law, within 
the law reform commission reports, and in respected international human 
rights tribunals — it is submitted that the international human right to an 
impartial court should extend to include the reform of contempt procedure 
to require the empanelment of a new judge for any contempt trial.250 This 
reform will not only have the salutary effect of reforming an unusually 
dangerous procedure, but also help to ensure that Australian law is 
consistent with the nation’s human rights obligations. While a number of 
commentators who have proposed reforms to the law and procedure of 
contempt in the face of the court have stopped short of making this 
recommendation, preferring instead to leave open the option of ‘swift action’ 
where required, the case law demonstrates that the power to commit for 
contempt in the face of the court is vulnerable to abuse.  
 
III THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE (ARTICLE 14.2) 
Article 14.2 of the ICCPR relevantly states that in the determination of any 
criminal charge, everyone shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty. 
The presumption of innocence is not an obvious feature of prosecutions for 
contempt in the face of the court in Australia. Instead, many jurisdictions 
require a person to ‘show cause’ as to why they should not be dealt with for 
contempt. In the ACT and in Queensland, in the criminal courts at each 
level, the accused is placed in a show-cause position as to why punishment 
should not be imposed for the contempt; so while there may be an 
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opportunity to make a defence, the burden is reversed.251 In the Magistrates 
Court in Tasmania, the relevant statutes allow for the person who commits 
contempt to be ‘deemed guilty’.252 The statutes are silent as to any 
opportunity to argue that the conduct was not committed or that it did not 
amount to contempt in the face of the court. In the Northern Territory 
Magistrates Court, the relevant provision is largely silent on procedure, 
stating that the ‘Court in whose presence any offence under this section is 
committed may forthwith convict the person guilty of the offence’.253 As 
Murphy J observed in his dissenting judgment in Keeley v Brooking:254 
The requirement to show cause is not mere form, for the accused is required 
to meet, not a case which is presented against him by evidence given at his 
trial, but a case which exists in the mind of the judge at the commencement 
of the trial, although it may be explained, as it was here, by reference to 
various matters which formed the basis of the judge's opinion. This can only 
mean that the tribunal commences, not with a presumption of innocence, 
but with a presumption of guilt. Such procedures are not easily reconcilable 
with fundamental principles of justice. 
Some jurisdictions expressly provide for the accused’s right to make a 
defence to the charge, while in most jurisdictions the relevant legislation 
provides that the judge is to adopt such procedure as the court thinks fit. In 
New South Wales the accused is required to make a defence to the charge in 
the courts at each level. 255 The same is true in Tasmania, but only in the 
Supreme Court.256 In the Supreme Court of Western Australia, the accused 
is also required to make his or her defence,257 but no such requirement 
exists in the District and Magistrates Courts. In the High Court of 
Australia, the alleged contemnor is required to make his or her defence to 
the charge.258 In South Australia, the relevant statute governing 
proceedings in the Magistrates Court is silent on procedure; however, in the 
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Supreme and District Courts the relevant statutes require that the court 
hear evidence for and against the charge. 259 The same is true under the 
Family Court Rules. 260 
 Also relevant to the presumption of innocence is the terminology used 
in some contempt proceedings. In some jurisdictions a person accused of 
committing contempt in the face of the court is referred to as the ‘contemnor’ 
before the charge has been made out. In the Supreme Courts of both New 
South Wales and Western Australia, the term ‘contemnor’ is defined to 
mean ‘a person guilty or alleged to be guilty of contempt of court’.261 The 
WALRC found that the use of the term ‘contemnor’ when referring to 
defendants was unduly prejudicial and recommended that the term 
‘defendant’ be adopted instead.262  
 In Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions, Lord Sankey 
observed:263 
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is 
always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the 
prisoner's guilt subject to ... the defence of insanity and subject also to any 
statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a 
reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the prosecution or 
the prisoner ... the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner 
is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or where the trial, the 
principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the prisoner is part of 
the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be 
entertained.  
 It is trite to observe that in contemporary criminal law a great many 
offences are characterised by strict liability, omissions liability and reverse-
onus provisions for exculpation. This is not necessarily a bad thing.264 
However, there is no compelling policy reason why the offence of contempt 
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in the face of the court should be characterised as such. Instead, the 
presumption of innocence should apply.  
 Human rights could be secured in the present context if the reforms 
developed in the preceding passage of this chapter were adopted. If there 
were a statutory requirement to refer proceedings for contempt in the face of 
the court to a different judge, then the new court could apply the 
presumption of innocence. There are invariably witnesses in the court other 
than the judge who would be available to give evidence. Guilty pleas may 
well be common (not that this is relevant). The Crown could be put to proof 
and procedural fairness would be maintained.  
 
IV THE RIGHT TO BE INFORMED PROMPTLY AND IN DETAIL REGARDING THE 
NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE CHARGE AGAINST ONESELF (ARTICLE 14.3(A)) 
Article 14 of the ICCPR states that the person is entitled to be ‘informed 
promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature 
and cause of the charge against him’.  
 It is a fundamental rule of trial fairness that an accused is entitled to 
have the charge specified.265 Specificity is required so that the accused has 
an opportunity to prepare a proper defence.266 This principle also applies in 
prosecutions for contempt in the face of the court.267  
 A review of the procedural law governing contempt in the face of the 
court across the various Australian jurisdictions highlights that the right to 
have the charge specified is not standard. Only in South Australia is there a 
specific requirement that the court must formulate a written charge. In that 
jurisdiction the written charge must contain reasonable details.268 In the 
vast majority of the remaining jurisdictions, there is only a requirement to 
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orally inform the accused person of the charge, with no additional 
requirement for any detail to be provided (although at common law the ‘gist’ 
of the charge must be plain).269 In many jurisdictions no statutory 
requirement exists to inform the accused of the charge, orally or otherwise, 
before the magistrate proceeds to sentence.270 In the District Court of 
Western Australia, a judge can punish a person for contempt ‘if he thinks 
fit’, and there is no statutory requirement to inform the defendant of the 
charge.271  
 It is recommended that a requirement to formulate a written charge 
should be a standard feature of contempt proceedings, if for no other reason 
than it slows down the process and affords the parties, including the judge, 
an opportunity for passions to cool. At the very least, fairness requires that 
the person be informed orally of the charge with sufficient detail so that the 
person might be able to prepare a defence. 
 In contrast to a standard criminal prosecution, there is no 
requirement to ask the alleged contemnor to formally plead to the charge. 
The Family Court Rules come close in so far as there is a requirement to ask 
the respondent whether he or she wishes to admit or deny the allegation,272 
but in no jurisdiction does a requirement exist to plead to the charge. The 
absence of such a requirement means that fitness to plead — a procedural 
safeguard that can be utilised to ensure that people with mental ill-health 
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are not convicted when they lack adjudicative competence — is not 
enlivened in contempt proceedings.  
 A requirement to formally plead to a charge of contempt in the face of 
the court should be a standard feature of reformulated contempt 
proceedings. It would flow from this requirement that the additional 
safeguard requiring defendants to be fit to plead could be invoked to ensure 
that people with significant mental health issues are not improperly 
convicted. Common-law notions of fairness dictate that an accused person 
must be fit to stand trial273 before he or she can be convicted of an offence. 
Contempt in the face of the court is a criminal offence and should be 
afforded the same procedural protections as other criminal offences. The 
concept of ‘fitness for trial’ requires a threshold mental capacity before a 
person can stand trial.274 In Eastman v The Queen,275 Gaudron J said: 
Traditionally, an accused person has not been put on trial unless fit to plead 
because of ‘the humanity of the law of England falling into that which 
common humanity, without any written law would suggest, has prescribed 
that no man shall be called upon to make his defence at a time when his 
mind is in that situation as not to appear capable of so doing.’ That 
statement may indicate a positive and independent right on the part of an 
accused not to be tried unless fit to plead. It is unnecessary to decide 
whether that is so. It is sufficient to approach the present matter on the 
basis that the common law guarantees an accused person a fair trial 
according to law and that one aspect of that guarantee is that a criminal 
trial cannot proceed unless the accused is fit to plead.	
 A defendant is presumed to be of sound mind, and therefore fit to 
plead and stand trial, unless unsoundness of mind is put in issue. The 
person who raises the issue has the onus of proving unfitness. At common 
law, the burden is different, depending on whether the issue is raised by the 
prosecution or the defence. At common law the prosecution must prove 
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unfitness beyond reasonable doubt,276 whereas the defence must only prove 
unfitness on the balance of probabilities.277 This difference has been 
removed by statute in many Australian jurisdictions.278  
 The common-law test for determining fitness to stand trial, which 
applies in all states and territories where fitness issues have not been 
regulated by statute, is set out in R v Presser.279 The ‘Presser rules’ require 
that the defendant must be able to understand the charge, plead to the 
charge, (though not relevant here) exercise the right to challenge the 
empanelling of jurors, understand generally the nature of the proceedings, 
follow the course of the proceedings, understand the substantial effect of any 
evidence that may be given against them, make a defence or answer the 
charge, and give any necessary instructions to his or her lawyer.280 The 
length of the trial, and also, importantly, the likely mental condition of the 
accused during the course of proceedings, are relevant considerations in the 
court’s calculus of fitness.281 
 One case that demonstrates how a fitness inquiry might operate in 
this context of a trial for contempt in the face of the court is the decision of 
the Federal Magistrates Court in Hogan & Lennard (No 3).282 Even though 
a substantial number of Family Court authorities have described the 
procedures relating to contempt prosecutions in that jurisdiction as 
tantamount to a code (and therefore exhaustive of the procedure that ought 
to be adopted),283 in Hogan & Lennard (No 3), Federal Magistrate Altobelli 
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ordered that an inquiry be undertaken into the fitness of a person accused of 
contempt. It is convenient to set out the description of the circumstances of 
the case provided by the magistrate, which, while lengthy, provide 
necessary context: 
The basis of Mr Schroder’s application was his concern in relation to the 
ability of the husband to understand the nature and gravity of the 
proceedings and the consequences of them. He expressed concern about the 
husband’s ability to provide instructions and that led him to have prima 
facie concerns about the husband’s mental capacity. Of course it was not 
appropriate for him to give me examples but he described the situation that 
he was dealing with as one where there were illogical instructions that are 
incoherent and fly in the face of common sense.  
 He sought an adjournment in order to place material before the 
Court as to his client’s medical condition. Obviously that medical evidence is 
not available today.  
 Mr Gates is the solicitor appearing for the applicant wife. He was 
ready to proceed today and he opposes the application for an adjournment 
and has serious concerns about whether there is any genuine issue about 
fitness to plead. Mr Gates made the appropriate submission that, based on 
experience in this jurisdiction, there are many clients who could be 
described as incoherent, illogical, do not understand and probably do not 
listen to advice that is given. He frankly admitted, however, that he could 
not comment on the husband’s mental capacity, an appropriate admission to 
make.  
 He pointed out that when this matter was before me last week, no 
concerns were expressed in relation to the husband’s capacity. He also 
reminded me of the history of the proceedings and of the gravity of the 
situation that confronted, it should be noted, not just the wife but the 
husband too, for if the mortgagee exercises its power of sale, it will be to the 
ultimate detriment of both the husband and the wife. In short, Mr Gates 
indicated that it was the wife’s position that the bona fides of the husband 
should not be accepted.  
Altobelli FM referred to the authorities on fitness to plead and said:284 
Where an accused’s representative raises a question concerning the 
unfitness of the accused, the trial judge would ordinarily be expected to 
accept that the issue has been raised in good faith. Legal representatives, 
whether barrister or solicitor, are subject to professional obligations. Once 
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raised by a practitioner, there is, prima facie, an obligation upon the trial 
judge to halt the trial and to conduct an enquiry before a separate jury. 
 If, however, the basis for concern is not obvious or the validity of that 
concern is dubious, it is appropriate for the trial judge to seek an 
elaboration upon the matters giving rise to the concern. Where that 
elaboration demonstrates a real and substantial question, good faith will be 
presumed. The question of unfitness must then be determined by a separate 
jury. It is only where there is patently no real and substantial question that 
the Court may impute an absence of good faith and decline to conduct an 
enquiry.	
Applying this test, Altobelli FM halted the trial on the charge of contempt. 
 For both the reasons given by Altobelli FM and the preceding 
reasons, it is submitted that the law and practice relating to fitness to plead 
provides a vital judicial safeguard of the rights of the accused,285 and this 
safeguard should be extended to people who have been accused of contempt.  
 Ultimately, it is unclear whether, in those jurisdictions that provide a 
code for the management of contempt in the face of the court, an implied 
power to make a fitness inquiry would not be available.286 However, the 
decision of the Federal Magistrates Court in Hogan & Lennard (No 3) 
indicates that there is some foundation for arguing that such a power may 
be exercised by a judge of a court with statutory or limited jurisdiction. This 
would include a power to adjourn proceedings and take other steps 
necessary in order to secure procedural fairness.287  
 At present the power to inquire into fitness in criminal trials is far 
from uniform throughout the various criminal courts in Australia. Some 
courts do not have any power to dispose of a matter on the basis of 
unfitness. While jurisdictional gaps remain such that magistrates in some 
states and territories cannot formally inquire into fitness and dispose of 
matters on that basis, it would arguably still be open to these magistrates to 
																																								 																				
285  See, eg, Jodie O’Leary, Suzie O’Toole and Bruce D Watt, ‘Exploring Juvenile Fitness 
for Trial in Queensland’ (2013) 20 Psychology, Psychiatry and Law 853. 
286  O’Brien v Northern Territory [2003] NTCA 4 [49]. 
287  Pfitzner v Pfitzner (1988) 62 ALJR 323. 
	 78	
hear submissions on unfitness in contempt prosecutions on the basis of the 
inherent or constitutional jurisdiction identified in Chapter One. 
 Perhaps it should not be overlooked that Hogan & Lennard (No 3) 
involved an alleged contemnor who was legally represented. The legal 
representative was able to raise the issue of unfitness, which then led the 
judge to order the inquiry into unfitness. Many people accused of contempt, 
and dealt with by way of summary procedure, will not be represented. In 
addition, it is unlikely that a self-represented litigant experiencing mental 
ill-health would appreciate that he or she has the right to raise fitness for 
trial as an issue. It is unlikely that such a person would appreciate that he 
or she has the option of seeking an adjournment to take legal advice, which 
could be a circuit-breaker that might bring this defensive option to their 
attention. Yet in these circumstances a judge considering a fitness inquiry 
would not have the benefit of opposing submissions on fitness, and could 
urge the provision of legal aid or even appoint a lawyer to act as amicus 
curiae to assist the court.  
 The absence of legal safeguards relating to charges and pleas in the 
context of a prosecution for contempt in the face of the court is particularly 
problematic for a person with mental health issues. This is especially so 
where that person appears in court without legal representation. 
Successfully navigating the distinct stages of considering a specified charge, 
deciding how to plead to that charge, and deciding whether there is fitness 
to plead to that charge all contemplate executive functioning of a relatively 
high order, or, at the very least, lucid intervals, which may not be realistic 
depending on the mental health issues at play.  
 The human right to a fair hearing guaranteed by article 14 of the 
ICCPR, understood within the context provided by article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(‘ICESCR’), would support the conclusion that, where fairness requires it, a 
fitness inquiry ought to be conducted. To the extent that the power to 
conduct a fitness inquiry in the context of a criminal proceeding is drawn 
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from inherent or implied powers, the common law can and should be 
adapted where possible to conform to international human rights 
principles.288 There is no reason why the human right to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of mental health should not be enjoyed at 
every moment, including during criminal trials. That being so, the courts 
should and do have the power to conduct fitness inquiries when a person is 
accused of contempt in the face of the court. Adopting such a procedure 
would be consistent with the position taken by the Full Family Court that a 
person charged with contempt must understand the charge and have the 
opportunity to avail himself or herself of defensive options.289 
 Human rights principles arguably require that an enquiry as to 
fitness to plead should be ordered when relevant. The common law 
guarantees an accused a fair trial according to law, and one aspect of that 
guarantee is that a criminal trial should not take place unless the accused is 
fit to plead. The diversity and prevalence of mental health issues in the 
community, the over-representation of people with mental health issues in 
the prison system, and human rights principles together warrant the 
implementation of an assessment procedure. For reasons that are further 
developed in the concluding chapter of this thesis, initial screening in 
relation to fitness to plead could be conducted by a court-based mental 
health professional with an understanding of court processes. 
 The presence of the human right to be informed promptly and in 
detail regarding the nature and cause of the charge against the accused 
enshrined in article 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR soundly reinforces the need for 
Australian law to be reformed. The Family Court’s requirement that the 
accused understand the charge in a contempt prosecution demonstrates 
compliance with the human right stated in article 14(3)(a). It is submitted 
that the human right to have the charge specified would be best 
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implemented in combination with the Family Court approach, and by 
making specific provision for a fitness inquiry to be undertaken.  
 
V THE RIGHT TO HAVE ADEQUATE TIME AND FACILITIES FOR THE 
PREPARATION OF A DEFENCE AND TO COMMUNICATE WITH COUNSEL OF ONE’S 
OWN CHOOSING (ARTICLE 14.3(B)) 
Article 14(3)(b) also sets out an entitlement for a person accused of contempt 
in the face of the court to have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his or her defence, to defend himself or herself in person or 
through legal assistance of his or her own choosing, and, if he or she does 
not have legal assistance, to be informed of this right and to have legal 
assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice 
so require, and without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she 
does not have sufficient means to pay for it.  
 Article 14.3(b) is drafted in similar terms to article 6.3(b) of the 
ECHR, which provides that anyone charged with a criminal offence has the 
right ‘to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence’. 
The Law Commission cautioned that ‘the requirement under article 6(3)(b) 
of adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defence is one of the 
main reasons that a court should be very wary of proceeding too summarily, 
and even if a court deals with a contempt immediately, this right must be 
respected’.290  
 The review of the law in the preceding chapter highlighted that not 
only is summary procedure (without an adjournment or provision of counsel) 
typical, it is also very widely regarded as being perfectly acceptable. Only in 
South Australia, in both the Supreme Court and the District Court, is there 
a requirement for the court to contemplate whether the matter is urgent 
such that the matter should proceed on that day. Even where the matter is 
considered urgent, a requirement remains for the charge to be reduced to 
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writing and that the charge contain reasonable detail. Where the matter is 
not urgent, a different procedure is mandated, whereby the Registrar is 
required to formulate a written charge and issue the person with a 
summons such that the matter can be put over to a later date.291 The High 
Court Rules, by contrast, state that after hearing the alleged contemnor 
make his or her defence, the court may proceed then or after adjournment to 
determine the charge; there is no requirement to adjourn.292  
 The rights contemplated by article 14(3)(b) of the ICCPR would have 
a significant and positive effect on the law of contempt in the face of the 
court in Australia. The provision of time and facilities would considerably 
enlarge the possibility that the person would be referred to services, 
enabling the person to make better-considered submissions that would 
advance his or her position. The provision of time and facilities could, if 
relevant services were made available in the court precinct (a 
recommendation made in the final chapter of this thesis), also increase the 
likelihood that submissions could be made drawing attention to any issues 
of mental ill-health relevant to culpability or punishment. An adjournment 
to allow the accused to prepare a defence might even provide the judge who 
has witnessed the contempt the opportunity to compose himself or herself 
and develop a sense of proportion — composure that can be lost in the heat 
of the moment. As Moses LJ observed in R v Huggins:293  
In the heat of the moment there may be a perception in the judge of the 
need for speedy action and condign punishment, but the importance of the 
time for reflection is that it presents an opportunity to consider whether a 
less stringent course may be taken. Indeed, that time for reflection may 
itself avoid the need for any further action at all. 
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VI THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ONESELF IN PERSON OR THROUGH LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE (ARTICLE 14.3(D)) 
In Australia, unlike many other common-law jurisdictions, there is no 
constitutional or common-law right to legal representation. There is a 
limited ‘right’ to representation that springs from the common-law power of 
courts to stay proceedings in the event that an indigent person has been 
accused of a serious offence and, through no fault of his or her own, has been 
unable to secure legal representation.294 However, this limited common-law 
right fails to protect people accused of contempt in the face of the court who 
really require legal representation.  
 In its review of the law of contempt, the Law Commission commented 
that ‘[i]t may be particularly important for the alleged contemnor to be 
legally represented on a contempt allegation if he or she was an 
unrepresented defendant at the time of engaging in the behaviour alleged to 
be a contempt’.295 This observation is doubly reinforced in cases where a 
person is experiencing mental ill-health and may have particular difficulties 
understanding what is taking place and what decisions should be made in 
his or her best interests. These propositions are well evident in the cases 
studies detailed in the next chapter. 
 
VII THE RIGHT TO EXAMINE, OR HAVE EXAMINED, THE WITNESSES AGAINST 
ONESELF (ARTICLE 14.3(E)) 
Even in those Australian jurisdictions where the governing statutes 
expressly provide that the accused can make a defence to the charge, no 
provision is made for the accused to cross-examine the presiding judge as to 
the judge’s perceptions or conclusions on the relevant conduct. In its review, 
the ALRC — commenting on the reliability and adequacy of the ‘judge’s-eye 
view’ — frankly and forthrightly acknowledged that 
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factors contributing to its unreliability include the expectations of the 
witness as to what might have happened, the witness being under stress at 
the time of the relevant events and the witness being of an advanced age. 
Any or all of these factors may be operative when a presiding judge is 
reaching a conclusion, based entirely on his or her own perceptions, as to 
what has happened in the courtroom. If, on the other hand, the mode of trial 
employed allows a number of persons who were present in the courtroom — 
including both the presiding judge and the accused — to describe the 
relevant events according to their individual perceptions, the likelihood of 
inaccuracy is reduced.296 
 Australian judges enjoy immunity from suit that would preclude 
them from serving as witnesses in contempt proceedings. However, people 
accused of contempt in the face of the court may generate some forensic 
benefit in cross-examining other witnesses, and in the light of the stigma of 
criminal conviction and the seriousness of the punishment, they ought not 
be denied any forensic advantage that might flow from the implementation 
of the right enshrined in article 14(3)(e).  
 
VIII CONCLUSIONS 
As the United Kingdom Law Commission has observed:297 
Courts have emphasised in a number of cases that the purpose of having 
power to deal with contempt is to protect the course of justice. If, however, 
the procedure by which the court seeks to impose its authority lacks the 
basic features of justice which apply to criminal proceedings, then it 
undermines rather than enhances the rule of law.  
 The material above demonstrates that Australian principles 
governing contempt in the face of the court fall well short of human rights 
standards. While the Australian Law Reform Commission explicitly referred 
to article 14 of the ICCPR in its 1987 review of the law of contempt, it 
stopped short of recommending cessation of summary procedure. Instead, 
the Commission recommended the following safeguards for the accused: 
• the charge should be in writing and specify the particulars of the alleged 
offence; 
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• the charge should contain a statement as to the rights of the defendant 
to elect the alternative mode of trial; and 
• there should be an adjournment for a reasonable period to give the 
defendant an adequate opportunity to obtain legal advice or legal 
representation and to prepare a case in defence.298 
 Similarly, the Western Australian Law Reform Commission 
recommended replacing the existing procedures for dealing with contempt 
in the face of the court with a uniform procedure applicable in all Western 
Australian courts. Under the procedure recommended by the WALRC, a 
contempt offence may only be tried by the presiding judicial officer where 
the alleged offender consents to that procedure, or where the conduct has 
occurred in the presence of the judicial officer, and the judicial officer 
considers ‘that the alleged contempt presents an immediate threat to the 
authority of the court or the integrity of the proceedings then in progress 
unless dealt with in a summary manner’.299 The WALRC recommended that 
where a court proceeds to determine a contempt offence summarily, it 
should: 
(a) inform the accused of the nature and particulars of the charge; 
(b)  allow the accused a reasonable opportunity to seek legal advice, to be 
 heard and to call witnesses and, if necessary, grant an adjournment 
 for any of those purposes; 
(c)  after hearing the accused, determine the charge and give reasons for 
 the determination; and 
(d)  make an order for punishment or discharge of the accused.300 
 Where the conditions for the exercise of the summary power were not 
satisfied, the WALRC recommended referring the matter to a different 
judicial officer, along with additional requirements that the alleged offence 
be reduced to writing and provided to the alleged offender.301 Where the 
matter was referred to a different judge rather than handled by the 
presiding judicial officer, the WALRC recommended that the judicial officer 
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be immune from giving evidence unless he or she chose to do so. Instead, the 
matter would be determined by reference to the transcript or recording of 
the events, and other available evidence and compellable witnesses.302 
 While these recommendations are worthwhile, they fall short of what 
is required to ensure justice for people with mental health issues in the 
courts. It is clear from the analysis in this chapter that summary procedure 
falls foul of article 14 of the ICCPR. Summary procedure has traditionally 
been justified on the basis that contempt in the face of the court requires 
immediate discipline and the avoidance of delay associated with an 
adjournment and a trial. However, summary procedure can truncate 
fairness to the accused and, worse, it is clear that in some cases it can be 
used as an instrument of oppression. For people who are experiencing 
mental ill-health, the use of summary procedure may be particularly unfair 
and discriminatory. It is strongly arguable that, in the light of the above, 
adherence to human rights principles, particularly those enshrined in 
article 14 of the ICCPR, require that: 
• the charge of contempt should be specified and a written charge be 
formulated; 
• the accused should be required to plead to the charge (with an 
associated opportunity to argue that they are unfit to plead); 
• the accused should be advised of his or her right to an adjournment; 
• the accused should be afforded representation; 
• the accused should be afforded time and facilities to prepare his or 
her defence; and 
• the matter should be heard by a different judge than the one who 
witnessed the contempt. 
 If nothing else, such reforms would serve to slow the process down 
and provide time for passions to cool.  
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 As contempt in the face of the court is a criminal offence, the ICCPR 
is of most direct relevance to any consideration of the relevant human rights 
standards to be applied. Article 14 of the ICCPR, in particular, has been the 
main focus of this chapter. However, Australia has also signed and ratified 
other international treaties that are relevant in the context of this thesis. 
For example, article 12 of the ICESCR recognises ‘the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health’. In General Comment No 14, the United Nations General Assembly’s 
Third Committee observed that ‘the right to health must be understood as a 
right to the enjoyment of [a] variety of facilities, goods, services and 
conditions necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of 
health’.303 As Ben Saul, David Kinley and Jacqueline Mowbray have 
observed, the ‘foundational feature of any health care system’ is availability, 
and ‘availability boils down to addressing the dual questions [of] whether 
the state has suitable and sufficient resources, and whether it has the 
capacity and willingness to utilize them appropriately and effectively’.304 
This is an evolutionary process.305 Article 12 of the ICESCR is also 
reinforced by the 1991 United Nations Principles for the Protection of 
Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care 
(‘MI Principles’). The Australian Government was closely involved in the 
negotiation of both the International Covenants, and the MI Principles. 
These principles only reinforce Australia’s obligation to take steps to reform 
the law to ensure justice for people with mental health issues accused of 
crimes in Australian courts.  While litigants in the Australian Capital 
Territory and Victoria can have recourse to their human rights statutes to 
press for recognition of their rights in this context, for the reasons that are 
developed further in the concluding Chapter of this thesis, it is 
recommended that the approach taken in the Family Court should be 
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accepted and implemented via a national, co-operative law reform initiative, 
to ensure uniformity of treatment across all Australian jurisdiction.    
 In the analysis in this chapter, international human rights principles 
have been adopted as the normative framework and reference point for the 
critical analysis of the principles and procedures governing contempt in the 
face of the court. It is true that Australia has traditionally had a poor record 
of compliance with the decisions of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee. As Darren O’Donovan and Patrick Keyzer have observed, ‘even 
rich, developed, liberal democracies can pursue a policy of deliberate and 
persistent non-compliance. Ultimately, access to international justice in this 
context is meaningless if the parties to international human rights 
instruments fail to comply.’306 However, it has been repeatedly recognised 
that Australian governments should redouble their efforts to meet the needs 
of people with mental health issues exposed to the criminal justice 
system.307 This was acknowledged by the Council of Australian 
Governments in the National Statement of Principles for Forensic Mental 
Health, which provides that state and territory legislatures must, when 
developing policies to support people experiencing mental ill-health, comply 
with the ICCPR and with the MI Principles.308  
 In the next chapter, the defects of the current regime of principles, 
and of the consequent denial of human rights, are illustrated via a number 
of case studies. In addition, the chapter will highlight circumstances where 
human rights must be balanced against other considerations, and 
punishment or even exclusion from access to the courts may be necessary to 
ensure the due administration of justice.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Cases Studies of People With Mental Health 
Issues Who Commit Contempt In the Face of 
the Court 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The man’s not well. He should not be here.309 
In this chapter, a number of detailed case studies of contempt in the face of 
the court are provided and critically analysed. These cases have been 
selected for a number of reasons: they demonstrate the diverse mental 
health issues experienced by litigants; they demonstrate the diverse 
circumstances that can give rise to contempt prosecutions; they demonstrate 
the utility of an approach that concentrates on the question of whether 
mental ill-health has overborne the will of the person concerned at the 
relevant time; and they demonstrate the diverse responses of the courts to 
people who commit contempt in the face of the court. After each case study, 
a series of questions are raised that are framed against the backdrop of the 
legal analysis conducted in Chapter One and the human rights issues 
traversed in Chapter Two. These questions then propel the analysis and the 
search for policy solutions in the final chapter of the thesis, Chapter Four.  
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II CASE STUDY ONE: THE MOORE-MCQUILLAN SAGA 
A search using the name ‘Markham Moore-McQuillan’ across databases 
provided by the Australasian Legal Information Institute discloses that he 
has been a party — almost invariably a plaintiff, applicant or appellant — 
in about 100 cases reported on that database, spanning a period of two 
decades. Moore-McQuillan recently appeared in the High Court in Moore-
McQuillan v The Queen, heard by Kiefel and Keane JJ on 18 June 2015,310 
in which he unsuccessfully appealed from the decision of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal of the Supreme Court of South Australia finding him guilty 
of threatening people in court. An important question raised by the Moore-
McQuillan cases is: How much is enough?311 
 On 26 February 2007, Moore-McQuillan committed contempt in the 
face of the court. Justice Perry of the Supreme Court of South Australia had 
rejected various applications by Moore-McQuillan to re-open previously 
unsuccessful applications he had made,312 and as Perry J handed down his 
judgment to that effect, his Honour was met by the following response from 
Moore-McQuillan:313 
Moore-McQuillan: Thank you for being an arsehole and thank you for 
being prejudicial and thank you for being a cunt. 
Perry J: That’s enough from you.  
Moore-McQuillan: Hope you have a good fucking retirement you stupid 
fucking idiot. Thank Christ we are getting rid of a fucking cunt like you. 
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 Witnesses in court also gave evidence that Moore-McQuillan had also 
called Perry J ‘corrupt’.314 Moore-McQuillan was charged with contempt in 
the face of the court.315 
 The contempt prosecution was heard by Nyland J.316 On this occasion 
Moore-McQuillan was represented by counsel. Expert evidence was 
considered. A psychologist named Richard Balfour examined Moore-
McQuillan and gave evidence about Moore-McQuillan’s mental health. 
Justice Nyland summed up Balfour’s evidence in the following terms:317 
Mr Balfour concluded that the defendant fitted the diagnostic criteria for 
being a Querulant of the Vexatious Litigant and Paranoid subtypes as 
referred to in an article by Paul Mullen and Grant Lester (2006) Vexatious 
Litigants and Unusually Persistent Complainants and Petitioners: From 
Querulous Paranoia to Querulous Behaviour, Behavioural Science and The 
Law, (24:33-349).318  
 Mr Balfour considered that the defendant had now lost all rational 
perspective with regard to the inappropriateness of his behaviour in court 
and did not see how his behaviour had severely undermined his credibility 
and legal cause. Mr Balfour thought that the defendant’s querulous 
behaviour was entrenched and there was ‘a high probability that he will 
continue to lose his temper in court and become obnoxious and abusive’. Mr 
Balfour described the defendant’s behaviour as challenging but believed 
that there was some hope that he might respond to rehabilitation.  
 The psychologist, Mr Balfour, said that he had discussed the concept 
of contempt of court with Moore-McQuillan, and the psychologist concluded 
that ‘he does not understand the concept at all’.319 However, in re-
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examination, Mr Balfour said that Moore-McQuillan would have understood 
that what he said was insulting to a judge of the Supreme Court, and 
inappropriate in the circumstances.  
 Moore-McQuillan offered a written apology — but it was heavily 
qualified. He wrote: 
I am apologizing for me [sic] behaviour which is more reactional to the 
stress and asking for assistance in my quest to have my rights pursuant to 
the legislation of South Australia that I have been denied. Forgive my 
outburst on 26-2-07.  
 Later in the ‘apology’, Moore-McQuillan said he had been asked 
whether he had respect for the court. He responded:320 
[T]he answer would be NO as respect has to be earnt [sic] not given and I 
have yet to see any fairness or effort from the courts to suggest respect 
should be given. I do have respect for the law but not for the manipulation 
of it by people who should know and do better. I have witnesses [sic] Judges 
openly lie about talking to other judges about myself which smacks of bias 
and prejudice. I have watched lawyer and Judges take the high ground and 
openly manipulate matters against me. I have seen the use of the Sherriff 
[sic] and Police dept [sic] to manipulate circumstances in a court against me. 
I ask that I be treated fairly but that is a joke as it’s more a behind the 
closed doors [sic] that my matters are solved to me [sic] detriment.  
 The document concluded with what Nyland J described as a plea by 
the defendant that an investigation be conducted into his matters by ‘a 
SUITABLE IMPARTIAL LEGAL OFFICER WHO IS NOT PART OF THE 
COURTS LEGAL OR JUDICY [SIC] SYSTEM SO COMMONSENSE WILL 
APPLY’.321 A separate document filed by Moore-McQuillan said that it ‘is 
easier to say I am paranoid etc when the courts fail to investigate, protect or 
allow injustice and corruption to continue’.322 Before the Supreme Court 
hearing, Nyland J asked Moore-McQuillan ‘Will you confirm that you will do 
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the best you can to behave during the court proceedings?’ to which he 
responded: ‘I have always tried to do that.’323 
 Notwithstanding this undertaking, Nyland J held that Moore-
McQuillan’s apology for his contempt before Perry J was not genuine. Her 
Honour concluded:324 
I am satisfied that the words used were a contempt in the face of the court 
notwithstanding that they were uttered after judgment had been delivered. 
I am satisfied that the defendant was aware of what he was saying and was 
able to control what he said. The statements were deliberately made by the 
defendant with the intention to insult, ridicule and to defy the authority of 
the court simply because the defendant had received a judgment which was 
not in his favour. To refer to a judge as ‘corrupt’ is an insult of the worst 
kind, designed to impair ‘confidence in the courts and their judgments’. I 
therefore find the defendant guilty of the charge of contempt. 
 Moore-McQuillan was sentenced to a three-month suspended 
sentence conditional on his being of good behaviour for 18 months.325  
 Significantly, Nyland J referred to the evidence of the psychologist, 
Mr Balfour, and recommended that Moore-McQuillan participate in a 
supervised, structured rehabilitation program, receive intensive case-
management support from a Community Corrections Officer, that he be 
referred to a psychiatrist with the intention that he take mood-stabilising 
drugs for anger and depression, and that he seek the assistance of a 
psychologist in order to receive cognitive behaviour therapy.326 	
 On 12 May 2008, less than a month after the contempt conviction, 
Moore-McQuillan breached his bond when he lost his temper in the Workers 
Compensation Tribunal. He became angry with a submission made by 
counsel for Workcover (a Mr Downs) and said:327 
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Moore-McQuillan: Listen, you just shut the fuck up and fucking sit down 
and don’t be a dickhead and instead of fucking turning around and dictate 
the terms— 
His Honour: That’s— 
Moore-McQuillan: I’m talking to you and I don’t need this fuckwit 
interrupting.  
His Honour: That is enough, Mr Moore-McQuillan.  
Moore-McQuillan: I don’t think so. Why doesn’t Downs tell us what his 
fucking instructions to— 
His Honour: Mr Moore-McQuillan, stop it.  
Moore-McQuillan: You lying piece of shit. Now, sit down, you dick-face.  
 Moore-McQuillan also accused both the Workers Compensation 
Tribunal and Workcover’s lawyer of bias.328 Moore-McQuillan’s bond was 
estreated and he was arrested, taken into custody and imprisoned.  
 Plainly, Moore-McQuillan had behaved very badly, and his behaviour 
warranted censure. But the circumstances of the case raise a number of very 
important questions. First, why were the recommendations of the 
psychologist not heeded and implemented? Secondly, was imprisonment an 
appropriate option for a person who was diagnosed as being paranoid and 
querulous? Imprisonment is the most severe punishment that can be 
inflicted in Australia.329 While the due and orderly administration of justice 
may require that a person who commits contempt of court should be 
expelled from court or even detained for a short period, the objective of 
recovery from mental illness may not be well served by prolonged periods of 
incarceration.330 How did things get to this point? Why is Moore-McQuillan 
still in the courts? Could something have been done earlier in this 25-year 
period to secure appropriate mental health services for Moore-McQuillan?  
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 Moore-McQuillan’s problems seem to have started in 1990.331 At that 
time he was employed as a shop assistant and dive instructor at the Wolf 
Air and Dive Shop in South Australia.332 On 9 September 1990, it appears 
that he may have slipped down some stairs and injured his left knee and 
several toes.333 Moore-McQuillan was dissatisfied with the amount of 
compensation he was awarded by WorkCover, and commenced a series of 
cases in the Workers Compensation Tribunal, a number of appeals to the 
Supreme Court, appeals to the Full Bench of the Supreme Court, and even 
appeals to the High Court in order to increase his compensation.334  
 Early on, Moore-McQuillan enjoyed some victories in his cases 
against WorkCover. But Moore-McQuillan’s fortunes changed when his ex-
wife informed WorkCover that his claims were fraudulent.335 WorkCover 
conducted an investigation and Moore-McQuillan was charged and 
convicted in March 1996 of six counts of obtaining dishonest payments.336  
 Moore-McQuillan appealed the convictions. The appeal grounds 
provide some insight into Moore-McQuillan’s ingenuity as a self-represented 
litigant. He claimed, among other things, that he had been inappropriately 
advised to plead guilty, and that he now wished to plead not guilty to the 
offences. He argued that there had been an abuse of process by the 
prosecution. He argued that he had been given unclear legal advice, and 
consequently he had suffered prejudice because he did not have sufficient 
time to prepare his case. He also argued that because he had been held in 
custody immediately before the trial, this had also prejudiced his 
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preparation. He argued that the pleas of guilty he made before a Special 
Magistrate were entered as a result of a misapprehension caused by his 
unclear legal advice, producing a mistake as to the basis of the plea he had 
entered, and that this resulted in a miscarriage of justice.337  
 Justice Perry rejected the appeal, holding that the evidence indicated 
that Moore-McQuillan had been fully advised of his rights at all times. This 
is when the contempt incident described above took place. 
 Over the last 20 years, Moore-McQuillan has been variously convicted 
of assault against a person seeking to serve a restraining order on him,338 
convicted of assault for threatening and spitting on a barrister working for 
an opposing party,339 and declared bankrupt due to unpaid court fees and 
legal fees.340 But this does not appear to have chilled his ardour for 
litigation. In 2012 he appeared in the South Australian Workers 
Compensation Tribunal, self-represented, on no fewer than four 
occasions.341 He was back in the courts, appealing (unsuccessfully) from one 
of the findings of the Tribunal to the Full Bench of the Tribunal in late 
2013.342 In 2014, Moore-McQuillan appealed — partly successfully — a 
conviction for three counts of threatening to cause harm (threatening a 
barrister, abusing a judge and threatening a solicitor by saying ‘I know 
where you live’).343 As noted above, his June 2015 application for special 
leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia against his conviction was 
unsuccessful.344  
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 In one of these matters, Olsson AJ had the opportunity to reconsider 
evidence gathered by investigators employed by WorkCover who had, 
unknown to Moore-McQuillan, taken video footage of him engaged in 
various physical activities that were inconsistent with his account of the 
damage caused by his injury.345 This video footage and the evidence of the 
investigators were totally at odds with Moore-McQuillan’s sworn testimony 
that he had suffered long-term damage as a result of his 1990 accident. The 
video evidence showed Moore-McQuillan engaging in diving and diving-
instruction activities without any apparent impediment. Moore-McQuillan 
could climb into his boat and use his putatively damaged left leg as a prop 
while pulling himself up. The video showed that he could bend, lift and 
carry heavy items. He could climb up and down the steps of jetties to enter 
and leave the water while wearing scuba diving gear, a weight belt and an 
air tank on his back. The video also showed that he could climb over rocks 
on the seashore. For his part, Moore-McQuillan denied that he was the 
person in the video footage and suggested that it had been concocted. Olsson 
J dismissed these evasions as ‘ridiculous’. 	
 Remarkably, it transpires that during a significant part of the period 
Moore-McQuillan has been in the South Australian courts, questions about 
his mental health have been raised.346 Almost 15 years ago, Moore-
McQuillan himself argued in the Workers Compensation Tribunal that he 
was unfit to maintain various actions he had commenced in that Tribunal 
because he was consulting a psychiatrist.347 Later, in the Supreme Court 
hearing in 2007 for Moore-McQuillan’s contempt, Nyland J, commenting on 
the evidence given by an experienced psychologist, observed:348 	
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Mr Balfour considered there was no clinical evidence to suggest that the 
defendant suffered from a psychotic illness, intellectual disability or drug or 
alcohol problems. He did, however, refer to the defendant’s dysfunctional 
childhood and considered that the defendant’s present mental health was 
poor. Mr Balfour believed that a number of factors were responsible for the 
defendant’s behaviour in court:349  
1. I believe his presentation and personal history are consistent with 
having a personality disorder of moderate severity characterised by 
paranoid and narcissistic traits. He has a degree of grandiosity, 
exaggerated egocentricity, lacks empathy with others, and has a 
narcissistic sense of entitlement to special treatment. He views the 
legal system as working in collusion against his best interests. He is 
paranoid but has not experienced a psychotic break with reality. I do 
not believe he has an encapsulated paranoid delusional disorder. 
 
2. He suffered a severe work-related injury on the 09/09/1990. He 
suffers from chronic pain which has made him depressed and 
irritable. He has been treated with the antidepressant, Endep, for 
the last two years. I believe he has suffered from a major depressive 
disorder which has waxed and wane[d] in severity in response to the 
psychosocial stressors in his life. He has felt increasingly suicidal 
and hopeless about his legal circumstances. He has experienced a 
major loss of quality of life. … 
 
6. He has decided to legally represent himself in court because he 
believes he cannot afford or find competent lawyers to represent him. 
Nevertheless, I believe the experience of legally representing himself 
would be very stressful and intimidating for an individual with no 
formal legal training. He has no capacity to disengage his emotional 
investment in his legal case and to examine legal issues at an 
intellectually rational level. He has a very low tolerance of 
frustration in court. He projects his anger onto court officials.   
 As noted above, Nyland J had recommended that Moore-McQuillan be 
referred to a psychiatrist, take medication for anger and depression, and 
seek the assistance of a psychologist in order to receive cognitive 
behavioural therapy. But there is no evidence that any of these orders or 
recommendations were complied with, and over the next five years Moore-
McQuillan was back in the South Australian Workers Compensation 
Tribunal causing problems.350  
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 Olsson AJ described Moore-McQuillan’s evidence as a witness in 2012 
as giving rise to ‘great difficulty’ because of the ‘overt animosity projected by 
him towards the legal representatives of the respondent and certain of the 
witnesses called’.351 His Honour said that the evidence and other exchanges 
during the hearing ‘gave rise to frequent acrimonious exchanges, virtually 
uncontrollable emotional outbursts on the part of the applicant and the 
constant use by him of foul language or making of gratuitous, highly 
offensive remarks, directed variously to, or in relation to, counsel, witnesses 
and both myself and other members of the Tribunal’.352 This ‘rendered an 
orderly hearing process extremely difficult, if not impossible, at times’.353 
During the course of his judgment, Olsson AJ described Moore-McQuillan as 
deliberately uncooperative and obstructive, unreliable, lacking credibility, 
impractical, childish, incredible, intemperate, uncontrolled, bizarre, 
obsessional, gratuitously and persistently discursive, deliberately false, 
evasive, unconvincing and ridiculous.354 His Honour observed:355 	
In the result, and having regard to such medical evidence as is before me, I 
entertain no doubt that the bizarre behaviour exhibited by him was, at least 
in large measure, the product of his emotional and seemingly obsessional 
mental health state.  
 It is to be noted that his intemperate and angry outbursts, use of foul 
language and reckless abuse of various persons, including myself, were as 
unpredictable as they were bizarre. On the face of them they often did not 
seem to be the actions of a rational person.  
 At other times he behaved reasonably and rationally and was quite 
cooperative, albeit for short bursts of time. Things said or occurrences in the 
courtroom seemingly triggered off quite unpredictable conduct on his part. 
In short, his conduct begged a conclusion that he was suffering from some 
mental health or emotional difficulty. 	
 This case study shows that Moore-McQuillan behaved very badly, 
assaulting lawyers and abusing judges. Yet it was known to the courts as 
early as 2000 that Moore-McQuillan had mental health issues, and that 
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these issues caused him to threaten people and swear at people in court. By 
the time Moore-McQuillan committed contempt, he had already been in and 
out of South Australian courts and tribunals for almost 20 years.  
 Justice Nyland carefully considered Moore-McQuillan’s mental 
health, and yet her Honour’s very sensible recommendations that he seek 
help and take medication do not appear to have been implemented. When 
one takes into account the observations of the judges in the various cases 
above, the diagnosis of Moore-McQuillan’s psychologist that his ‘mental 
health was poor’, and his previous applications in which he said he was 
unfit to plead, not to mention the hundreds of sitting days occupied by 
Moore-McQuillan’s baseless actions, and the thousands of days of work 
engaged in by judges, court workers, lawyers, Workcover employees, experts 
and witnesses, it beggars belief that there had been no effective mechanisms 
in place to guide Moore-McQuillan to appropriate services. It is important to 
note that these events may well have affected the mental health of other 
people in court at the times these events took place.  
 Moore-McQuillan has consumed a vast quantity of public resources 
and appears to have wasted much of his life as a ‘court ghost’.356 Should he 
have been declared a vexatious litigant many cases ago? Could more have 
been done earlier to help Moore-McQuillan with his mental health 
problems? Could more be done to assist litigants with mental health issues 
before they commit contempt in the face of the court?  
 It is submitted that the answer to all three of these questions is ‘yes’.  
Moore-McQuillan has been wasting court time for over 25 years.  Over 
twenty years ago, South Australian courts decided that his workers’ 
compensation claims were bogus, and his pattern of continuing to press 
baseless actions richly reinforces the conclusion that he is a querulent 
litigant.  Dr Balfour concluded that Moore-McQuillan had (in 1997) a 
‘personality disorder of moderate severity characterised by paranoid and 
narcissistic traits. He has a degree of grandiosity, exaggerated egocentricity, 
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lacks empathy with others, and has a narcissistic sense of entitlement to 
special treatment’.  However it is difficult to accept any contention that this 
affected his will in the relevant sense.  His outbursts in court and abuse of 
judges, lawyers and others were not irresistible impulses.  While his mental 
health might be ‘poor’, his behaviour was wilful.  For these reasons, rules 
governing abuse of process could and should have been applied to prevent 
Moore-McQuillan from accessing court to make any further baseless claims.     
 However the question remains whether the courts could have done 
more to prevent Moore-McQuillan from becoming a court ghost.  It is 
arguable that effective diversion to mental health services may well have 
quelled or even halted Moore-McQuillan’s repeated attempts to access the 
courts to advance baseless actions. Accessing such services might even have 
improved his mental health and advanced his prospects of recovery.  
 Australian courts have the power to recommend that a person seek 
psychological treatment.  It is submitted that where a person has been 
found guilty of contempt in the face of the court, that court could require 
evidence of successful treatment before providing leave to a person to 
commence new proceedings.  This would not prevent contumacious 
behaviour for one-off litigants, but it would assist with those like Moore-
McQuillan.   For one-off contemnors, referral to mental health services 
would be appropriate.  This topic will be revisited after the next case studies 
are outlined. 
 
III CASE STUDY TWO: THE COLEIRO CASE 
The second case study, A Bank & Coleiro,357 is quite different. But it raises 
important additional questions about the adequacy of the law and procedure 
of contempt in the face of the court to protect the human rights of litigants. 
																																								 																				
357  [2011] FamCAFC 157. 
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The case also raises questions about the adequacy of judicial mental health 
literacy and judicial mental health.  
 In A Bank & Coleiro, Mrs Coleiro, the former wife of Mr Coleiro, had 
filed an application against her husband in the Federal Magistrates Court 
at Parramatta in February 2011 seeking final property settlement orders, 
including an order that her former husband pay her $100,000, and interim 
orders that would restrain her former husband from dealing with the 
proceeds of the sale of the family home, which had been sold in January 
2010.358 Other orders were sought seeking to restrain the husband from 
dealing with the proceeds of the sale.359 The husband declined to appear at 
the hearing and Joseph Harman FM made the orders sought.360  
 At the next hearing the wife appeared with counsel and the husband 
attended with an interpreter, but no legal representation.361 The husband 
confirmed that the house had been sold, who the solicitors were, and that 
the money was with the solicitors.362 Counsel for the wife referred to bank 
records that indicated that some of the proceeds had been banked in other 
accounts contrary to the Court’s original orders.363 After a short 
adjournment a duty lawyer appeared to represent the husband and the 
following exchange with the magistrate took place:364 
HIS HONOUR: You have come into the matter very recently. Of the 
$200,050, have you had an opportunity, or if not, could you have an 
opportunity to find out where that all is or what has occurred to it? Because 
certainly …  
[MS N]: Your Honour, my concern at the moment is that [the husband] 
firstly has trouble hearing, and secondly, that he also has dementia. And I 
do have some concerns about his capacity to instruct me at the moment.  
HIS HONOUR: Certainly.  
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[MS N]: I have attempted to seek instructions from him in relation to the 
money and all he has been able to tell me is that he no longer has the 
money. I am …  
 The federal magistrate interrupted, and, addressing the husband via 
the interpreter, said:365 
HIS HONOUR: Right. Can I ask you, Ms Interpreter, to explain. I want [the 
husband] to tell me where the $200,050 is; and if he either refuses to tell 
me or he genuinely no longer has the money, he starts a gaol 
sentence today.  
THE INTERPRETER: Okay. [The husband] says that he fell sick. He put 
the money in the back of the car and that when he looked for that, they were 
no longer there.  
HIS HONOUR: Can you ask him is there any money left in any account 
with [the bank]?  
THE INTERPRETER: Okay. All I have left is about $3000. 
HIS HONOUR: Then can you ask him is there somebody who can 
bring his toiletries because he is going into a police cell in about 
five minutes time? 
 THE INTERPRETER: I don’t have any money.  
HIS HONOUR: I am getting the police here now. They are going to 
take you into custody and put you in a cell.  
THE INTERPRETER: Okay. I can’t do anything about it.  
HIS HONOUR: Very well. While we are waiting for them, you need to go to 
the witness box, please.  
Bryant CJ later observed:366 
At this stage I observe the husband had not given any sworn evidence and 
had not been charged with any contempt. Although an injunction had been 
granted ex parte on 1 April 2011 restraining him from disposing of funds, 
there was no order to pay any money to the wife. Thus there was no legal 
basis on which his Honour could have had the husband imprisoned. His 
comments then, assuming he was aware of this, could only be seen as in 
terrorem. Such an approach is inconsistent with an obligation to apply the 
law fairly and to exercise discretion judicially, not arbitrarily.  
 The husband was then sworn and gave evidence. ... As a result of the 
husband’s evidence that he had apparently withdrawn funds originally 
deposited with the bank his Honour charged the husband with contempt.  
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 After the husband was sworn, the federal magistrate continued his 
questioning of the husband.367 The husband’s answers were inconsistent and 
unclear.368 The duty lawyer from Legal Aid tendered a doctor’s report 
informing the Court that her client had dementia.369 The duty lawyer also 
advised the Court that Mr Coleiro suffered from acute diabetes and needed 
to eat, and asked the federal magistrate to allow her client to wait in the 
duty lawyer room and eat, instead of being sent to the cells.370  
 The matter resumed later in the afternoon, at which point the Court 
held a teleconference with the bank to ascertain the whereabouts of the 
money. The witness from the bank was not sworn or affirmed. After the 
phone call, the federal magistrate indicated that he was thinking about 
gaoling the husband until he had produced $120,000.371 Counsel for the 
husband then made a submission that, as her client had dementia, he 
should be released. The federal magistrate indicated that he would accept 
that submission but that:372  
I’m going to release [the husband] on condition that he appear on the next 
occasion and that he present 120,000 bucks or he goes to gaol next time. I 
don’t believe for one second his story, or his friend’s story about 200 grand 
in the back of the car; not for one second. I would slot him for perjury now, if 
somebody could produce a $20 note that shows he was lying. But I’m just 
unimpressed that he is served with an application, and two working days 
later, banks the cheque and proceeds to withdraw it by telephone banking 
— whether he did it or somebody else — but he must have given them the 
details for telephone banking after 1 March because that’s when he set up 
the account, as it would appear, a new customer of [the bank]. 
 Counsel also sought an adjournment in order to arrange a grant of 
legal aid for the husband and legal representation for him. The matter was 
then adjourned and later resolved without the need for the contempt 
proceedings to go ahead. 
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 It is difficult to imagine things getting worse, but they did. In a 
subsequent hearing in the same matter, Harman FM contemplated that if 
Mr Coleiro received a beating in jail after he had been imprisoned for 
contempt of court that it might have the positive effect of causing Coleiro to 
recant what the magistrate regarded to be Coleiro’s previous, perjured 
evidence:373  
HIS HONOUR: But I just don’t see — I suppose, being blunt, I don’t 
particularly want to see the Sunday Telegraph with a banner headline 
about the nasty Federal Magistrate who caused an elderly deaf man 
to get beaten in jail, when it’s not achieving a purpose. If it 
achieved a purpose, well, he can cop the beating.  
 The bank, which had been joined to the proceedings on the motion of 
the federal magistrate, appealed on grounds that are presently immaterial. 
While the matter in the Full Family Court was not an appeal in relation to 
any contempt in the face of the court, Bryant CJ, with whom Finn and 
Strickland JJ agreed, took the opportunity to observe that Harman FM had 
failed to observe the Federal Magistrates Court Rules by failing to allow the 
husband to plead to the charge, to obtain advice, or to have an opportunity 
to call evidence in relation to the charge.374 Proceedings were not adjourned 
to allow these things to happen.375 Bryant CJ also criticised the magistrate 
for using the threat of prison to elicit evidence from Coleiro regarding the 
putatively withdrawn funds.376 The Chief Justice, reflecting on Harman 
FM’s misapplication of the Federal Magistrates Court Rules relating to 
contempt, observed:377 
[I]t is obvious no proper procedure to arrive at a conviction and 
imprisonment had taken place. However it accords with the order that his 
Honour made, which had the character of punishment for contempt rather 
than a remand until the contempt could be heard. If that is so, it needs no 
further comment to demonstrate the clear and unambiguous failure to 
comply with the Federal Magistrates Court Rules, established authority and 
basic tenets of procedural fairness. The admission from his Honour that he 
had convicted and imprisoned the husband reveals that he failed:  
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• to allow the husband to plead to the charge;  
• to afford the husband an opportunity to get advice or be heard;  
• to allow the husband to call evidence in relation to the charge;  
• to make findings on the evidence to determine whether the charge 
was proven beyond reasonable doubt;  
• to make a formal conviction;  
• to properly sentence;  
• to give reasons.  
Judges have significant powers which must be exercised judicially. In 
particular, the deprivation of the liberty of an individual is something not to 
be treated lightly by ignoring Rules and procedural fairness or by being 
used as a weapon with which to threaten a party as a means of seeking to 
achieve an end.  
I am conscious that no appeal by the husband was brought against his 
asserted conviction (and that his capacity to conduct proceedings still 
remains uncertain) and that there is no contradicter to support the manner 
in which the Federal Magistrate conducted the proceedings. Accepting those 
caveats however the transcript itself makes clear the flaws in the process 
adopted by the Federal Magistrate.  
 The wider interests of public confidence in the administration of 
justice and expectation that judicial officers will not act arbitrarily, has 
caused me to take the unusual step of commenting on the process adopted 
by his Honour in relation to the contempt charge against the husband, 
absent an appeal against his orders. 
 While Coleiro was not committed for contempt of court, this case 
demonstrates how the power to commit for contempt can be abused. As the 
Full Family Court recorded, Mr Coleiro was not charged, not given an 
opportunity to plead to a charge, not given an opportunity to make a 
submission that he was unfit to plead to the charge, was not provided with 
timely legal representation, and was not heard, there was no finding that he 
was guilty of contempt, and there was no conviction, sentence, or reasons. 
The federal magistrate utterly failed to give due consideration to Mr 
Coleiro’s mental health and its impact on his behaviour and testimony in 
court.  
 A Bank & Coleiro provides an illustration of what can occur when a 
person with mental health issues is dealt with summarily. The case 
demonstrates why an explicit procedure is required to safeguard the rights 
of the accused. The case demonstrates that if procedures for the 
determination of contempt of court are truncated, a person with poor mental 
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health can find himself or herself at risk of being incarcerated through no 
real fault of his or her own. The case also illustrates the need for judicial 
education about mental health and the need for careful treatment of people 
with mental health issues.  
 Finally, the case indicates that steps should be taken to ensure that 
judges themselves have good mental health. Remarkably, it transpires that 
the magistrate who heard the Coleiro matter was also experiencing mental 
ill-health at the time of these matters.378 This raises an important 
additional reform issue: a case of contempt in the face of the court involves 
two people, the person who commits the offence and the judge who makes 
the decision to commit that person. Some attention to the mental health of 
judges in contempt cases is warranted in the development of a holistic 
approach to the problems that plainly emerge in this area.  
	
IV CASE STUDY THREE: WILSON V PROTHONOTARY 
The third case study, Wilson v The Prothonotary,379 is particularly useful to 
illustrate the role that appropriate sentencing can play in achieving a just 
outcome in cases where people with mental health issues commit contempt 
in the face of the court. As Heydon J observed in the appeal judgment in this 
case, John Wilson, a dentist with obsessive compulsive disorder, was seated 
behind the bar table in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1999 
waiting to receive judgment in a case he had brought against a bank.380 But 
Wilson entered the courtroom with a folder containing three bags of paint. 
Immediately after Murray AJ delivered his decision (which Wilson had lost), 
Wilson381 
threw one of the bags of paint towards him. The bag hit his Honour and 
landed on the bench before him, causing yellow paint to splash onto his 
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Honour’s coat. The appellant then threw a second plastic bag of yellow paint 
towards his Honour. The second bag landed between the judge’s Associate 
and the Court Reporter, splashing paint on impact. The court staff 
thereafter restrained the appellant.  
 The Chief Judge at Common Law directed the Prothonotary of the 
Supreme Court to commence proceedings against Wilson for contempt in the 
face of the court. Wilson was also charged with the crime of threatening a 
judicial officer.382  
 Before his trial, Wilson sought unsuccessfully to have his trial heard 
before a jury, on the basis that he had a right to trial by jury protected by 
the Magna Carta and the Constitution.383 These submissions were destitute 
of foundation. An appeal from this judgment was unsuccessful.384 Wilson 
subsequently appealed to the High Court — an appeal heard by Gaudron 
and Callinan JJ on 16 April 1999. Wilson represented himself, re-running 
his arguments that the Magna Carta and the Constitution protected his 
right to trial by jury, but adding a submission that the English Bill of Rights 
of 1688 also protected his right to trial by jury. (A number of these 
judgments are conveniently set out on a website that John Wilson appears 
to have created called ‘rightsandwrongs.com.au’). Justice Gaudron patiently 
explained that the English laws that Wilson had invoked no longer apply in 
Australia, and that s 80 of the Constitution does not apply to state laws at 
any rate.385  
 After losing in the High Court, Wilson made another application in 
the Supreme Court alleging breaches of various international covenants.386 
This application was also dismissed. Wilson later filed a communication 
with the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The Committee held 
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that the claims made by Wilson were inadmissible and unsubstantiated.387 
(A number of these judgments and Mr Wilson’s submissions are set out at a 
website on the Internet called ‘corrupt.club’ — perhaps a title selected by 
Wilson to describe the courts that have not accepted his arguments.)  
 At his trial for contempt, Wilson represented himself and tendered no 
evidence as to his mental state at the time of the contempt. The Court 
sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment.388 The trial judge said that he 
chose not to give Wilson a sentence offering the opportunity of release on 
parole because of Wilson’s389 
refusal to acknowledge the criminality involved in throwing paint bombs at 
a judicial officer. In the absence of any sign of contrition or of insight on his 
part into the wrongness of his conduct and in the presence of his belligerent 
defiance of the court, it is evident that no purpose whatever will be served 
by a period of supervised release on parole.  
 The New South Wales Court of Appeal unanimously rejected his 
appeal against conviction, but Heydon JA, with whom Sheller JA agreed 
(Meagher JA dissenting), upheld his appeal against sentence. Importantly, 
the majority of the Court of Appeal placed weight on the diagnosis of a 
psychologist that Wilson had Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder 
(OCD). The psychologist opined that OCD ‘is not strictly a mental illness’ 
but rather a description of inflexible personality traits that were 
‘exceedingly unlikely’ to change ‘given his age and persistence in attitude’.390  
 It transpires that the litigation that was punctuated by the contempt 
in the face of the court was part of a campaign by Wilson against variable 
interest rate loans, which he contended rendered loan contracts inherently 
uncertain.391 Wilson had himself had a home loan that left him and his wife 
‘owing more money after 13 years than they had borrowed despite having 
paid off substantial sums’.392 Wilson’s wife gave evidence that Wilson was 
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very concerned about people who were less well off, such as destitute 
farmers and young homeowners, who were losing their properties and 
experiencing personal distress as a result of their home loans.393 These 
experiences led him to despise the legal system. 
 Wilson was a frequent user of the Supreme Court, but also brought 
cases in the District Court and the High Court, activities that eventually led 
to him being declared a vexatious litigant in 2010.394 Up to that point, 
Wilson had expended very considerable time and energy on his campaign 
against variable interest rate loans. This campaign involved writing to 
newspapers, politicians and interest groups, speaking on talkback radio, 
moving motions at Liberal Party conventions, and making submissions to 
public bodies.395 Wilson had ‘studied legal books from libraries and 
represented himself in court due to an overwhelming stubborn streak that 
makes him do things his way’.396  
 The evidence was that Wilson’s campaign against variable interest 
rate loans was not his only crusade.397 He also campaigned for the safe 
handling of mercury by dental workers in dental surgeries, believing that 
dental workers risked being poisoned by mercury vapours, and that this 
would cause physical, mental and gynaecological damage.398 This campaign 
had lasted over 12 years, and had involved extensive research, the 
development of safety boxes, the taking out of patents, numerous 
appearances on media, contact with sympathisers in the United States, 
including travel there, and publication of an article in The Lancet.399 Mrs 
Wilson estimated ‘that the campaign cost $500,000, and [ironically enough] 
forced the Wilsons to re-finance their mortgage’.400 Wilson was also involved 
in other crusades ‘against smoking, to reduce speeding, against drugs in 
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sport, in favour of rule changes in squash and changes in the size of the 
squash ball, in favour of the placement of traffic lights on roundabouts, 
against an Australian Republic, in favour of a return to Privy Council 
appeals, against the Dentists Act, against behaviour at rock concerts, 
against television advertising and against aspects of shopping centre 
leases.’401  
 Meagher JA, the senior justice hearing the matter in the Court of 
Appeal, dissented. His judgment is short and can be reproduced in full:402 
I have read in draft the judgment of Heydon JA. I disagree with it. The 
relevant facts are as follows: Mr Wilson threw a bag of paint at a judge. On 
that fact alone he had committed a serious contempt of court, a contempt in 
the face of the Court. The learned Chief Judge at Common Law sentenced 
him to two years’ imprisonment. That is the decision now appealed from. At 
the hearing before the Chief Judge, Mr Wilson led virtually no evidence, 
although invited to do so several times by His Honour. On appeal from His 
Honour, there was an application to lead further evidence, said to be of a 
‘subjective’ nature. This was acceded to by the court, although in my opinion 
wrongly so. Neither before His Honour, nor on appeal, was there any 
apology, or any sign of contrition. It was made clear to the Court that this 
was not due to any inadvertence, but was a calculated decision. In my view 
this is a fact which on its own should preclude any alteration to his 
Honours’ sentence. There was nothing novel about the additional evidence 
led before this court. It could have been led before His Honour, who invited 
Mr Wilson to do just that. There has been no explanation why it was not led. 
There is no evidence that Mr Wilson is mentally unbalanced: eccentric yes, 
obsessive certainly, but demented no. It follows that at all stages of the case, 
both below and before us, he knew exactly what he was doing. In my view 
the appeal against sentence should be dismissed with costs.  
 It is plain that Meagher JA saw Wilson’s failure to apologise as 
decisive. Disagreeing with Heydon J, Meagher JA rejected the evidence that 
was led on appeal (by leave) relating to Wilson’s mental health. Justice 
Meagher rejected the notion that Wilson’s obsessive-compulsive disorder 
had caused him to behave in the way that he did. 
 Heydon J (as his Honour then was) reached the opposite conclusion, 
and Sheller JA agreed. The majority concluded that the ‘difficulty’ with the 
contempts that Wilson had committed was that ‘serious as they were, [they] 
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have their origin’ in the appellant’s obsessive-compulsive disorder.403 While 
the majority acknowledged that OCD may not be a mental illness, ‘it is a 
mental or personality disorder which, according to (psychiatrist) Dr 
McMurdo, is exceedingly unlikely to be treatable’.404 In a significant 
passage, the majority went on to observe:405  
If general deterrence of persons not suffering from ... Obsessive Compulsive 
Personality Disorder can be achieved by imprisoning those who do so suffer, 
the period already served does so sufficiently. A further period in gaol for 
the appellant would not appear to operate as a legitimate means of 
deterring persons who do not suffer from that Disorder. If the appellant 
were not suffering from the Disorder, the time already served would 
sufficiently deter him from similar conduct in the future. There is no reason 
to suppose that continuance of the term will deter the appellant any more 
than it has done already. To endeavour to do so appears futile.   
 Much of the difficulty in this appeal stems from the appellant’s 
failure to offer an apology at any stage, or otherwise to manifest contrition 
for or awareness of his serious wrongdoing, or to indicate appropriate 
acceptance of the court’s authority. In the case of an offender who did what 
the appellant did but did not suffer from the Disorder, that would weigh 
heavily against a sentence as light as that which is proposed below. But 
given that the appellant does suffer from the Disorder, a failure to apologise 
loses significance given that it appears to flow from the Disorder as much as 
did the contempts themselves.  
 On this basis, Heydon JA restricted the penalty to time served 
(Wilson had been imprisoned from 9 November 1999 to 28 February 2000 in 
the Silverwater Correctional Centre).406 
 The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Wilson v 
Prothonotary demonstrates that judges can have regard to evidence of 
mental ill-health in cases of contempt in the face of the court.407 Justice 
Heydon’s remarks directly acknowledge the principle that a person’s mental 
health issues may cause them to commit contempt, and also that 
imprisonment for contempt in the face of the court may serve no deterrent 
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purpose when the contemnor has mental health issues. It is submitted that 
the majority of the Court of Appeal very sensibly took Wilson’s mental 
condition into account in sentencing. The case points the way to an 
evidence-informed approach to the consideration of contempt in the face of 
the court that, for reasons developed in this thesis, is preferable.  
 The Wilson case also demonstrates the diversity of perspectives 
within the judiciary about mental health issues in contempt cases. Meagher 
JA would have required a person to be demented, rather than merely 
obsessive, to attract leniency in sentencing. So what about someone with 
paranoid schizophrenia? Such a person is not, by definition, demented, but 
nonetheless experiencing serious mental health issues. Overwhelmingly, 
people diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia are found not guilty of crimes 
more serious than contempt, such as murder, by reason of mental illness. 
Why should contempt in the face of the court be treated any differently? 
Also, while the decision of the Court of Appeal and recent decisions of the 
High Court demonstrate a greater awareness of the need to take into 
account mental health issues in sentencing, it is clear that sentences 
ordered in cases involving contempt in the face of the court can still be 
disproportionate or excessive.408 
 The Wilson case study also points to the need for evidence of mental 
health conditions to be available during the trial to avoid the risk of 
unnecessary incarceration. A case like Wilson demonstrates that provision 
may need to be made to ensure that such evidence is available in spite of the 
accused (and a case like Coleiro demonstrates that provision may need to be 
made at the initiative of counsel). The Wilson case also makes it clear that 
the moral architecture of contempt in the face of the court, which classically 
requires an apology as the first step in purging the contempt, may be utterly 
irrelevant to the contemnor with mental health issues, and yet it could 
conceivably result in indefinite imprisonment. Even though Wilson’s actions 
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constituted a very serious contempt, if the trial court was aware of the fact 
that Wilson suffered from OCD, it may well have decided, like the majority 
of the Court of Appeal, that no purpose would be served imprisoning him, 
and instead ordered some other penalty, such as a fine or a suspended 
sentence. Ideally, an order could provide a pathway to mental health 
services. 
 As a postscript, it is notable that on 23 September 2010, John Wilson 
was declared a vexatious litigant. Just as with the Moore-McQuillan cases, 
many hundreds of sitting hours and thousands of hours of judicial and 
court-worker time might have been saved had effective services been 
provided to John Wilson at an earlier juncture. The court could have been 
protected from an assault. Early diversion to effective services might have 
also assisted his long-suffering wife and family. In addition, John Wilson 
might have held onto his dentistry practice in North Rocks, improving the 
dental health of thousands of people. These litigants consume a significant 
proportion of court resources. 	
 A declaration that a person is a vexatious litigant is always an 
extraordinary step to take, as it directly impacts access to justice. If mental 
health services were made available for Wilson when he committed the 
contempt, it is conceivable that he might have desisted from using the 
courts, and the vexatious litigant declaration might never have been 
made.409 While the courts have been reluctant to make vexatious litigant 
declarations, some consideration may now need to be given to making 
continued access to court contingent on a person completing (independently 
ordered) treatment and having been declared competent to conduct 
proceedings by appropriately qualified senior psychologists.	
 
																																								 																				
409  It may also be acknowledged that, in the light of the evidence of the psychologist in 
the appeal that his OCD was ‘exceedingly unlikely to be treatable’, it might be that it 
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V CASE STUDY FOUR: MEGUMI OGAWA 
The final case study is the case of Dr Megumi Ogawa. This case is a difficult 
one. On one view, if the findings of fact made by the District Court of 
Queensland and accepted by the Court of Appeal and High Court are 
correct, then the case illustrates the risk that mental health issues can be 
invoked by a litigant seeking to avoid punishment for contemptuous 
behaviour for which they were properly held responsible. On the other hand, 
if Ogawa was genuinely experiencing severe depression and anxiety (as one 
of the experts had testified) at the time she committed contempt in the face 
of the court, then the case illustrates the inadequate mental health literacy 
of the courts, and the inappropriateness of expecting people with serious 
mental health issues to understand what is in their best interests when they 
participate in court proceedings.410 
 Ogawa committed contempt of court when she screamed abuse at a 
District Court judge and flashed her buttocks at him.411 After Ogawa was 
convicted of contempt of court and sentenced to prison she appealed on the 
basis that she was experiencing mental ill-health at the time of the 
contempt. However, the Queensland Court of Appeal rejected these 
submissions and concluded that Ogawa was a ‘humbug’ who was ‘feigning 
an incapacity to represent herself’.412  
 Megumi Ogawa was in court because in two 18-hour periods in April 
and May 2006, she sent 83 emails and made 176 phone calls to the Federal 
																																								 																				
410  Some of the material in this first part of the chapter is drawn from my article, ‘A 
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megumi-ogawa-loses-latest-bid-against-deportation/story-e6freoof-1226312446188>. 
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Court Registry and federal court justices’ chambers, threatening, among 
other things, to kill people. The subject lines of just a few of the emails give 
an indication of the flavour of her correspondence with the Court:413 
‘RETURN MY DOCKET JUDGE!’ 
‘Bastard fink’ 
‘Why do I have to be VICTIMISED’ 
‘STOP HARASSING ME!’ 
‘sneaky court’ 
‘CORRUPTED FEDERAL COURT’ 
‘I CANNOT TAKE IT’ 
‘I WILL KILL PEOPLE’ 
 In March 2009, the Queensland District Court and a jury, having 
regard to evidence of these emails and phone calls, convicted Ogawa — who 
was self-represented at trial — of four counts of using a carriage service to 
harass people and make threats. As the Court of Appeal later noted:414 
On 18 January 2008, the indictment was mentioned before his Honour 
Senior Judge Skoien. At that stage, the trial had been listed to commence in 
the following week. At the mention, the prosecution was ready to proceed. 
Representatives from Legal Aid Queensland (‘LAQ’) appeared to advise his 
Honour that the appellant, though then unrepresented, had been previously 
represented by six different law firms funded by LAQ. In each instance, the 
appellant had indicated to those firms that she did not wish them to 
represent her. LAQ confirmed that it would no longer fund the appellant’s 
representation. 
 During the trial Dr Ogawa was highly disruptive. She screamed at 
the judge, had to be removed from the Court on several occasions, and, at 
one point, started taking off her clothes. After sentencing Ogawa to six 
months for the email and telephone threats, the District Court charged her 
with contempt of court. Ogawa was later convicted, and she was imprisoned 
for four months.415 The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Ogawa 
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against this sentence.416 In August 2010, the High Court of Australia 
dismissed an application by Ogawa for special leave to appeal from the 
judgment of the Queensland Court of Appeal.417  
 Megumi Ogawa has a doctorate in intellectual property law from the 
University of Queensland. She has been employed as a tutor or lecturer at 
several Australian universities.418 Her book, Protection of Broadcasters’ 
Rights, was published by respected international publisher Martinus Nijhoff 
in 2005 with a Foreword by Sir Anthony Mason AC KBE in which his 
Honour described Ogawa as an expert in the field of intellectual property 
and her research as making an invaluable contribution to that field.419 
However, after her criminal convictions for making threats and for 
contempt, it appears that Ogawa has returned to the Courts to file further 
applications that lack foundation.420 What caused things to go awry? It is 
important to consider how Ogawa’s mental health issues emerged and 
developed, in order to consider what sort of policies or programs might be 
developed in the future to assist people with mental health issues before 
they commit contempt in the face of the court.  
 In 1999, Megumi Ogawa came to Australia on a Rotary International 
Scholarship to enrol in a PhD at the University of Queensland. She was 
later offered scholarships by the University of Melbourne and decided to 
transfer her doctoral candidature there. Unfortunately, her PhD derailed at 
Melbourne Law School. Her doctoral supervisor left the University and was 
replaced by a supervisor with different, and arguably the wrong, 
expertise.421 In 2002, Ogawa’s enrolment expired after continued problems 
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securing appropriate supervisory arrangements. This resulted in the 
cancellation of her student visa. This was a significant setback, resulting in 
her spending 10 weeks in an immigration detention centre.422  
 There is a substantial literature that demonstrates that immigration 
detention can cause mental health problems.423 It was apparent that the 
detention was having an impact on Ogawa. Fears for her mental health 
resulted in her being placed on suicide watch. Interestingly, this fact does 
not figure in the later judgments in the District Court, Court of Appeal or 
High Court, in which Ogawa made submissions that her contemptuous 
behaviour was driven by mental health issues. (Indeed, there are grounds 
for reaching different conclusions to the trial and appellate courts in the 
Ogawa case: the evidence was most certainly not ‘unequivocal’, as the Court 
of Appeal held. To demonstrate this, passages from the judgments have 
been italicised in the analysis below.)  
 Ogawa fought to keep her visa.424 But she was then arrested and 
charged with the offences described above: making threats using a carriage 
service and contempt in the face of the court.  
 These offences took place within the broader context of Ogawa’s trade 
practices litigation against the University of Melbourne. When her PhD 
supervision arrangements fell apart, Ogawa initiated proceedings in the 
Federal Court against the University of Melbourne for misleading conduct 
																																								 																				
422  Richard Ackland, ‘Locked-up and angry: the lot of a foreign student’, Sydney Morning 
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Human(e)ness’ (2003) 27 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 
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under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), seeking, under s 82 of that 
Act, an award of damages of over $400,000.425 She alleged that the 
University of Melbourne had made misleading comments about the support 
it could provide PhD candidates.426 The action was instituted in the Federal 
Court’s Queensland registry because Ogawa had re-enrolled at the 
University of Queensland after her problems at the University of 
Melbourne.427 The matter was transferred to the Melbourne registry, and 
then, mistakenly, to the Federal Magistrates Court. The case should have 
gone to the Federal Court because of the size of the damages claim.428  
 After seeking a stay of the orders of the Federal Magistrate Court to 
take jurisdiction, and appealing against an adverse costs order in that case, 
Ogawa engaged in a series of unsuccessful applications and collateral 
litigation.429 For example, in late 2005, she brought a discrimination case 
against the Federal Court for failing to provide her with an interpreter, and 
alleged that the Queensland Registry of the Federal Court had engaged in 
discriminatory conduct by failing to do so.430  
 Ogawa’s arguments are elaborated in several scholarly (but also self-
serving) articles describing her trials and tribulations in Australian courts. 
Of particular note is ‘A Second Language Speaker in Court’ in the 
Alternative Law Journal in which Ogawa writes:431	
I have been running a case in court as a litigant in person since 2003 with 
occasional assistance from a counsel or an interpreter. I have spent almost 
my entire life in Japan speaking Japanese until arriving in Australia … My 
research area (copyright law) has nothing to do with my action primarily 
under consumer protection law and, in my view, my research helps little to 
overcome the language-oriented advantages ... 
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 The article then sets out four pages of thinly veiled criticism of the 
Federal Court and its judges for failing to provide an interpreter, which 
Ogawa later unsuccessfully claimed constituted institutional bias. 
 Ogawa has excellent English. She wrote a doctoral thesis in English, 
a book in English and a number of refereed journal articles in English.432 In 
such circumstances, it would have been extremely difficult to argue that the 
Court had discriminated against her by failing to provide her with an 
interpreter. However, this litigation, baseless or not, would probably have 
contributed to her stress, and, quite possibly, affected her mental health. 
Indeed, by early 2006 Ogawa had failed to attend court as required to argue 
her various cases, citing ill health.433	
 On 4 April 2006, the Federal Court held that Ogawa’s jurisdictional 
claim had merit, and that her original trade practices claim should indeed 
have been heard in the Federal Court. This might appear to have been good 
news for Ogawa, but she did not take it that way. By this stage, Ogawa had 
decided that the Federal Court of Queensland was biased against her for 
opposing her initial jurisdictional claims (and for failing to provide her with 
an interpreter, as noted above), and so she opposed transfer of her trade 
practices claim to the Queensland District Registry of the Federal Court 
because of her concerns about possible bias because of her discrimination 
case against the Court.434  
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 It is hard to imagine things getting worse, but they did. Ogawa then 
made the threats that were the subject of the criminal action described 
above. Then, when Ogawa was sentenced for those crimes, she committed 
contempt of court by screaming at the judge and flashing her buttocks at 
him.	
 Before her trial in the District Court, Ogawa made ‘a number of 
applications’ over ‘a long period’ seeking an adjournment or extension of 
time to prepare her case.435 Ogawa said that she had not been well enough 
to prepare, and that she would not have the capacity to conduct a trial.436 
Townsville District Court Judge Durward SC rejected these applications. 
His Honour said there had been a number of previous applications of this 
nature, and that they appeared to be ‘directed to the avoidance of hearings 
and ultimately the avoidance of being brought to trial’.437 After rejecting an 
application that he recuse himself from the bench on the ground of an 
apprehension of bias (an application made in the light of the judge’s prior 
decisions not to support Ogawa’s submissions in respect of these and some 
other procedural matters), Durward J reflected on Ogawa’s approach to 
representation and concluded that Ogawa was ‘self-represented by her own 
choice’ because she had repeatedly dismissed her publicly funded legal 
representatives.438 Durward J then observed that: 
the applicant wishes all of the proceedings to be adjourned until she has 
recovered from her ‘incapacity’, either temporarily caused by changes to her 
prescribed medication or to a condition she refers to as her ‘depression’. Dr 
Kingswell diagnosed a personality disorder. He specifically withdrew a 
preliminary diagnosis of major depressive disorder. I have accepted the 
evidence upon which he re-diagnosed the applicant’s psychiatric 
condition.439  
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 Judge Durward later quoted a portion of the transcript from the trial 
hearing on 10 December 2008, including a question he asked the 
psychiatrist, Dr Kingswell:440 
HIS HONOUR: I’ll cut to the chase. She has said that because of her 
medical or psychiatric or psychological condition she is unable to prepare or 
properly be able to represent herself for Court. So prepare the case and then 
to present her case following a presentation of the prosecution case in a trial 
situation. That is, I think the core of what she may be saying to you, which 
is associated with the question of fitness and the considerations you have to 
make for that. You see, you do appreciate the distinction, if there is a 
distinction. In other words, we get to the eve of the trial and she may say ‘I 
haven’t been well. I haven’t been able to prepare. I’m ill. I have a condition. 
The trial can’t go on. It is unfair if it goes on. I can’t represent myself. I have 
no capacity to do that. I don’t have the capacity to prepare. I need more 
time’, and this has been going on for a very long time? 
(ANSWER [DR KINGSWELL]) In my view that would be simply untrue. 
On that basis, the judge refused the application. Kingswell had said:441 
Miss Ogawa is quite disturbed and she is prone to anxiety and depression. 
Her disturbance in large measure is due to her personality disorder rather 
than a mental illness. Nonetheless, she needs ongoing psychiatric 
supervision. She needs continued surveillance for worsening of her anxiety 
and depression. Treatment for anxiety and depression is appropriate. It is 
likely that psychological management would assist Miss Ogawa [to] control 
some of her care enlisting behaviour and perhaps form more stable 
relationships. Treatment could be provided as an outpatient.  
I am not of the view that Miss Ogawa suffers from any illness that would 
warrant her hospitalisation, particularly not her involuntary 
hospitalisation.  
 Judge Durward then directed Ogawa to make submissions about the 
evidence of Dr Kingswell. 
 Ogawa responded by making (late) submissions that the trial be 
vacated or adjourned until she could be seen by a private psychiatrist (Dr 
Michele Calvird). Judge Durward then delivered a second judgment in 
which he concluded:442 
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In my view the accused was and continues to be engaged in a wilful course 
of frustrating the legal system. She is more intent on avoiding the 
continuation of the proceedings than in dealing with the charges. Dr 
Kingswell said the following in his second report:  
The principle [sic] risk Miss Ogawa poses to herself is repetitive 
querulous behaviour in the … Court that will severely limit the 
Court’s capacity to continue its job and frustrate the attempts to 
resolve this matter.  
And further:  
In my view it is for Miss Ogawa a matter of choice as to whether she 
pursues this matter in a committed way, motivated by a desire to 
resolve the issue or whether she chooses to frustrate the Court.  
Judge Durward concluded:443 
I accept Dr Kingswell’s evidence of the accused’s capacity to prepare for and 
to appear self-represented on a trial before judge and jury. I accept the 
opinion expressed by him on this issue. I have no doubt that the accused has 
the capacity to represent herself in this matter including preparation for 
any pre-trial hearings, if any, and to prepare for a trial and appear without 
legal representation.  
Concluding his treatment of the mental health issues, Judge Durward 
said:444 
The applicant has sought that the trial date (09 March 2009) be vacated. 
The grounds appear to be those previously relied upon by her in seeking 
adjournments. She has made articulate and relevant submissions in this 
Court, including before me. She is a trained lawyer and is employed in an 
academic capacity at an Australian University. She has a doctorate [in law] 
awarded in Australia. She may not have practised as a solicitor or barrister 
but in my view she is intelligent and perfectly able to look after her own 
interests in respect of the trial. She has had ample time to prepare for trial. 
There is no reason or proper basis for the trial date to be vacated. I refuse 
the application in respect of this ground. 
 The contempt charges were heard on 27 March 2009. Evidence 
emerged from an independent psychiatric examination that Ogawa had 
significant mental health issues (including ‘a major depressive disorder of a 
severe degree’ and anxiety).445 However, after cross-examination by the 
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contempt trial judge (who was also the judge who had experienced the 
contemptuous behaviour himself), the psychiatrist, Dr Kingswell, withdrew 
his diagnosis that Ogawa’s behaviour was caused by her mental health 
issues. 
 On this occasion, Ogawa was represented by counsel, who tendered 
an apology on her behalf. However, Judge Durward rejected the apology, 
stating that he did not believe it to be genuine. Judge Durward said that 
Ogawa’s ‘behaviour involved what I regard as derogatory statements about 
the Court and the system of justice, constant loud screaming in Court and 
physical struggle with the Corrective Services officers. You also attempted 
to disrobe in Court.’446 He went on to say, ‘I doubt that any other Court has 
ever had to endure the level of disgraceful conduct that you are responsible 
for in the course of this trial.’447 Finding that her behaviour was intended, 
his Honour concluded:448 
I do not regard your conduct as being driven by a psychiatric condition or 
the effects of it, although your personality disorder may have been an 
influencing factor in your decision to behave as I have described. 	
Ogawa appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal.449 On this occasion she 
was represented by senior counsel. On her behalf, it was argued that the 
District Court trial judge had erred: first, by failing to allow the jury to 
consider whether she was capable of understanding the proceedings so as to 
be able to make a proper defence;450 and, second, by failing to allow a jury to 
consider whether she was of sound mind during the course of the trial.451 It 
was argued that the Court should have applied the principles enunciated in 
Kesavarajah v The Queen,452 which required an inquiry into the fitness of 
the accused for trial.  
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 The Crown submitted that there was ‘no real question’ as to the 
capability of the defendant to understand the proceedings and make a 
proper defence. 
 The Court of Appeal concluded that the Crown’s submissions had to 
be accepted:453 
The present case is not analogous to Kesavarajah … where it was held that 
the trial judge ought to have directed an inquiry as to the accused’s fitness. 
In Kesavarajah the trial court was faced with competing evidence as to the 
accused’s fitness to plead; that is, the fact that there was competing 
evidence gave rise to ‘a real question’. That was not the case here. Indeed on 
the evidence which had been adduced at pre-trial hearings instigated by the 
appellant, the learned trial judge had formed views distinctly adverse to the 
appellant. ... That view was well open to his Honour.  
 His Honour had the benefit of having seen and heard the appellant 
conduct her applications over many days. She conducted lengthy cross-
examinations of medical witnesses with competence and energy inconsistent 
with a debilitating mental illness. The expert medical evidence was all one 
way to the effect that the appellant suffers from no mental illness which 
would impair her participation in the trial process ...  
 The appeal was rejected. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction 
and rebuked Ogawa. Keane J (as his Honour then was), with whom 
Chesterman and Jones JJ agreed, said that Ogawa was ‘a humbug’ who was 
‘feigning an incapacity to represent herself’.454  
 Ogawa applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court. One of 
her grounds for appeal was that ‘the Court of Appeal erred with respect to 
the need for a fitness hearing’.455 The High Court rejected her application, 
saying:	
The applicant’s complaint concerning the failure to direct a fitness hearing 
does not involve any question of principle. It is a challenge to the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that no ‘real question’ concerning the applicant’s fitness 
to plead was raised.456 The Court of Appeal found that the medical evidence 
was all one way to the effect that the applicant was not suffering from a 
																																								 																				
453  R v Ogawa [2009] QCA 307 [108]−[109] (emphasis added).  
454  Ibid [29]. 
455  Ogawa v The Queen [2010] HCASL 188 [6] (French CJ and Bell J). 
456  R v Ogawa [2009] QCA 307 [105], [108] referring to Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 
181 CLR 230, 245 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) citing Ngatayi v The Queen 
(1980) 147 CLR 1, 9. 
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mental illness which would impair her participation in the trial process in 
accordance with the criteria set out in R v Presser.457 Nothing in the 
submissions filed on the applicant’s behalf gives rise to any reason to doubt 
the correctness of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion.458 	
 Megumi Ogawa has lectured in law at several Australian 
universities. How could someone so highly qualified, so knowledgeable in 
the law and having the personal wherewithal to complete a doctorate in 
intellectual property law from the University of Queensland find herself in 
prison for contempt in the face of the court?459 One possibility is that Ogawa 
was experiencing significant mental health problems at the time of the 
contempt.460 That is why she later argued that her fitness to plead should 
have been considered.  
 The alternative reading of the events — the one preferred by the 
District Court, Court of Appeal and High Court — was that Ogawa’s 
diagnosis did not excuse her contemptuous conduct.461  
 Regardless, the case does support a call for law reform to ensure that 
litigants with mental health problems are diverted to services that assist 
the courts in dealing with such issues swiftly and effectively. Leaving aside 
the question of the correctness of the findings of fact made by the various 
courts, there is no doubt that Ogawa had a miserable time, and suffered 
depression and anxiety. Could more have been done at an earlier stage in 
Ogawa’s litigation — before she unravelled and started threatening people 
— to divert her from the court system to mental health services? Should we 
wait until a person has committed contempt and consumed substantial legal 
and judicial resources before reaching the conclusion that they require 
mental health services? Is it possible to devise a system that would yield 
better outcomes than this before all this time and energy is wasted? This 
case, like that of Moore-McQuillan, illustrates the need for procedures 
																																								 																				
457  R v Ogawa [2009] QCA 307 [109] citing R v Presser [1958] VR 45. 
458  Ogawa v The Queen [2010] HCASL 188 [9]. 
459  Ackland, above n 422. 
460  R v Ogawa [2008] QDC 338 [17]. See also Floyd, above n 410, 65−6. 
461  Contrast Ackland, above n 422. 
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enabling diversion to psychological and/or psychiatric services earlier in a 
person’s participation in litigation. This would assist the due administration 
of justice and possibly also advance the litigant’s prospects of recovery. 
While the appeal was determined against Ogawa, the case indicates that 
more could be done to assist people to manage what are quite possibly 
litigation-induced mental health issues.  
 Assuming that the Court of Appeal reached the correct conclusion, 
the case also indicates that any procedure that is developed to advance the 
human rights of people with mental health issues accused of contempt must 
also ensure that mental ill-health is not invoked spuriously to avoid the 
consequences of poor behaviour in court. A person should not be able to 
invoke mental health issues as a basis for avoiding punishment for 
contempt in the face of the court if they are not genuinely experiencing 
mental health issues at the time of the relevant events. A balance must be 
settled between the human rights of the accused and the need for the due 
administration of justice.  
 
VI ANALYSIS 
The case studies reviewed in this chapter raise a number of important 
questions and issues. The power to commit for contempt in the face of the 
court contains some questionable features and it is a power that can be 
abused. The cases highlight that prosecutions for contempt can be swift, 
with little attention being given to matters of procedural fairness. Litigants 
are not always formally charged, and are often deprived of the opportunity 
to plead or raise fitness to plead as an issue.  
A A Failure to Give Due Weight to Mental Ill-health and the Need For 
Better Mental Health Literacy Among Judges 
In some cases, particularly evident in Coleiro, judges can fail to give proper 
consideration to a defendant’s mental health issues when determining 
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whether contempt has taken place. What principles relating to intention or 
wilfulness should be applied when people with mental health issues are 
dealt with for contempt in the face of the court? This was a live issue in 
Coleiro, but perhaps not in Moore-McQuillan or Ogawa. Should people be 
held responsible for contempt if they have no idea what they are doing is 
wrong, or what is going on? The very loose procedures governing 
prosecutions for contempt in the face of the court mean that significant 
mental health issues might be given insufficient weight or, worse, go 
completely unnoticed. In such cases justice may only be served once a 
sentence has been appealed and proper consideration of mental health 
issues has taken place. This is little comfort for the unrepresented litigant 
further disadvantaged in the criminal justice system due to mental ill-
health. 
 The Coleiro matter unequivocally demonstrates that judges must be 
conscious of the possibility that participants in litigation in their courts may 
be experiencing mental health conditions that render them vulnerable. 
Judges have a responsibility to maintain a sound working knowledge of 
mental health issues to ensure that the mental ill-health of a litigant in 
their court does not go undetected. The importance of mental health literacy 
within the judiciary is addressed in the following chapter. The need for 
integrated mental health services will also be addressed.  
 
B The Need For Nuanced Consideration of the Impact of Mental Ill-
health on the Conduct of the Contemnor 
 
In the Introduction to this thesis it was submitted that it is likely 
that in only a small subset of cases a person’s mental ill-health will negate a 
finding that they wilfully committed contempt.  A distinction between the 
irresistible impulse and the resistible impulse is necessary to ensure that a 
diagnosis of mental ill-health is not invoked inappropriately by people to 
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blame their mental ill-health for contumacious behaviour over which they 
had control.   
 In the first case study considered in this chapter, it was noted that 
Moore-McQuillan’s principal diagnosis was that he is a querulous litigant.  
It is submitted that this diagnosis could not properly be invoked to 
exculpate him, even if it is an acceptable diagnosis (it is not in the DSM-V, 
which superseded the DSM IV in 2013, after Moore-McQuillan was 
convicted for contempt). This would be an exercise in circular logic.  Moore-
McQuillan’s other diagnoses were anger and depression.  He was aware of 
his depression as early as 2000, and he knew that he had a tendency to 
threaten people and swear at people in court. He should have sought 
professional help. Indeed, an argument could be mounted that he should 
have received a stiffer sentence than the one handed down by Nyland J in 
the Supreme Court, as Moore-McQuillan knew that he had a tendency to 
lose his tempter in court.  This case study (comprising over 100 cases) would 
provide a solid foundation for a conclusion that Moore-McQuillan is a 
vexatious litigant, and that he should be excluded from the courts, and only 
allowed to participate subject to leave and formal written undertakings 
regarding his behaviour, and subject to costs.    
 Coleiro was not convicted (or even tried) for contempt.  However it 
appears that he suffered from dementia.  Federal Magistrate Harman took 
issue with Coleiro’s prevaricating, which, as noted in Chapter One, is one 
variety of contempt in the face of the court.  Bearing in mind that the nature 
and quality of Mr Coleiro’s mental health was not the subject of contested 
evidence and review by any court, it certainly appeared that his will was 
overborne in the circumstances of the hearing before Harman FM. If a 
contempt charge had proceeded and a trial held, it would have been grossly 
unfair to convict him of contempt given his mental ill-health.      
 Wilson had obsessive-compulsive disorder.  As the psychiatric 
evidence in that case indicated, it is a personality disorder that is 
exceedingly unlikely to respond to treatment.  Nevertheless he was not 
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suffering from a disorder that can properly be regarded as having the 
potential to overbear his will.  His crime was premeditated, at any rate – he 
intended to throw the bags of paint at the judge if he lost.  The finding of 
contempt was correct.  Reasonable minds could differ on the question of 
punishment, but the approach taken by the majority of the Court of Appeal, 
to consider the disorder in sentencing, was appropriate and showed mercy.      
 Ogawa was diagnosed with depression.  There was no evidence 
indicating that her depression had an overbearing effect on her will.  The 
conclusion of the Court of Appeal that she was in control of her behaviour at 
the relevant time is difficult to resists, and psychological expert evidence 
was considered. On the basis of the psychological evidence available, the 
finding of the District Court was appropriately upheld. 
  As noted in the Introduction, since some contemnors with personality 
disorders continue to appear in the courts and commit contempt after 
contempt, appearing not to respond to judicial attempts to manage their 
contumacious behaviour, even under pain of imprisonment, a real question 
can be raised whether any recommendations made by a court for treatment 
would be followed. In these cases, rules governing abuse of process and rules 
designed to control vexatious litigation could properly be invoked to prevent 
further disruptions to court processes.  While Wilson and Ogawa appear to 
have stopped accessing the courts to mount further baseless claims, an 
order to control Moore-McQuillan may be necessary.  The invocation of a 
rule requiring the leave of the court before proceedings are issued might be 
the only way possible to balance the human right to access to justice, on the 
one hand, and the need for a court to control order, on the other. 
    
C Judicial Stress and the Need for Mental Health Supports for the 
Judiciary 
As noted above, it transpired that the magistrate who heard the Coleiro 
matter was also experiencing mental ill-health. Maybe the magistrate’s own 
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mental health condition caused him to behave in the way that he did? The 
Coleiro case study raises the important and substantially unexplored 
question of whether mental health support might need to be available to 
judges. While this thesis focuses predominantly on the mental health of 
people accused of contempt, it is sensible, in the context of a review of the 
principles and practice in this area, to consider the mental health of the 
principal dramatis personae in this context. A case of contempt in the face of 
the court ultimately boils down to the activity of two people: the person who 
is alleged to have committed the offence, and the judge who determines 
whether they are guilty. Some attention must be paid to the role and 
behaviour of the judge in contempt cases in the search for a holistic solution. 
This issue will be explored in the following chapter.  
D How Much Is Enough? Querulous Litigants and Vexatious Litigant 
Declarations 
The Wilson, Moore-McQuillan and Ogawa sagas raise important questions 
about the balance that should be struck between access to justice on the one 
hand, and the due administration of justice on the other. In the Australian 
legal system, courts play the final role in dispensing access to justice under 
law. People need access to courts to achieve justice, and access to justice is a 
basic human right; however, controlling access to courts might sometimes be 
in the best interests of some litigants. 
 Wilson, Moore-McQuillan and Ogawa all consumed vast quantities of 
public resources; they also assaulted and threatened people in their dealings 
with the courts. Could something have been done earlier on to secure 
appropriate services for these people? Should we wait until a person has 
committed contempt and consumed substantial legal and judicial resources 
before reaching the conclusion that they require access to mental health 
services? Is it possible to devise a system that would yield better outcomes, 
and before all this time and energy is wasted? Should vexatious litigant 
provisions have be invoked sooner and used as a trigger to ensure that 
litigants who have been diagnosed with mental ill-health get access to 
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mental health services. The colossal waste of time and resources associated 
with the predominantly baseless litigation advanced by some litigants 
demonstrates the need for legislative and policy reforms to speed up access 
to services. These ‘court ghosts’ are a sorry lot, and steps should be taken to 
help them access needed services. 
 It is notable that in both the Moore-McQuillan and Ogawa cases, 
concerns were expressed early in the litigation about each contemnor’s 
questionable mental health. In fact, both Ogawa and Moore-McQuillan were 
described as exhibiting repetitive querulous behaviour.462 Some or even 
many querulous litigants experience mental health issues, and some, like 
Ogawa and Moore-McQuillan, are ultimately dealt with for contempt. 
Should judges or court administrators have seen Ogawa’s or Moore-
McQuillan’s behaviour coming? Could it be argued that courts owe 
querulous litigants a duty of care to limit their access to courts in some way 
— for example, restrict them to written submission or insist that they are 
not self-represented — so that they might not end up imprisoned for 
contempt? At the very least, members of the judiciary should be aware of 
the literature on querulousness in the hope that they might be able to 
recognise querulous behaviour when it presents itself. 
 As Lester, Wilson, Griffin and Mullen have observed:  
It would be ‘cavalier to ignore the possibility that knowledge and 
approaches developed in the mental health field might offer help to 
organisations and individuals in avoiding the damaging and distressing 
effect of unusually persistent complaining’.463  
																																								 																				
462  As to which, see Mullen and Lester, above n 318; Grant Lester et al, ‘Unusually 
Persistent Complainants’ (2004) 184 British Journal of Psychiatry 352; Ian 
Freckelton, ‘Querulous Paranoia and the Vexatious Complainant’ (1988) 11 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 127; P T d’Orban, ‘Psychiatric aspects of 
contempt of court among women’ (1985) 15 Psychological Medicine 597.  
463  Lester et al, above n 462, 356.  
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And as Mullen and Lester have also reflected, ‘by the time they reach our 
clinic, [querulents] have usually laid waste to the financial and social fabric 
of their lives’.464  
 Currently the main way courts eventually respond to litigants like 
Moore-McQuillan is to prevent them from accessing the courts without 
leave, via vexatious litigant declarations. Simon Smith deals with this topic 
comprehensively in his recent Australian book, Maverick Litigants, and so 
this topic is addressed only incidentally here in this thesis. This is because 
vexatious litigant provisions do not directly address the issue sought to be 
addressed here; they are invoked in extreme cases only, and their focus is 
not on the mental health of the litigant, but rather on the impact of that 
litigant’s activity on the courts. In addition, measures to control vexatious 
litigants are only invoked well after the fact of any contemptuous behaviour. 
The focus of this thesis is on what can be done by the courts, before and 
during the relevant events, if possible, to deal effectively with the mental 
health issues of people charged with contempt in the face of the court, in a 
manner that is consistent with their human rights.  
 Effective diversion to mental health services may well have quelled or 
even halted Ogawa and Moore-McQuillan’s repeated attempts to access the 
courts to advance baseless actions. Accessing such services might even have 
improved their mental health and advanced their prospects of recovery. 
Even if the Queensland Court of Appeal was correct when it reached the 
conclusion that Ogawa was just a ‘humbug’ (rather than a person 
experiencing a serious depressive disorder, which was a finding open on the 
evidence), it is clearly plausible to suggest that if Ogawa had been diverted 
to appropriate psychological and/or psychiatric services, this may have 
produced better outcomes for her in the long run, as well as possibly 
																																								 																				
464  Mullen and Lester, above n 318, 338−9. See also P E Mullen, ‘Querulous behaviour: 
Vexatious litigation, abnormally persistent complaining and petitioning’, in Michael G 
Gelder et al (eds), New Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry — Volume 2 (OUP, 2009, 
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preventing the crimes that she later committed — the threats and the 
contempt. 
 
VII CONCLUSIONS 
Statistics relating to the number of contempt prosecutions are not kept in 
Australia.465 Statistics relating to the number of people who have been tried 
or convicted for contempt who have mental health issues are not kept either. 
It may be noted, though, that, while dated, in a study of 72 case histories 
over a five-year period, d’Orban found that almost 40 per cent of women 
imprisoned for contempt of court had a psychiatric disorder. Most had a 
paranoid disorder, with litigiousness being a prominent feature of their 
illness.466 There has been no subsequent research about the mental health 
of contemnors. However, the recent case studies identified in this chapter 
underscore the need for strategies for managing people who unravel in court 
and for improved mental health literacy in the courts.467 Appropriate 
policies and programs need to be developed and implemented within the 
courts that are guided by human rights principles. The ICCPR prohibits 
arbitrary detention and the ICESCR guarantees the right to health, 
including mental health. As Australia is a signatory to both of those 
Covenants, legitimate questions can be raised regarding the compliance of 
Australian law with their provisions.  
 The law governing contempt in the face of the court in the majority of 
the Australian jurisdictions allows for contempt proceedings to be 
commenced and concluded in a very short space of time. In Chapter One it 
was demonstrated that the absence of safeguards typically found in a 
																																								 																				
465  As was noted by the Australian Law Reform Commission in 1987. See Australian Law 
Reform Commission, above n 7, 67 [107]. 
466  P T d’Orban, ‘Psychiatric aspects of contempt of court among women’ (1985) 15 
Psychological Medicine 597.  
467  Mental health literacy may be defined as ‘knowledge and belief about mental 
disorders that aid their recognition, management or prevention’. See Nicola J Reavley 
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criminal prosecution mean that a very real chance exists that an alleged 
contemnor who suffers mental ill-health could be convicted and possibly 
imprisoned without his or her impairment being detected. The absence of 
procedural safeguards is also of concern because it allows the power to 
punish for contempt to be abused by judges when tension between difficult 
litigants and highly stressed judges boils over.  
 A more sophisticated set of laws and protocols are necessary, if for no 
other reason than the fact that a contemnor can be sent to prison. The 
seriousness of this outcome cannot be overstated. Imprisonment is the most 
severe punishment that can be inflicted in our system of justice468 and, in 
many Australian jurisdictions, sentencing remains ‘at large’ for contempt in 
the face of the court where the relevant legislation fails to set maximum 
terms. Prison is a place in which egregious abuses of human rights take 
place.469 Imprisonment can have very serious, negative psychological 
impacts on anybody, let alone vulnerable people.470 Even in cases where a 
person receives a fine or a suspended sentence, the convicted person carries 
the stigma of the criminal conviction471 and the reputational damage 
associated with a criminal conviction.472 For all these reasons, it is 
important that steps be taken to ensure that people who exhibit signs of 
mental ill-health be referred for assessment so that a judge can have insight 
into any bearing that their condition has on their courtroom behaviour.  
 It is not suggested that every person with questionable mental health 
should be excused when they behave badly in court, lest there be a risk that 
																																								 																				
468  As Barwick CJ, Menzies, Stephen and Mason JJ observed in Power v The Queen 
(1974) 131 CLR 623, 627: ‘We cannot understand how … imprisonment, either with or 
without hard labour, can, however enlightened the prison system is, be regarded as 
otherwise than a severe punishment.’ See also Witham v Holloway (1995) 183 CLR 
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every bitter person experiencing anxiety or depression would have a defence 
for contempt. Instead, procedures need to be developed to ensure that judges 
have all relevant facts before making a decision to deal with someone for 
contempt. Once all the facts are before the judge, the presence of mental 
illness and/or personality disorders should be taken into account. First, the 
diagnosis should be taken into account to see whether the person had the 
necessary wilfulness, should wilfulness be included as an element of the 
offence, as was argued in Chapter One. Secondly, if the judge does proceed 
to convict a person for contempt, the diagnosis should be taken into account 
by way of mitigation of penalty.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Policy Reforms: Improved Mental Health 
Literacy, Access to Mental Health Court 
Liaison Clinicians, and Mental Health 
Supports for The Judiciary 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
The Roadmap for National Mental Health Reform 2012–2022 developed by 
the Council of Australian Governments reflected a commitment ‘to mental 
health reform as an ongoing national priority’ and committed to ‘ensuring 
that people affected by mental health issues and their families have access 
to appropriate services and supports’. The Roadmap envisages that people 
should be ‘able and encouraged to access appropriate services and support 
— early in the course of illness, and early in episode’.473 The Roadmap calls 
for ‘well-integrated and well-coordinated services, including in the fields of 
health and justice’ that ‘work closely together to provide early support to at-
risk individuals, and are set up to be responsive to ongoing need in chronic 
or episodic ill-health; ensuring that there are multiple service pathways’.474 
In addition, the Roadmap says that governments ‘need to improve the 
effectiveness of their systems by improving the planning, organisation and 
integration of relevant services and support’.  
 With this backdrop, attention now turns to consideration of policies 
and practices needed to buttress the legal reforms recommended in this 
thesis. The case studies examined in the preceding chapter highlighted a 
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2012−2022 (7 December 2012) 6.  
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need for greater mental health literacy among judicial officers and 
administrators so that they can detect possible mental ill-health among 
court users. When necessary, judicial officers should then be able to access 
court-based mental health liaison services in order to quickly obtain ‘mental 
state assessments’ on court users suspected of suffering mental ill-health. 
Both of these issues will be examined in this chapter. 
 However a further, important issue will also be dealt with in depth in 
this chapter.  How can we ensure that the judges who determine contempt 
matters are themselves in good mental health?  In the last chapter, the 
decision of Federal Magistrate Harman was considered in detail.  In that 
case, an elderly, deaf man who suffered from dementia was threatened with 
imprisonment for contempt in the face of the court by the magistrate, in 
circumstances which the Full Family Court held was an abuse of power.  Mr 
Coleiro had not been charged, was not given an opportunity to plead and 
was not given an opportunity to make a submission that he was unfit to 
plead.  Magistrate Harman failed to give due consideration to Mr Coleiro’s 
mental ill-health, and, it transpires, was himself experiencing mental ill-
health at the time of these matters. This raises an important additional 
reform issue: a case of contempt in the face of the court involves two people, 
the person who commits the offence and the judge who makes the decision 
to commit that person. Some attention to the mental health of judges in 
contempt cases is warranted in the development of a holistic approach to the 
problems that plainly emerge in this area.  Consideration of these issues 
will be the subject of this final chapter. It is hoped that recent developments 
and improvements in mental health awareness and acceptance may provide 
the catalyst for the policy reforms set out here.  
 
	 139	
II THE NEED FOR MENTAL HEALTH LITERACY AND ACCESS TO COURT-
BASED MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS TO SUPPORT LITIGANTS AND ENSURE 
INFORMED JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 
It is clear that litigation can have significant psychological consequences for 
litigants,475 and Australian courts should develop better ways to manage the 
stress of litigation for participants rather than imprisoning them for 
contempt of court.  
 Certainly, the correlation between a litigant’s condition and his or her 
courtroom behaviour is a matter that deserves careful attention and, ideally, 
expert advice. Sometimes the litigant’s condition might attract him or her to 
litigation, in the case of querulous litigants. For others, they might not have 
arrived before the court voluntarily, such that they did not bring the action; 
however, once there, their conditions might make it very difficult to control 
their behaviour, leading them to misbehave in court. Not every person 
seeking to avoid a punishment for contempt should be able to do so by citing 
mental illness. But, at the very least, steps should be taken to ensure that 
such people are identified and assessed so that their condition can be taken 
into account to assist the judge or magistrate in deciding how best to 
proceed. 
 The principles of contempt in the face of the court emerged some 
centuries before the emergence of psychology and psychiatry. It is timely to 
conduct a review and ensure that judicial officers have the skills, and have 
access to the knowledge, that they need to discharge their duties in a fair 
and considered fashion. As illustrated in the Chapter Three case study of 
Coleiro, the undoubted advances in knowledge of how the mind works 
appear to some judges to be of little import. As Ian Coyle and David Field 
have observed:476	
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For over two centuries the observations of Lord Mansfield in Chadd v Folkes 
(1782) have stood sentinel to the capacity of juries to discharge their fact-
finding functions without the assistance of expert opinion in matters of 
human behaviour. Therein it was noted: 
The fact that an expert witness has impressive scientific 
qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on 
matters of human behaviour within the limits of normality any more 
helpful than that of jurors themselves; but there is a danger that 
they may think it does. 
Despite the undoubted advances in medicine and the behavioural sciences 
that have occurred since Chadd v Folkes, the thrust of this opinion still 
exerts influence on judicial thinking.  
 However, judicial office does not, by this fact alone, make judicial 
officers’ opinions on putative mental health issues (which may be relevant 
vis-à-vis contempt in the face of the court) any more important than that of 
any lay witness — but there is a danger that they may think it does. More 
recently, Ian Coyle and Don Thomson have drawn attention to the following 
observations of Heydon J in Aytugrul v The Queen:477 
[S]ometimes general references are made by courts to the causes of 
psychiatric injury478 and the diagnosis of psychiatric illness.479 Sometimes 
more specific reasoning is propounded after the court has had recourse to 
expert literature. … If frailty rests on a psychological fact, and on 
psychological research,480 expert material bearing on the psychological fact 
must have potential significance.  
 Rejecting the notion that this expertise could be relied on as ‘common 
knowledge’, Heydon J said that the ‘technical sophistication’ of some 
scientific evidence militates in favour of a conclusion that expert guidance 
will be necessary. In terms relevant to the issues raised in this thesis, 
Heydon J stated:  
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To borrow the words of Judge Frank speaking about psychiatry, it would be 
dangerous for the Court ‘to embark — without a pilot, rudder, compass or 
radar — on an amateur's voyage on [this] fog-enshrouded sea.’481 
 Are the legal principles governing contempt in the face of the court in 
Australia cognisant of the importance of expert psychological evidence 
relevant to contempt prosecutions?  The central argument of this thesis is 
that reforms are necessary to ensure that the courts are properly appraised 
of the mental health condition of people who engage in contumacious 
behaviour.  The gravity of the consequences and human rights principles 
require no less.  
 In the absence of the reforms recommended below, judges may need 
to be ‘proactive’ to ensure that litigants with mental health issues are 
diverted from the court, and they may need to adopt a posture characteristic 
of the inquisitorial system.482 This approach challenges the traditional 
notion of the judge as passive. Indeed, the litigant with mental health issues 
challenges the role of the traditional court administrator, which is also 
passive. Basic assumptions of the traditional common-law method of dispute 
resolution are particularly inapt when a litigant with mental health issues 
comes to court: they cannot be relied on or expected to describe their own 
case to maximum advantage, they lack the capacity to make sensible 
forensic decisions, they may not have the capacity to act in their own best 
interests, and they will almost certainly be unable to accept the outcome if 
they are not vindicated.483	
 Whether this active approach is taken or the reforms outlined below 
are accepted and implemented, judges and magistrates should also be 
supported and resourced in practical ways to ensure that they are better 
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equipped to deal with difficult court users. Trained mental health workers 
should be available to assist the identification of litigants whom a judge, 
magistrate or legal practitioner might suspect suffers mental ill-health. This 
would ensure that the judicial officer has all the relevant information before 
deciding whether to resort to punishment for contempt. It is recommended 
that mental health services be made available in courts so that workers can 
provide judges and magistrates with preliminary assessment, including 
screening for fitness to plead.  
 In Chapter Three, a number of detailed case studies were set out.  In 
Moore-McQuillan, it was clear that the contemnor had failed to respond to 
prior treatment, and it appeared that he had not complied with the 
recommendations of his psychologists.  Compulsory treatment would only be 
available under mental health legislation, and it is not proposed here that 
people to be tried for contempt should be subjected to compulsory treatment 
unless their mental health condition plainly warranted that approach.  
None of the people in the case studies set out in Chapter Three would 
qualify for compulsory treatment.  So how would the courts ensure that they 
were taking appropriate steps to address the mental ill-health of alleged 
contemnors?  How could the courts avoid having an adjournment for such 
purposes lead to an indefinite hiatus?   
 These are difficult questions.  If proper resourcing and services are 
available along the lines outlined above, then it is more likely that the 
courts will be placed in a position in which evidence of recovery is available.  
Courts could make orders requiring parties to tender relevant evidence for 
consideration, and they could even interview the people concerned, much as 
Nyland J did in the Supreme Court hearing of the Moore-McQuillan case.  
As far as the second question is concerned, time limits might be necessary to 
ensure that adjournments do not delay proceedings indefinitely.  However 
the ordinary prudential considerations relating to decision-making 
regarding such matters (as adjournments) could apply. Given the variability 
of people and their mental health conditions there is no need to take a hard 
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and fast approach, and every reason not to. Where an adjournment for 
assessment and/or treatment results in a matter being stalled, the 
prosecutor could take steps to expedite the matter by way of an application.  
 Summing up the legal and procedural reforms enunciated to this 
point, it is submitted that the appropriate approach to take is to: 
1. enable courts to order that an alleged contemnor undergo 
psychological assessment and treatment before the contempt 
prosecution is progressed;  
2. punish contemnors whose mental health issues are found, on the 
basis of expert evidence that is available for proper testing in a court, 
not to have overborne their will at the relevant time; 
3. exonerate people charged with contempt where mental health issues 
are found, on the basis of expert evidence, that is available for proper 
testing in a court, to have overborne the will of the alleged contemnor 
at the relevant time; 
4. where disruptions continue in proceedings (or take place in future 
proceedings) that courts should be authorised to order that a 
contemnor file evidence relating to their assessment or treatment, in 
a format that is confidential to the litigant and the court, and that the 
court then have the power to order that the litigant only be given the 
opportunity to participate in court proceedings if they behave 
properly, with the court retaining a power to punish the contemnor 
with costs if required. 
 This approach is essentially consistent with the approach taken by 
Justice Nyland in the Supreme Court of South Australia in the Moore-
MacQuillan case, analysed above. The difference would be that the rules 
relating to this procedure would be made explicit, and referral pathways 
would be carefully defined.  This would help to ensure an effective balancing 
of the rights of the participants. 
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 A detailed analysis of the mental health services that ought to be 
made available by way of referral from the courts is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  However it is notable that the Council of Australian Government’s 
Roadmap to Mental Health Reform 2012-2022, touched on in the conclusion 
of Chapter One, states, inter alia (at p 11): 
Community-funded and private service providers (including those in 
the fields of health, community services, education, employment, 
housing, justice and corrections) need to work more effectively with 
each other and with individuals, families and carers, to help people 
with mental illness to recover and maximise their wellbeing. Where 
possible, they also need to work towards preventing and reducing the 
risks associated with the development and exacerbation of mental 
health issues.  
At page 22, the Roadmap states: 
Early detection of mental health issues and mental illness, followed 
by appropriate, timely intervention can significantly reduce the 
severity, duration and recurrence of mental illness and its associated 
social disadvantage, no matter when in life the episode or episodes 
occur. Early detection of mental health issues can improve people’s 
prospects of completing education and training, increase their 
opportunities for securing and retaining employment, help them 
maintain stable accommodation, and minimise their interactions with 
the corrections and justice system. 
While successful referral from court is not, in and of itself, a performance 
criterion recognised in the Roadmap, performance criteria relating to the 
number of people accessing mental health services does provide a criterion 
for measurement of progress against the goals enunciated in the preceding 
paragraphs, and such figures could be maintained without compromising 
the privacy of the people concerned.      
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 There are already court-based mental health liaison services in many 
courts in Australia, but these tend to be concentrated at the Magistrate or 
Local Court level. Magistrates in all Australian states and territories, 
excluding the Northern Territory, have dedicated court liaison mental 
health services.484 But there are geographical gaps in coverage. For 
example, while a court liaison service provides services to 23 Local Courts in 
New South Wales,485 in Western Australia the service is provided on a daily 
basis at the Metropolitan Central Law Court only, on an ‘as-required basis’ 
to other metropolitan Magistrates Courts, and via video conference to 
regional and remote courts.486 
 The Australian Centre for Research Excellence in Offender Health 
issued a comprehensive report in 2015 describing the availability of court 
liaison services in each Australian jurisdiction. The report also described 
both the role and model of each court liaison service. The report found: 
[W]hile there is variation between the models and the legislation that 
supports mental health diversion, the services all have the primary aim of 
identifying individuals with mental illness (and in some cases intellectual 
disability) who have been charged with an offence. Court liaison services 
(CLS’s) seek to intervene in the criminal justice process as early as possible. 
While CLS’s may have a role at various stages in the process … they 
describe the majority of their role as identifying those with mental health 
needs at the pre trial stage or during the trial process. CLS’s undertake 
mental health assessments of individuals and then provide timely clinical 
advice to the court to assist it in decision making regarding appropriate 
disposal.487 
 The research found that the form and level of detail provided to the 
courts by way of assessment varied between jurisdictions. For example, in 
Victoria and Queensland, brief written feedback through the use of a pro 
forma was utilised. In Tasmania, the majority of the information was 
provided verbally. In Western Australia and South Australia, both written 
and verbal information was supplied to the court. In the ACT and New 
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South Wales, lengthier feedback was supplied. In New South Wales, a 
written report of two-to-three pages of descriptive, rather than ‘brief tick box 
pro forma’, were typically supplied.488  
 In the majority of jurisdictions, mental health nurses provided the 
largest professional discipline undertaking the assessments,489 and in each 
jurisdiction, except Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania, the 
nurses could seek advice from a psychiatrist on an ‘as-required’ basis.490 
 The research found that ‘mental state assessments’ were the most 
common form of assessment undertaken by the court liaison service 
clinicians,491 as distinct from standard mainstream mental health 
assessments, which was reported to be the norm in Victoria.492 
Interestingly, none of the jurisdictions described a waiting list for the 
assessments.493  
 In several jurisdictions — specifically, Queensland, Western 
Australia, Victoria, the ACT, and New South Wales — mental health 
databases were used to cross-check custody and court lists to determine 
whether a person had a history of mental ill-health or a current treatment 
plan.494 In addition to providing assessment and referral services, some of 
the court liaison services also indicated that they provided education and 
training to court personnel on mental health matters.495  
 The Family Court of Australia also offers a comprehensive service to 
support litigants, judges and administrators. The Family Court has the 
highest proportion of self-represented litigants, as well as a client group 
experiencing the stress of a family breakdown. In 2004 the Family Court of 
Australia, along with the Department of Health and Ageing, responded by 
																																								 																				
488  Ibid 24. 
489  Ibid 10. 
490  Ibid 23. 
491  Ibid 22. 
492  Ibid. 
493  Ibid. 
494  Ibid. 
495  Ibid 6 and 8. 
	 147	
conducting a pilot project in the Adelaide and Darwin registries of the 
Court, enabling referral of litigants to external mental health organisations. 
The project also involved the development of protocols for staff, improved 
mental health literacy and staff training.496 In 2006 the project was 
implemented nationally throughout the Family Law Courts (comprising of 
the Family Court of Australia and the Federal Magistrates Court of 
Australia), as part of the Integrated Client Services Delivery Program.497 
The main activities of the Integrated Client Service Delivery Program are: 
to provide client access to counselling and mental health support services 
not available in courts via a referral network; to deliver a national, 
integrated client-service training program for staff encompassing mental 
health, in addition to family violence, special client needs and non-
judgemental communication; to train staff on protocols so that they knew 
what was expected of them in a range of client-service situations, such as 
how to respond in emergencies when clients threaten to harm themselves or 
others.498 
 Different courts have different client groups with different levels of 
need for mental health support services. The pilot program run by the 
Family Court of Australia proved successful for its clients and court staff 
alike, and was therefore rolled out on a nationwide basis. The client liaison 
service model in operation in many, but not all, magistrate or local courts 
has the advantage of being able to access court-based mental health 
clinicians, rather than seeking assistance from external agencies. This 
results in an ability to access mental health assessments in a timely 
fashion, which is essential given the fast pace of the workload in that 
jurisdiction. Ideally, all Australian courts should be able to call upon the 
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services of a mental health practitioner when needed, and consideration 
should be given to adopting programs, like those detailed above, in all 
Australian courts, adapted to fit the requirements of the particular court.  
 
III IMPROVING THE MENTAL HEALTH OF JUDGES 
Ultimately, a prosecution for contempt in the face of the court boils down to 
the choices and actions of two people: the person who is alleged to have 
committed the offence, and the judge who determines their guilt. To this 
point, the mental health of litigants has been the focus of this thesis. The 
mental health of judges will now briefly be explored. It is submitted that the 
human-rights approach explicated previously should be supported by 
programs that not only provide training for judges in mental health literacy, 
but also support judges experiencing mental health challenges themselves. 
While it is likely that mental ill-health among judges impacting negatively 
upon work performance would be relatively rare, it was plainly an issue in 
Coleiro, and it is a factor that should not be overlooked in the search for 
justice in this field. 
 Judges are expected to be sober, alert and impartial.499 Ideally, they 
are also good-humoured and efficient.500 However, as some of the cases 
illustrate, judges have their patience sorely tested at times by difficult and 
highly abusive litigants. It would not be easy to remain cool, calm and 
collected when someone calls you a ‘cunt’ or throws a dead cat at you. On 
occasion it may well be that the judge has no real choice but to punish a 
person for contempt. Releasing laughing gas into a court is an amusing 
prank in the abstract, but it could be extremely dangerous. Given that 
judges are people, and experience mental health issues just like anyone else, 
it is necessary to consider whether judicial mental ill-health might 
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occasionally cause judges to commit a person for contempt when they should 
not have done so, resulting in injustice.501  
 A number of Australian judges have recognised that judges are not 
immune to stress. In a series of speeches, Justice Michael Kirby, then a 
recent appointee to the High Court, brought judicial stress ‘out of the 
closet’.502 Justice J B Thomas, from the Supreme Court of Queensland, gave 
a differing account of judicial stress in his 1997 paper titled ‘Get up off the 
ground’.503 And former Chief Justice Murray Gleeson once said that ‘judicial 
stress is something I give, not something I have’.504 However, the balance of 
extra-curial commentary since these papers were published indicate that 
Justice Kirby’s account of judicial stress — that it is real and many judges 
experience it — is more likely to be correct.505 
 Justice Kirby has pointed out that the judge’s life is a lonely one: ‘an 
element of distance ... is a usual part of the judicial life after our 
tradition’.506 Most judges sit alone, write their judgments alone, and only 
have contact with a small court staff.507 The connection between isolation at 
work and psychological ill-health is well established.508 Even in larger 
courts, where a number of judges sit together (as in state and territory 
courts of appeal and the High Court) and loneliness could be alleviated by 
																																								 																				
501  As in the cases O'Brien v Northern Territory of Australia [2003] NTCA 4 and Clampett 
v A-G (Cth) [2009] FCAFC 151, discussed below. See Richard Ackland, ‘High time to 
put an end to clubby protection’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 17 June 
2011<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/high-time-to-put-an-
end-to-clubby-protection-20110616-1g5sw.html>. 
502  Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Stress’ (1995) 13 Australian Bar Review 101; Michael Kirby, 
‘Judicial stress: an update’ (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 774; Michael Kirby, 
‘Judicial stress — a reply’ (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 791.  
503  James Burrows Thomas, ‘Get up off the ground: (a commentary on Justice Kirby’s 
“Judicial stress — an update”)’ (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 785.  
504  Joel Gibson, Deborah Snow and Elizabeth Sexton, ‘Jogging and yoga help curb 
anxiety’ Sydney Morning Herald, 18 October 2010.  
505  See, eg, Gerard Brennan, ‘Why Be a Judge?’ (Speech delivered at the New Zealand 
High Court and Court of Appeal Judges' Conference, April 1996, Dunedin). See 
Gibson, Snow and Sexton, above n 504 (referring to comments by Supreme Court 
Justice George Palmer).  
506  Michael Kirby, ‘Judicial Stress’, above n 502, 112.  
507  Brennan, above n 505.  
508  Dieter Zapf, Carmen Knorz and Matthias Kulla, ‘On the relationship between 
mobbing factors, and job content, social work environment, and health outcomes’ 
(1996) 5(2) European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology 1. 
	 150	
collegiality, tension within the court can make the work environment very 
unpleasant.509  
 In addition, judgments — the principal product of judicial work — are 
subjected to intense professional scrutiny and critique by lawyers, 
academics, the media510 and other judges (on appeal or in other cases).511 
The relentlessness and intensity of this professional scrutiny is very likely 
to cause a psychological reaction in some people. It is well documented that 
many lawyers experience depression, and there is no reason to think that 
judges, a subset of lawyers (and a subset under very particular pressures), 
are immune from depression or other mental health issues. 
 There is no systematic research that specifically demonstrates that 
Australian judges suffer mental health problems. There are some 
constitutional sensitivities attending research on this topic, which will be 
considered further below. However, it is fair to hypothesise that at least 
some Australian judges could be suffering from stress and mental health 
problems. This material, surveyed below, amply justifies the consideration 
of policy responses to judicial mental health needs.  
 Justice Michael Kirby noted in 1995 that the workload of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal trebled in volume over 30 years.512 That was 
20 years ago and it is difficult to imagine that things have gotten any better. 
In relation to magistrates, the Magistrates Research Project has analysed 
the work of Australian judicial officers since 2000.513 Kathy Mack, Sharon 
Roach Anleu and Anne Wallace recently reported that magistrates’ work is 
dominated by a high volume of unpredictable in-court activity and that 
magistrates frequently work additional hours in order to complete their 
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many and varied tasks.514 Three-quarters of magistrates regard the volume 
of cases as ‘unrelenting’.515 In a 2009 Submission to the Senate Judicial 
System Inquiry, Mack and Anleu said that the work of magistrates was 
characterised by ‘long lists each day, unrepresented litigants, disadvantaged 
litigants and significant time pressure’.516 It is also worth noting that 
members of the judiciary have limited capacity to delegate their workload.517  
 A very substantial literature exists indicating that overwork leads to 
stress and mental health problems across a range of occupations, including 
among white-collar workers and public servants.518 Indeed, the proposition 
that overwork can lead to stress and mental health problems is regarded as 
axiomatic in Australia.519 While it may be conceded that no data exist that 
specifically links judicial overwork in Australia with stress and mental 
health problems, there is foreign research that confirms that judicial 
overwork can lead to stress and mental health problems.520 In addition, 
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lawyers, as a profession, experience stress from overwork521 depression, and 
other varieties of mental ill-health.522 In a 1999 survey of Western 
Australian lawyers, it was reported that those who left the profession did so 
because they had worked under sweat-shop conditions, that their work 
spilled over into their personal lives, and that they had suffered the physical 
conditions associated with high stress, including ‘exhaustion, ulcers, broken 
sleep, crying, loss of confidence and self-worth, irritability and 
depression’.523 A 2007 survey of professionals that included lawyers found 
that they had higher levels of depression than the general population, and 
were more likely to use alcohol or drugs to cope with their depression.524 A 
2008 review of solicitors in private practice in Melbourne found that many 
were exhausted, and that they are ‘caught up in a system that appears 
remarkably hostile to employee choice and employee-oriented flexibility’.525 
A 2009 study of criminal lawyers found higher levels of vicarious trauma 
effects, including depression, stress and concern for their safety.526 The 
Brain and Mind Research Institute’s major 2009 study found that ‘members 
of the legal profession exhibit higher levels of psychological distress and 
depression than do community members of a similar age and sex’.527 If we 
can hypothesise with safety that judges — as former lawyers — share these 
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problems, then these studies give cause for concern for judicial mental 
health. 
 Now, it may be that some judges find that they are less busy on the 
bench than they were at the bar, and may therefore be less prone to stress 
and mental health problems than lawyers generally. However, it would be 
implausible to suggest that, as a group, judges, who are selected from a pool 
of people who have higher levels of psychological distress and depression 
than the general population,528 would be freed from those problems upon 
appointment to the bench. While there is a need for further systematic 
research to specifically demonstrate that Australian judges suffer stress and 
mental health problems, the reports of the hearings of Australian judicial 
disciplinary bodies demonstrate that at least some judges experience mental 
ill-health.  
 On 21 April 2011, the Conduct Division of the New South Wales 
Judicial Commission published a report of its Inquiry in relation to 
Magistrate Jennifer Betts. Betts had repeatedly lashed out at litigants in 
her courtroom and was the subject of a series of complaints over a six-year 
period from 2003 to 2009, including a complaint that her Honour had a 
tendency to abuse the power to commit for contempt.529 In her defence, Betts 
claimed she was stressed and depressed from overwork. There is no reason 
to doubt that this explanation was accurate.530 Ultimately an inquiry was 
conducted by Justice Carolyn Simpson, David Lloyd QC, and former police 
commissioner Ken Moroney on behalf of the Judicial Commission, and the 
New South Wales Parliament was invited to consider whether Magistrate 
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Betts should be removed from the bench.531 The Parliament decided not to 
do so.532  
 Magistrate Betts was not the only Australian judge whose mental 
health issues affected her and her court. Magistrate Brian Maloney recently 
escaped the censure of the New South Wales Parliament after admitting to 
bipolar disorder after receiving many complaints about his erratic judicial 
behaviour. One of the complaints levelled against Magistrate Maloney was 
by a pregnant doctor who said he made inappropriate comments about 
childbirth to her during a hearing (namely, that she would have difficulty 
giving birth to her baby given the size of her belly). Another complaint came 
from a female colleague to whom he showed a computer screensaver 
depicting three half-naked women. In a court hearing in 2009, Magistrate 
Maloney pronounced the name of an Arabic man in an ‘exaggerated 
accented fashion’, demeaning his heritage.533  
 Maloney said he accepted his diagnosis of bipolar disorder and was 
receiving treatment for it, including regularly seeing a psychiatrist and 
taking anti-depressive medication.534 He launched Supreme Court action to 
stop a Judicial Commission report from being tabled in Parliament on the 
grounds his mental health condition was under control.535 During the 
hearing to stop the report being tabled, counsel for the Judicial Commission 
had argued that the ‘mischief’ of Mr Maloney’s condition was that ‘it’s not 
possible to say when the condition will interfere with his judicial duty’.536 
Maloney admitted that he had engaged in inappropriate behaviour but 
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insisted that he was now medicated and consequently his work would not be 
affected.537 The Parliament exonerated him.538 
 The Betts and Maloney inquiries were unusual. Very few judges are 
subject to disciplinary proceedings.539 However, there are a legion of 
anecdotes that indicate that judicial stress and mental ill-health may be 
more widespread than is presently appreciated. An article in the American 
Bar Association Journal noted:540 
An irate Philadelphia judge throws a glass of water at a lawyer in his 
courtroom. A Walla Walla, Washington judge calls a defendant a ‘smart 
aleck’ and yells ‘shut up before you go to jail’. In St Tammany, Louisiana, a 
judge explains to a witness that she is on his turf and, in that venue at 
least, he is God. From the odd to the bizarre, these are only a few examples 
of ‘black robe fever’.  
 In one remarkable incident, a judge named Joseph Troisi stepped 
down from the bench, took off his judicial robe, confronted a defendant who 
had sworn at him, and then bit off a chunk of the defendant’s nose.541 A 
report prepared for the state Supreme Court said that Judge Troisi had a 
long-standing inability to control his temper on the bench and had lost his 
temper some 19 times in the two years preceding the nose-biting incident. 
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11 October 1997 <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/11/news/mn-41742>; Judge Bites 
off Defendant’s Nose because the Man Cussed at Him!Weekly World News, 19 May 
1998, 13.  
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Troisi was acquitted of federal charges after pleading no contest to a state 
charge of battery, served five days in jail, and resigned. 
 Sometimes a judge experiencing stress or mental ill-health may use 
contempt in the face of the court as a weapon.542 In O’Brien v Northern 
Territory of Australia,543 the Northern Territory Court of Appeal held that a 
magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction when he sent a young solicitor to the 
cells for contempt in the face of the court because the solicitor disagreed 
with the magistrate about whether he should enter a plea on behalf of his 
client. To set the scene, some further background is necessary. Peter 
O’Brien was representing an aboriginal young person for an offensive 
weapon charge (possession of a knife) in the Northern Territory children’s 
court. O’Brien had instructions from his client, which were confirmed by the 
client’s mother, that the police had agreed to the young person being 
diverted from court through a (new) diversionary policy of the Northern 
Territory government. It appears that the police who advised the young 
person and his mother that this would take place had not advised the police 
prosecutor of the children’s court, Sergeant Perry. When the matter was 
called on, Stipendiary Magistrate Richard Wallace invited O’Brien to enter 
a plea for his client. O’Brien started to explain to Wallace SM why his client 
should not be placed in a position where a plea was required, and why the 
police diversionary program had foundered in this instance. Wallace SM 
misconstrued O’Brien’s submission as resistance to his request for a plea. 
When O’Brien persisted with his submission — in a courteous tone and in 
circumstances where it was manifestly appropriate and in the best interests 
of his client to do so — Wallace SM directed a police auxiliary to remove 
O’Brien from the court to the cells. 
 A police auxiliary then took O’Brien to the cells, where he handed 
over his wallet, keys and mobile phone, and removed his belt and shoelaces. 
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In the meantime, up in the court, the magistrate, who had apparently cooled 
down, adjourned the offensive weapons charge. After a few more minutes he 
asked the police auxiliary to retrieve O’Brien. O’Brien was brought up from 
the cells and stood in the court, in front of the bar table, holding up his 
pants with one hand (his belt had been taken from him, which is standard 
practice to avoid people hanging themself in the cells) and in bare feet (his 
shoelaces had been taken away, so his shoes would not stay on). The 
magistrate then advised O’Brien that the charge had been adjourned, and 
asked him whether he was ready to proceed with other matters in the list, 
as if nothing had happened. O’Brien, who was plainly shaken from his 
experience of being sent to the cells, apologised to the magistrate. The 
magistrate indicated that he would make a decision about whether to 
charge O’Brien for contempt of court after lunch, but then, after a short 
adjournment, indicated he would not. 
 What could make a magistrate imprison a lawyer because of a 
disagreement over a submission? The Northern Territory Court of Appeal 
later found that O’Brien had been respectful at all times, and was only 
persisting with a submission that was in his client’s interests.  
 In a more recent case, a federal magistrate was held to have exceeded 
his jurisdiction when he committed a person in the public gallery for 
contempt. Leonard Clampett was in court to support Lesley Noah, who had 
brought previous unsuccessful proceedings and was liable for a debt of about 
$3,000 in legal costs. The Attorney-General brought enforcement 
proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court. Noah, who represented 
herself, was unsuccessful in her application to have the proceedings for debt 
rejected. This made her upset and, along with Clampett, she had the 
following exchange with the judge:544 
FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: Now, gentlemen, if you don’t be quiet, I’ll deal 
with you. Is that what you’d like? One further utterance from you, madam, 
and I will deal with you as well. MS NOAH: In which way? FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATE: Yes. Just watch your tongue or I will deal with you as well. 
																																								 																				
544  [2009] FCAFC 151 [7]. 
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MS NOAH: You already are dealing with me, sir, in not a very fair and 
equitable way. FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: Ms Noah, I’ll give you one further 
warning. MR CLAMPETT: Will that be civil contempt or criminal contempt? 
MS NOAH: Yes, that’s what I’d like to know. Would that be civil or 
criminal? FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: Okay, that’s it. What’s your name sir? 
MR CLAMPETT: It has got nothing to do with you, your Honour. FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATE: What is your name? MR CLAMPETT: I’m [in] the public 
gallery. FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: Would you get the — just get the 
Federal Police along here, thank you, Mr Bailiff. MR CLAMPETT: They 
know who I am. FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: I’m not interest[ed] in — I want 
to know your name, please. MR CLAMPETT: Leonard William Clampett. 
You know very well who I am. FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: I have no idea. 
MR CLAMPETT: That’s the reason why you’ve got a kangaroo on the wall 
behind you. It’s called the Kangaroo Court. MS NOAH: Yes. MR 
CLAMPETT: Both you and Mr Henry are paid by the Commonwealth 
Government. MS NOAH: To represent the people, not protect your public 
[sector] colleagues, conspire with them, to pervert the course of justice. 
FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: Anything further you want to add? MS NOAH: 
Quite a lot actually, I’d like to appeal this and I don’t recognise [indistinct] 
— FEDERAL MAGISTRATE: Well, you’ll get your chance to appeal but 
after I’ve dealt with you for contempt. MS NOAH: I don’t like — FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATE: Just adjourn the Court for the time being, thanks. MS 
NOAH: I want to challenge the jurisdiction of this whole Court actually. 
 The federal magistrate charged Mr Clampett with contempt in the 
face of the court for his remarks, found him guilty, and ordered him to spend 
28 days in prison with hard labour.545 Clampett appealed successfully to the 
Full Federal Court. The Court concluded that there were several 
unsatisfactory features of Clampett’s case and that there had been a 
substantial miscarriage of justice. Of relevance to the issue of tension 
between the judicial officer and the litigant was the Federal Magistrate’s 
decision to order that Clampett remain handcuffed while seeking to make 
his defence in circumstances where there was no reason to think that he 
was violent.546  
 The cases of O’Brien, Clampett and Coleiro suggest that the power to 
punish for contempt in the face of the court can lend itself to abuse when 
emotions in the courtroom boil over. It has been noted earlier in this thesis 
that the magistrate who heard the Coleiro matter was also experiencing 
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mental ill-health, and it may have been that the magistrate’s own mental 
health condition caused him to respond in the way that he did. These case 
studies raise the important question of whether mental health supports 
might need to be made available to judges and court staff. As has been 
stated previously, a case of contempt in the face of the court ultimately 
comes down to the activity of two people: the person who is alleged to have 
committed the offence, and the judge who determines whether they are 
guilty. It is therefore necessary to pay attention to the role and behaviour of 
the judge in contempt cases in the search for system-wide improvements.  
 When it comes to judges, it may be necessary to establish formal 
mental health support systems for judges and magistrates. A cultural shift 
is also necessary to overcome barriers to seeking help. Shortly after the 
Betts and Maloney affairs, the Sydney Morning Herald conducted some 
investigative reporting about how judges and courts manage mental health 
issues. The comments of journalists Joel Gibson, Deborah Snow and 
Elizabeth Sexton are illuminating and worthy of quotation at length:547 
For better or worse they [the courts] have largely resisted the 
encroachments of human resources managers and taken responsibility for 
pastoral care on themselves. 
 ‘I don't see why judges would be any different statistically to the 
general community and that would include relatively manageable ailments 
such as anxiety and depression,’ Judge Richard Cogswell says. To keep 
stress at bay he practises Christian meditation for half an hour twice daily. 
‘I do it on planes, trains, in cars,’ he says. 
 Judge Helen Murrell practises yoga. Justice Ruth McColl is a keen 
cyclist. Others report jogging, swimming or regular gym visits. Justice Peter 
Young finds escape in his model bus collection. He grew up near a bus-stop 
and says ‘I've always been interested in timetables and buses’. 
 The Chief Magistrate and his deputies make a point of speaking one-
on-one to each of their flock at least once a year. ‘The health of members of 
this court is paramount,’ says Judge Graeme Henson. ‘I chant it almost like 
a mantra to them, health first, family first, work second.’ 
 In the District Court, a support committee of four senior judges was 
established in 2005 to assist with issues such as health, behaviour in court 
and other ‘difficulties’, says Judge Dianne Truss, one of its members. ‘It just 
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works very informally. If it were a formal process I think the judges would 
be [reluctant].’ 
 All judicial officers have annual health checks and access to a free 
counselling service, although the magistrate Daphne Kok suspects lawyers 
‘are averse to accepting free government-sponsored help because they do not 
believe it will necessarily remain confidential’. 
 In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Jim Spigelman has baulked at 
forcing a formal monitoring system on his colleagues. ‘It’s just not that kind 
of a problem,’ he says, preferring to rely on the collegiality of the court as a 
support system. 
 After Justice Anthony Whealy left his liquor licensing practice 10 
years ago, he was struck by the sight of a retiring judge who ‘just left the 
building by himself — and nobody said anything to him’. 
 Whealy has since emerged as an unofficial social secretary, 
organising dinners for retirees and new arrivals, annual concerts and 
regular Friday evening drinks from his impressive cellar. 
 This article — while not reporting systematic research — is 
nevertheless illuminating. It demonstrates, at least anecdotally, that judges 
see stigma in admitting to mental health problems. It also indicates that 
judges, who are not experts in the clinical management of mental health, 
have hitherto only developed informal policies relating to the management 
of their own mental health. It demonstrates that the former Chief Justice 
(though not the Chief Magistrate) did not see mental ill-health as a problem 
among judges. And it demonstrates that judges are inclined to self-diagnose 
and then resort to practices that may well reduce stress (such as ‘Christian 
meditation’ or ‘yoga’), but will likely prove ineffective in countering mental 
illness. In fact, some responses, such as drinking on Friday nights, may well 
be the last thing that a depressed person really needs, as alcohol is a 
depressant. It is surprising how little these judges seem to understand 
about mental health conditions such as depression, and the availability of 
proven remedies, such as medication and/or cognitive behavioural therapy. 
 It is necessary to acknowledge that there are many barriers to 
treatment solutions for judges and magistrates who are significantly 
stressed or who suffer mental ill-health. First, if judges admit that they are 
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not coping well or are suffering mental ill-health,548 then they risk 
undermining their own authority. Second, there is a significant stigma 
associated with seeking out psychological or psychiatric assistance.549 
People who work in intensive professional environments act out ‘scripts’ 
that disable them from seeking help.550 As Jennifer Jolly-Ryan has 
observed:551 
Ironically, the very people who are in the best position to increase the 
number of lawyers who intimately understand the discrimination and 
health care laws in our society impose some of the highest hurdles to 
employment and educational opportunities. Lawyers stigmatize and often 
decline to hire other lawyers unless they have a clean mental health history 
— free of disabilities, disorders, and illnesses.  
 Third, judges today are more accountable than ever before, and if 
they admit to having mental health problems, this could cause them to be 
counselled and affect their chances for promotion.552 While judges who 
admit they have mental health issues may experience catharsis in doing so, 
they may well damage their career. Professor Ian Freckelton has also noted 
that disciplinary proceedings can bring on psychological problems. 
Professionals who are the subject of disciplinary proceedings can be deeply 
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traumatised by the experience, which may result in the onset of depression 
and other mental health problems.553  
 Finally, in extreme cases, if a judge admits to mental health 
problems, this could bolster the case for their dismissal. The cases of 
Magistrate Betts and Magistrate Maloney were previously noted. In the 
case of Maloney, counsel for the Judicial Commission explicitly identified 
Maloney’s mental health problems as a justification for his dismissal. This 
does not encourage reporting by judges. 
 It may also be noted that in some jurisdictions, the threshold test for 
removal of a magistrate is quite low. Magistrates in the ACT, New South 
Wales, Tasmania and Victoria enjoy the same protections against removal 
as judges in the superiors courts in those jurisdictions, but in Western 
Australia the Attorney-General can initiate proceedings to determine a 
magistrate’s physical or mental unfitness for office; and in Queensland and 
South Australia, magistrates can be removed on the (potentially) wider 
ground of ‘proper cause’. Magistrates in the Northern Territory have the 
least protection and can be removed by the Administrator on the grounds of 
incompetence, incapacity, failure to comply with a direction of the Chief 
Magistrate, or if the magistrate is ‘unsuited to the performance of his 
duties’.554 This category is arguably sufficiently wide to encompass the 
indiscretions of Magistrates Betts and Maloney, and, if applied, might have 
resulted in their removal from office.555  
 Federal guarantees of judicial tenure are not necessarily stronger. 
While the proceedings contemplated by s 72 of the Constitution involve a 
joint parliamentary sitting (which has never been required), the criterion of 
‘proved misbehaviour or incapacity’ has never been applied. As the Senate 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee noted, there ‘is no settled 
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process for the application of section 72’.556 Duncan Kerr SC, a former 
Minister for Justice and now President of the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal, has observed that ‘any ad hoc procedure put in place after a 
specific allegation of judicial misconduct or incapacity has been brought to 
light can, and almost certainly will, be criticised as lacking at least some of 
the institutional attributes appropriate for a fair hearing and respect for the 
rule of law’.557 A submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee in 2009 concluded:558  
At present it appears there are only two alternatives when a member of the 
federal judiciary becomes incapacitated by mental illness. There is the 
constitutional response — removal by both houses — which is likely to 
encompass some kind of ad hoc investigatory body attended by many of the 
doubts which Mr Kerr has highlighted. Or there is the possibility of an 
informal approach made by the individual’s colleagues.  
 There is a wide gap between these alternatives. And yet, as Norm 
Kelk and his colleagues from the Brain and Mind Research Institute have 
said, ‘mental health problems and psychological distress must be seen as 
legitimate health problems for which students and legal professionals can 
seek special consideration and support’.559 While there may well be cases 
where a judge who is seriously ill will satisfy the constitutional criteria for 
removal, it is more likely that there would be cases where a judge would 
simply need support and treatment. The Parliament of New South Wales 
reached this conclusion in the cases of Magistrate Betts and Magistrate 
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Maloney. And as Luke Foley MP remarked during the parliamentary 
hearing into Magistrate Maloney’s fitness for office:560 
I do believe that it is possible for people who suffer from depression when 
treated well, and when found the right medication, for them to lead 
completely fulfilling and productive lives, including productive working 
lives. 
 For many years, Justice Thomas’s robust response to Justice Kirby’s 
admission of judicial stress — ‘Get up off the ground!’ — was seen as 
adequate.561 There is now too much material pointing to a real problem in 
this area, and these types of problems cannot be solved without expert 
services and help. Judges are not clinical psychologists or occupational 
health and safety experts. They rely on expert evidence in determining 
matters, and there is no reason why they should not adopt the same 
approach in tackling the problem of stress and mental ill-health among 
their own vocational community. A significant literature in the field of 
occupational stress indicates that appropriate, structured supports in the 
workplace can minimise stress and the development of mental health 
problems among workers.562 Judges should adopt approaches to the 
management of mental health issues that are informed by psychological 
knowledge. Such measures will better assist them to remain calm and 
impartial in their dealings with difficult court-users. 
 The issue of judicial overwork has been touched on above. Judicial 
overwork is an institutional concern largely out of the hands of judges 
themselves. The Magistrates Research Project has demonstrated that 
magistrates are overworked. Overwork can lead to stress and mental health 
problems. Steps should be taken to address this, perhaps by appointing 
more judges, through the provision of court-annexed meditation, and the 
like. While there is no systematic research that specifically demonstrates 
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that Australian judges suffer stress and mental health problems, sufficient 
material nevertheless exists to indicate that the courts should take steps to 
reduce the risk that judges will become stressed or develop mental health 
problems as a consequence of overwork. The posture of denial adopted by 
Chief Justice Gleeson, Chief Justice Spigelman and Justice Thomas needs to 
be replaced with a posture of acceptance that a problem at least may exist. 
Assisting judges who are stressed or who suffer from mental ill-health is a 
task for courts; it is not just a problem for judges.563 Courts need to take on 
the mental well-being of their judges as a central institutional concern. 
Courts should focus on the risk factors for psychological distress in the 
courts. Stress and mental illness must be seen as legitimate health 
problems for which judges can seek special consideration and support.  
 In this regard, it would be useful if the Judicial Research Project 
conducted by Mack, Anleu and Wallace were expanded to (sensitively) 
generate intelligence about judicial mental health. Alternatively, a 
confidential study could be commissioned by the courts themselves.  
 Acknowledging the constitutional sensitivities, disclosure by judges of 
issues relating to mental health needs to be handled in a discreet and 
utterly confidential way. The state and territory legislation governing the 
tenure of magistrates (reviewed earlier in this chapter) should be revised to 
develop a more nuanced approach to the issue of judicial incapacity that 
acknowledges that people can live with mental health problems and still 
function at a high level in their professional lives, with the right supports in 
place.  
 Judges and magistrates have difficult jobs to do, and under stressful 
circumstances. They are often overworked and, given their work 
environment, they may themselves be experiencing mental ill-health. To 
add to the mix, the number of people with mental health issues appearing in 
courts has risen since deinstitutionalisation, and the number of people self-
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representing has also increased. Judges and magistrates are forced to 
manage people who are experiencing the stress of the court case and, as 
illustrated in the case studies in this thesis, some of these people also have 
mental health issues.  
 For their part, judges ought not be isolated, but rather assisted. This 
will ensure that they are better placed to deal with litigants with mental ill-
heath in ways that are more appropriate than punishing for contempt in the 
face of the court. We should aim to create court environments that allow our 
judges with mental ill-health to, as Luke Foley put it, ‘lead completely 
fulfilling and productive lives, including productive working lives’.564  
 A holistic response to dealing with litigants experiencing mental ill-
health requires steps to be taken to ensure that judges are able to respond 
calmly and rationally. Court administrators need to take on the mental 
well-being of all participants as a central institutional concern. This should 
not be left to judges who may themselves have developed dysfunctional 
coping mechanisms. Court Registrars would be better placed to organise 
expert supports and programs to engender cultural change. It is 
recommended that steps be taken to promote the mental health and 
resilience of all court staff, including judges and magistrates. 
 The Judicial College of Victoria has been recognised as a world leader 
among judicial educators in developing programs and resources to promote 
judicial well-being.565 The College primarily deals with mental health and 
well-being through its judicial education programs. Four years ago it ran a 
judicial-stress program that had unexpectedly high attendance. In 2013, a 
program for long-serving judicial officers identified the impact of 
accumulated stress, and vicarious trauma was further identified as an issue 
as part of the sexual assault reforms of the previous government. The 
College has continued its work over the past two years, by delivering 
programs on resilience, trauma and the judicial role, and another on the 
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impact of stress on cognitive performance and decision-making.566 In April 
2014 the College ran a program examining ‘the nature, risk and signs of 
maladaptive responses to stressful and traumatic events’. The session 
encouraged judicial officers to think about ‘prevention and management 
techniques that promote resilience in the judicial role and environment’.567 
These programs should be independently evaluated and, if successful, they 
should be made available across the country. 
 It may be that more than education is needed. Properly trained 
psychologists should be available to the courts, with strict confidentiality 
obligations. A court psychologist could develop referral networks for people 
who seek their assistance. If the psychologist had good experience and 
forensic skills, then she or he could also assist the court with reports about 
people who commit contempt in the face of the court, opening the door to 
allied services. 
 It would be sensible to provide a basic level of service at the court 
precinct, with additional services being made available on an ‘as-needs’ 
basis. A court psychologist could be appointed with a role of assisting 
litigants and judges, and be given access to referral networks to deal with 
volume and complex cases.  
 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
In Chapter One, it was demonstrated that Australia’s relatively complicated 
federally organised justice system has produced diverse rules and 
approaches. In some jurisdictions the rules governing contempt in the face 
of the court have scarcely changed in a century. In the majority of 
jurisdictions, only the most rudimentary common-law safeguards protect 
contemnors, leaving litigants with mental health issues particularly 
vulnerable. Although the law in this area has been the subject of two long 
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and searching reviews by the ALRC and the WALRC, respectively, the 
recommendations of those Commissions have not been implemented, except 
in the Family Court. Perhaps the United Kingdom’s Law Commission final 
report into contempt in the face of the court, which is due for release in late 
2015, may finally provide a sufficient motivation for much needed reform of 
Australian law. 
 Chapter Two identified the human rights principles that are relevant 
in the context of contempt in the face of the court, and considered whether 
Australian law and practice were in compliance. It was demonstrated that, 
according to what is demanded by the principles, Australian law falls well 
short of what is required to ensure justice for those with mental health 
issues coming before the courts. In extreme cases, vexatious litigant 
declarations may be warranted, but the human right of access to justice and 
the human right to the highest attainable standard of mental health 
requires that a more nuanced set of responses are employed to manage 
litigants who may be suffering mental ill-health.  
 Chapter Three considered a number of detailed case studies against 
the backdrop provided by the human rights principles discussed in Chapter 
Two. People with mental health issues were denied procedural fairness in a 
variety of ways, such as being deprived of the opportunity to plead to a 
specified charge, or of an opportunity to raise fitness to plead as a distinct 
issue. In all of the trials where summary procedure was adopted, judges 
failed to give proper consideration to the mental health issues of the accused 
and justice was only achieved on appeal. All of the case studies raised the 
question of whether substantial resources could have been saved if 
appropriate diversions to mental health services were in place. Quite apart 
from anything else, early diversion might have prevented the deteriorating 
mental health of the accused and more swiftly provided a pathway to 
recovery.  
 The majority of Australian jurisdictions make no special provision to 
ensure that a person accused of contempt in the face of the court has an 
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opportunity to have his or her mental state taken into account in 
determinations of culpability. It was submitted that the substantive law 
governing contempt in the face of the court should be reformed to 
incorporate a wilfulness requirement. If a contempt offence does not require 
wilfulness, an important opportunity for a person with mental health issues 
to excuse his or her behaviour is lost. At common law and under many 
statutes, no wilfulness is required to be established prior to a conviction for 
contempt in the face of the court. While many contemporary statutory 
offences remove this traditional requirement of a crime, it is particularly 
important for a person with mental health issues, as the presence of such a 
requirement can at least yield an opportunity to ventilate issues relating to 
mental functioning, even where such evidence of mental illness might not 
ultimately prove exculpatory.  
 The approach to wilfulness favoured by the ALRC seems sound — 
that is to require that the substantial disruption caused to the court must 
have been committed wilfully. Although wilfulness sets a low level of 
wilfulness, and one that is often easily established, it still has the potential 
for triggering an inquiry into the mental health of the accused. Such an 
approach would not only accord with traditional principles of criminal 
responsibility, it would also enable the injection of traditional common-law 
procedural safeguards into the process, helping to ensure that the 
defendants in such cases receive a fair trial.  
 Procedural reforms are also required. Standard procedure for the trial 
of criminal offences should be adopted for a charge of contempt, and 
recourse to truly summary procedure should be abandoned or at least 
reserved for rare cases. Summary procedure has traditionally been justified 
on the basis that contempt in the face of the court requires immediate 
discipline and the avoidance of the delay associated with an adjournment 
and a trial, but not all situations require immediate action. There will 
continue to be rare instances where a judge feels compelled to act swiftly — 
for example, to protect people in the court from physical harm — and 
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recourse to truly summary prosecution could perhaps be retained for these 
occasions. But judges should then be required to state his or her reasons for 
departing from normal procedures for the trial of a criminal offence. 
Limiting recourse to summary procedure is very important, as people with 
mental health issues can be at greater risk in circumstances where 
summary procedure has been adopted. There is a very real risk that a 
litigant’s mental ill-health might go undetected due to the fact that 
summary procedure can be particularly swift. Not only can the use of 
summary procedure in these circumstances be an affront to human rights, 
the power to punish for contempt can be used as an instrument of 
oppression.  This was particularly apparent in the Coleiro case study set out 
in Chapter Three.  The case studies reviewed in this thesis reinforce the 
need for the implementation of the human rights principle that a criminal 
tribunal should be free from bias when it determines whether a person has 
committed contempt in the face of the court.  Referring the matter to 
another judge helps guarantee a hearing free from bias, and helps ensure 
that if a judge is experiencing mental health issues that these do not affect 
his or her handling of a case. 
 The majority of Australian jurisdictions also make no provision to 
ensure that a person accused of contempt in the face of the court has an 
opportunity to have their mental state taken into account in mitigation of 
penalty. Only one Australian jurisdiction, Queensland, makes explicit 
provision for courts to have regard to the mental health of the convicted 
contemnor in sentencing. The law should be reformed in each jurisdiction to 
ensure that the mental health of the contemnor is taken into account in 
sentencing. The decision of the majority of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal in Wilson v Prothonotary reflected a nuanced understanding of the 
psychological condition of the contemnor, and was informed by expert 
evidence.568 Given the prevalence of mental ill-health in the general 
community, and among court-users specifically, it is incumbent upon judges 
																																								 																				
568  [2000] NSWCA 23. 
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to develop and maintain a high degree of mental health literacy, and have 
this inform their decision-making in every instance. 
 In summary, the law governing contempt in the face of the court 
should be reformed to ensure that:  
• the offence of contempt in the face of the court require mens rea, 
such as wilfulness; 
• the charge of contempt is specified and a written charge 
formulated; 
• the accused is required to plead to the charge (with an associated 
opportunity to argue that they are unfit to plead where 
relevant); 
• the accused is advised of his or her right to an adjournment; 
• the accused has the right to seek legal representation; 
• the accused is afforded time and facilities to prepare his or her 
defence;  
• the matter is heard by a judge other than the one who witnessed 
the contempt; and 
• there is an opportunity for evidence relating to the mental 
health of the accused to be led to possibly deny culpability or 
mitigate penalty.  
 To comply with human rights principles and common-law principles 
of fairness, Australian law — both substantive and procedural — should be 
reformulated in every jurisdiction to match the ALRC recommendations 
reflected in the Family Court provisions.  These reforms would provide an 
antidote for many of the injustices that have characterised the law in this 
field.  The tension between the need to control order in the courtroom and 
principles of procedural fairness and human rights should be recalibrated in 
favour of the latter principles.  The ALRC recommendations adopted in the 
Family Court reflect these principles.  As demonstrated in this thesis, 
particularly in Chapter Two, they are consistent with the relevant human 
rights principles.  
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 In addition, in this final chapter, it has been submitted that mental 
health policies and programs should operate in all courts to assist judicial 
officers when court-users present with difficult behaviours, possibly 
attributable to mental ill-health. This should include regular training 
programs to promote a high level of mental health literacy among judicial 
officers so that they can detect possible mental ill-health among court-users. 
Judges and magistrates should be able to call on mental health clinicians to 
provide mental health assessments in a timely fashion to assist the court in 
decision-making about appropriate disposal. It has also been submitted that 
formal supports need to be put in place to assist judges experiencing mental 
health challenges themselves, to assist them to remain dispassionate in 
their dealings with difficult court-users. The right to health soundly 
reinforces the need for such reforms.  
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